K. Dickson

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice due to trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The trial, arising from a 2012 motor vehicle accident, had been adjourned multiple times and was scheduled for February 2021 in London, Ontario.

Given the suspension of civil jury trials, the elderly plaintiff's failing health, and the financial hardship of the co-plaintiff, the court found that further delay would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering the trial to proceed judge-alone unless jury trials resumed by the trial date.

Following a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought damages for various physical and psychological injuries.

A jury awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages and dismissed her other claims.

The defendants subsequently brought a threshold motion under section 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court held that the jury's verdict should be strongly considered when deciding a threshold motion.

Finding that the plaintiff's current conditions were not caused by the accident and agreeing with the jury's implicit finding of only minor and transitory injuries, the court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the action.

Following a jury verdict awarding modest damages in a motor vehicle accident action, the defendant brought a post-verdict threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff’s claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court applied the three-part test from Meyer v. Bright to determine whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

Despite the minor impact of the final collision and the jury’s minimal damages award, the court found credible medical and vocational evidence that the accident exacerbated existing conditions, resulting in chronic pain syndrome and functional incapacity preventing gainful employment.

The court held that the plaintiff met the statutory threshold and the defendant remained liable for non‑pecuniary damages.

The court sentenced an offender for firearm and drug trafficking offences arising from the operation of a large marihuana processing and distribution enterprise.

The offender possessed a handgun with accessible ammunition in his bedroom at the location used for drug processing and packaging.

The court held the firearm functioned as a tool of the drug trade and imposed consecutive sentences for the drug trafficking and firearm offences, rejecting the joint submission for a fully concurrent global sentence.

The offender’s request for additional credit based on alleged stringent bail conditions was denied.

The court granted a DNA order and ordered forfeiture of large sums of cash and 70% of the offender’s residence as offence‑related property and proceeds of crime.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in the period following the initial trial date.

The court examined the approximately eighteen‑month period between the Charter exclusion ruling and the eventual sentencing and forfeiture proceedings.

Applying the factors from Supreme Court jurisprudence on delay, the court found the delay largely attributable to inherent case requirements, judicial deliberation time, scheduling conflicts, and the availability of counsel and court resources.

The applicant had not previously raised concerns about delay and demonstrated minimal prejudice from bail conditions or scheduling impacts.

The court concluded that the delay did not violate the applicant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.