J. Shime

The applicant, an Indigenous male charged with first-degree murder, sought to challenge potential jurors for cause based on race and pre-trial publicity.

The Crown consented to the challenge based on race but opposed the challenge based on pre-trial publicity.

The court dismissed the application regarding pre-trial publicity, finding the media reporting was minimal and fair, and did not create a realistic potential for partiality.

The court also rejected the applicant's request to use multiple-choice answers for the race-based challenge questions, opting instead for standard yes/no questions to protect juror privacy and avoid vague responses.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.