A. Diniz

The court sentenced the offender after convictions arising from prolonged sexual abuse of a child by a stepfather in a position of trust.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court held the sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching counts flowed from the same delict, matter or cause, and entered a conviction only on sexual interference because it more precisely captured the child-specific nature of the offence.

The court treated the victim's young age, the prolonged duration of abuse, the abuse of trust, anal intercourse, and the impact on the victim as major aggravating factors, while recognizing the offender's lack of prior record and positive community background as mitigating.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, the court imposed an eight-year penitentiary sentence together with DNA, SOIRA, firearms prohibition, and non-communication orders.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a child over a prolonged period beginning when the complainant was approximately five years old and continuing into adolescence.

The Crown’s case relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony describing repeated sexual acts occurring in the family home and later in the accused’s apartment.

The accused denied the allegations and called several witnesses to challenge the plausibility of the events and his opportunity to commit the offences.

Applying the framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court rejected the accused’s evidence as inconsistent and implausible, found the complainant credible despite minor inconsistencies, and concluded the evidence established the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of charges alleging sexual offences against a child on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court assessed total Crown and institutional delay at approximately 17 months within an overall period of about 29 months and 21 days from charge to trial.

The court attributed a significant portion of the delay to the complainant's hospitalization and found only limited prejudice arising from stigma, legal expense, and restrictive bail terms.

Balancing the accused's interests against the strong societal interest in trying serious sexual offence allegations on their merits, the court held the delay was not unreasonable.