ORDER MO-1278
Appeal MA‑990204‑1
City of Toronto
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The appellant made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the City of Toronto (the City). The request was for access to a copy of letters sent to the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation by a member of the public regarding concerns about the operation of a sports league. The appellant also asked for related correspondence from the Department of Parks and Recreation.
The City granted partial access to the records it identified as responsive to the request, claiming that the withheld information fell within the exemptions found in sections 14(1) and 38(b) of the Act.
The appellant appealed the City’s decision.
A Notice of Inquiry was initially sent to the City and the member of the public (the affected person). Representations were received from both parties. I then sent a revised Notice of Inquiry to the appellant, along with the non-confidential parts of the City’s representations. The affected person’s representations were not shared with the appellant because of confidentiality concerns. Representations were received from the appellant.
RECORDS:
The records consist of correspondence back and forth between the City and the affected person. During mediation, the appellant confirmed that he is no longer seeking access to pages 4 and 5 of the records. The records which remain at issue are Records 1-3 and 11-14, which are the affected persons’s letters dated May 25, 1998 and May 20, 1999 respectively, and the name and address of the affected person contained in Records 6, 8 and 15, which are the Parks and Recreation department’s replies dated May 29, 1998, November 18, 1998 and July 7, 1999.
DISCUSSION:
Invasion of Privacy
Under section 2(1) of the Act, "personal information" is defined, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual.
The information severed from Records 6, 8 and 15 consists of the affected person’s name and address. The information withheld in Records 1 to 3 and 11 to 14 includes the affected person’s name, address, telephone numbers, and the affected person’s concerns about the league’s management of its finances and other matters. This information, in my view, qualifies as the personal information of the affected person under the following paragraphs of the definition:
"personal information" means recorded information about an identifiable individual, including,
(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except if they relate to another individual,
(f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,
(h) the individual's name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual;
Because Records 1-3 and 11-14 also contain references to the appellant’s involvement in the league, I find that these records also contain the personal information of the appellant.
Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by a government body. Section 38 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access.
Under section 38(b) of the Act, where a record contains the personal information of both the appellant and other individuals and the institution determines that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the requester access to that information.
Where, however, the record only contains the personal information of other individuals, section 14(1) of the Act prohibits an institution from releasing this information unless one of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (f) of section 14(1) applies. In the circumstances, the only exception which could apply is section 14(1)(f) which reads:
A head shall refuse to disclose personal information to any person other than the individual to whom the information relates except,
if the disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
In both these situations, sections 14(2) and (3) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates. Section 14(2) provides some criteria for the head to consider in making this determination. Section 14(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 14(4) refers to certain types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
The Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established, it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in 14(2) [John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 1993 CanLII 3388 (ON CTGDDC), 13 O.R. (3d) 767].
The City submits that sections 14(2)(f) and (h) apply to the personal information in the records. The affected person submits that section 14(2)(h) applies and that he fears his identity and the comments he made are being requested for retaliatory purposes. The appellant indicates that he is requesting the identity of the individual who made claims about his involvement with the league so he can have the right to “face his accuser”.
Sections 14(2)(f) and (h) read:
A head, in determining whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether,
(f) the personal information is highly sensitive;
(h) the personal information has been supplied by the individual to whom the information relates in confidence; and
With respect to section 14(2)(f), the City submits that in the context of the complaint, the information at issue is highly sensitive within the meaning of section 14(2)(f). Although I accept that there is a contextual sensitivity in this situation, I find that the information itself would not normally be considered highly sensitive, and I give this factor little weight.
The affected person and the City both refer to section 14(2)(h), and the records provide evidence that the affected person expected that the information would be treated confidentially. The City confirms that its employees confirmed that the affected person’s complaint would be handled in confidence. Accordingly, I find that section 14(2)(h) is a relevant consideration, and carries moderate weight.
With respect to the appellant’s concerns about his right to “face his accuser”, the City’s representations indicate that it was possible in this case to conduct an investigation of the concerns expressed by the affected person without having to disclose his identity. The City found that the league was operating in an open manner as a non-profit organization, and took no action against the appellant or the league. Although I find the appellant’s concerns are relevant, in the circumstances they carry little weight.
Having balanced the factors weighing in favour of disclosure against the factors favouring privacy protection, in the circumstances of this appeal, I find that disclosure of the records would constitute an unjustified invasion of the affected person’s privacy. Accordingly, Records 1-3 and 11-14 are exempt under section 38(b), and Records 6, 8 and 15 are exempt under section 14 of the Act.
ORDER:
I uphold the City’s decision.
Original signed by: February 22, 2000
Holly Big Canoe
Adjudicator