Jennifer Lauren McCulloch Gamble

The appellant mother brought a motion to stay a Crown wardship order without access pending appeal.

The underlying order granted summary judgment to the child protection society and placed the child in Crown wardship for purposes of adoption.

The court applied a two‑part test requiring an arguable issue on appeal and a determination of the child’s best interests under s. 69(4) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The judge found no arguable merit in the proposed appeal grounds and concluded that reinstating access would not be in the child’s best interests given the child’s stability with foster parents and evidence of anxiety related to access.

The motion for a stay and interim access pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection order granting summary judgment to the child protection society and making the child a Crown ward for adoption.

The appeal alleged that the lower court shifted the burden of proof, improperly relied on hearsay evidence contained in the society’s affidavits, and that fresh evidence regarding counselling participation should be considered.

The appellate court held that the motion judge correctly applied Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, including the allocation of the legal burden on the moving party and the evidentiary burden on the responding party.

After reviewing the transcripts, the court found no indication that the motion judge relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence.

The court therefore dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the Crown wardship order.

The accused was charged with trafficking in Diazepam contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown relied on the testimony of a single witness who alleged that the accused gave her pills and instructed her to crush and consume them.

The court found significant concerns with the witness’s credibility and reliability, including admitted intoxication, vague memory, and implausible aspects of the narrative.

In the absence of corroborating evidence such as additional witnesses or a certificate of analysis, the court held that the Crown failed to prove the essential elements of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.