Jeff Saikaley

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

The parties had a brief relationship, after which the defendant made public allegations in the gaming community and on social media that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted her and was a sexual predator.

The court found that while the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff's defamation claim had substantial merit and there were grounds to defeat the defence of justification.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions.

The motion was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

The plaintiff estate sought leave to amend its statement of claim mid-trial in a long-running family business dispute involving an oppression remedy claim.

The court granted leave for some amendments, finding they merely provided further particulars of the originally pleaded misappropriation of funds (e.g., the Stapledon loan allegations and the Stoke Lacey sale).

However, the court refused leave for other amendments (e.g., failure to pay property taxes and failure to complete audited financial statements), finding they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action that would cause actual and presumed non-compensable prejudice to the incapacitated defendant due to inordinate delay.

The court also refused amendments that amounted to a collateral attack on findings made in the first part of the bifurcated trial.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The action arose from a Facebook post in which the defendant alleged the plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her during their marriage.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff demonstrated that his claim had substantial merit and that the defendant's defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege could realistically fail.

The court concluded that the severe harm to the plaintiff's career and reputation outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion was dismissed, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the plaintiff was not a powerful entity using litigation to intimidate a vulnerable opponent and that the claim had substantial merit.

Applying a modest discount for the defendants' delay in bringing the motion, the court awarded the defendants $75,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff, Tarik Bouragba, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim and lift a stay of proceedings previously ordered.

The defendants opposed the motion and brought cross-motions to prohibit the plaintiff's father, a non-lawyer, from representing him, and to stay the proceeding due to unpaid costs orders.

The court granted the cross-motion prohibiting the father from acting as legal representative.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings, finding the proposed amendments lacked material facts, were incomprehensible, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court ordered that all outstanding costs awards must be paid before the plaintiffs can bring any further motions.

In the context of ongoing oppression remedy actions, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their pleadings on the eve of the continuation of the trial, necessitating an adjournment.

The plaintiffs subsequently sought an adjournment of their own motions to amend in order to cross-examine a deponent.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for the trial preparation thrown away and the motions, payable as a condition precedent to the plaintiffs proceeding with their motions.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct in the litigation, including late decision-making and failing to properly plead discoverability, unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings and warranted sanction.

The court awarded the defendants $37,450 in substantial indemnity costs, payable by the plaintiffs as a condition precedent to proceeding with their motions to amend.

The applicant appealed three arbitral awards dismissing its claims against the respondent municipality for remediation costs, additional construction costs, and interest related to a waterfront development project.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the arbitrator made reversible errors of law and breached procedural fairness in all three awards by relying on legal theories and defences—such as an implied 'time is of the essence' term, implied fiduciary-like duties for a construction manager, and equitable estoppel—that were never pleaded or argued by the parties.

The court held that these errors were not trivial and tainted the outcomes, directing the parties to schedule a case management conference to determine the appropriate remedy.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation and unjust enrichment action after a five-day trial, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offers and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court found that the defendant's offers did not trigger substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49 and the plaintiffs' conduct did not warrant a punitive costs award.

The court awarded the defendant costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $59,940.78 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

A motion was brought to appoint the plaintiff's wife as his litigation guardian after he suffered a stroke and brain hemorrhage.

The court adjourned the motion, finding that the medical evidence of incapacity was insufficient because it relied on hearsay rather than a direct affidavit from the capacity assessor.

Furthermore, the court noted that the proposed litigation guardian was a co-defendant in the proceedings and may have an adverse interest, contrary to the requirement that a litigation guardian be indifferent to the outcome.

At a trial management conference for two related actions, the court addressed delays in obtaining a joint expert report on corporate finances and concerns regarding a party's capacity to testify following a stroke.

On consent, the court ordered peremptory deadlines for the production of financial documents to the expert and for the completion of the expert's report.

The court also ordered, on consent, that the party who suffered a stroke undergo an assessment to determine whether he is a person under a disability requiring a litigation guardian under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

At a trial management conference for two related actions, the court addressed delays in obtaining a joint expert report on corporate finances and concerns regarding a party's capacity to testify following a stroke.

On consent, the court ordered peremptory deadlines for the production of financial documents to the expert and for the completion of the expert's report.

The court also ordered, on consent, that the party who suffered a stroke undergo an assessment to determine whether he is a person under a disability requiring a litigation guardian under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants in two separate defamation actions brought a motion to consolidate the actions and to compel the plaintiffs to serve a further and better affidavit of documents.

The actions arose from a report published by the defendants alleging the plaintiffs had ties to terrorist organizations.

The court declined to consolidate the actions into one, noting they were already set for trial, but ordered that they be heard together or consecutively.

The court also ordered the plaintiffs to produce certain requested documents relevant to the defence of justification, while denying the request for other documents deemed irrelevant or part of a fishing expedition.

Following a decision on share ownership, the court held a trial management conference to determine next steps in the consolidated actions, which include an oppression remedy claim.

The court directed the parties to consider whether a stay motion will be brought pending an appeal of the initial decision, how to efficiently gather and present extensive financial evidence, and the potential for a mid-trial settlement conference.

The conference was adjourned to allow counsel to obtain instructions.

Following a decision on share ownership, the court held a trial management conference to determine next steps in the consolidated actions, which include an oppression remedy claim.

The court directed the parties to consider whether a stay motion will be brought pending an appeal of the initial decision, how to efficiently gather and present extensive financial evidence, and the potential for a mid-trial settlement conference.

The conference was adjourned to allow counsel to obtain instructions.

Following dismissal of preliminary motions seeking leave to amend pleadings and adjourn trial, the court was required to fix the quantum of costs previously awarded on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving parties argued that costs should instead be assessed on a partial indemnity basis and that costs for an earlier adjournment appearance before another judge should be included.

The court held that the scale of costs could not be reconsidered absent an appeal and that costs related to the earlier appearance remained to be determined later.

The court fixed substantial indemnity costs payable to the responding parties for preparation and attendance on the motions.

Payment was ordered within 30 days pursuant to rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants in a defamation action brought under the simplified procedure moved for an order extending the time for oral examination for discovery from two hours to 21 hours, and for a further and better affidavit of documents.

The court partially granted the request for further documentary production, ordering the plaintiff to produce documents relating to its relationship with CAIR and certain individuals, as these were relevant to the defendants' detailed plea of justification.

However, the court dismissed the request to extend the oral discovery time, finding no jurisdiction or justification to depart from the strict two-hour limit mandated by Rule 76.

The defendants brought a motion for non-suit to dismiss the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and to withdraw the defence of qualified privilege from the jury regarding the plaintiff's defamation counterclaim.

The court granted the non-suit, finding no evidence that the defendants initiated the criminal proceedings, as the police exercised independent discretion.

The court also withdrew the defence of qualified privilege, ruling that statements made by the plaintiffs to a priest were not made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

During a consolidated family corporate dispute involving multiple related actions and a counterclaim, the moving parties sought leave at the outset of trial to amend their pleadings and requested an adjournment of the trials.

The proposed amendments largely consisted of legal arguments relating to whether the plaintiff’s oppression remedy claim should instead proceed as a derivative action under the Business Corporations Act.

The court held that the motion lacked evidentiary support, was brought far too late in a case‑managed proceeding, and raised arguments that did not require pleading amendments.

The court also refused the requested adjournment, finding the moving parties had failed to pursue procedural remedies earlier regarding outstanding undertakings and trial scheduling concerns.

All motions were dismissed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the responding parties.