Amanda Pinto

Justice for Children and Youth (JFCY) brought a motion for leave to intervene in the Law Society of Ontario's application for judicial review of a decision finding the respondent to be of good character but imposing a condition that he not meet alone with minor children.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing JFCY lacked a unique perspective, would augment the record, and was in a conflict of interest.

The court granted JFCY leave to intervene on the issues of whether the condition is consistent with Charter values or international law, and whether the Law Society's duty to regulate in the public interest includes protecting children.

The court found no conflict of interest and restricted JFCY from augmenting the evidentiary record or taking a position on the disposition.

The responding party sought judicial review of a professional discipline appeal division decision finding the moving party to be of good character despite past sexual misconduct.

The moving party brought a motion for a declaration that the tribunal's anonymization order applied to the court proceedings, or alternatively, for a new anonymization order.

The court held that the tribunal's order did not apply and a separate court order was required.

Applying the test for exceptions to the open court principle, the court granted a temporary anonymization order protecting the identities of the moving party, his former spouse, and their children until the end of the judicial review hearing, finding that the risk of psychological harm to the children outweighed the temporary impact on the open court principle.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion for a stay of a Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division decision finding the respondent to be of good character and directing that he be licensed to practise law.

The Law Society argued that licensing the respondent before its judicial review application was heard would irreparably harm the public interest, given his past sexual misconduct.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding that the Law Society raised a serious issue, that the public interest would be irreparably harmed if an applicant who did not meet the good character requirement was licensed, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment order that quashed a by-law directing the deduction of $5,434.21 from the respondent former councillor's severance pay.

The municipality argued the motion judge failed to consider its limitation period defence and erred in finding bad faith.

The Divisional Court held that the amended statement of claim did not raise a new cause of action, meaning the claim was not statute-barred.

The court upheld the finding of bad faith, noting the by-law was a 'one-shot reimbursement device' enacted without notice.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash only the specific section of the by-law directed at the respondent, rather than the entire by-law.