Mohammed Jeewa v. Toronto District School Board and Ali Abdi, 2017 HRTO 1681

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Mohammed Jeewa

Applicant

-and-

Toronto District School Board and Ali Abdi

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: December 19, 2017

Citation: 2017 HRTO 1681

Indexed as: Jeewa v. Toronto District School Board

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Mohammed Jeewa, Applicant

Self-represented

1The applicant filed an Application alleging discrimination and reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). Among other things, the applicant alleged that the respondents harassed him and failed to provide him with a positive and supportive environment.

2On May 1, 2017, the applicant filed a Request for Interim Remedy. The applicant sought various interim remedies in his Request, including that he be allowed to access release time to allow him to attend workshops or committee work, an improvement of his work environment and that his communications with the personal respondent be restricted or moderated.

DECISION

3The conditions for awarding an interim remedy are set out in Rule 23.2:

The Tribunal may grant an interim remedy where it is satisfied that:

a. the Application appears to have merit;

b. the balance of harm or convenience favours granting the interim remedy requested; and,

c. it is just and appropriate in the circumstances to do so.

4Normally, the Tribunal’s power to order respondents to do or refrain from doing something is contingent upon a finding that they have violated the Code. Interim remedies are extraordinary in that they constitute an order to do or refrain from doing something in the absence of a finding that the Code has been violated. For this reason, an applicant bears a “significant onus” in establishing that the Tribunal should award an interim remedy: TA v 60 Montclair, 2009 HRTO 269. The Tribunal has generally been more reluctant to order an interim remedy that will create a new state of affairs than one that would preserve an existing state of affairs: VandenBroek v. Villa Otthon, 2011 HRTO 279.

5In TA v. 60 Montclair, the Tribunal stated that since the Code is remedial legislation, the fundamental consideration in determining whether to award an interim remedy is “whether an interim remedy is necessary to facilitate and ensure the Tribunal is able to award a complete, appropriate and effective remedy at the end of a hearing, should a violation of the Code be found.”

6Even if I were to accept that this Application appears to have merit, I am not persuaded that it is appropriate to award an interim remedy in this case. As noted above, interim remedies are exceptional in that they constitute an order to do or refrain from doing something in the absence of a finding that the Code has been violated. I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to order the respondents to provide the interim remedies sought by the applicant in the absence of a finding of discrimination. I also do not find that the interim remedies sought by the applicant are necessary to ensure the Tribunal is able to award a complete, appropriate and effective remedy at the end of a hearing, should a violation of the Code be found.

order

7For the above reasons, the applicant’s request for an interim remedy is denied. Since both parties have agreed to mediation, the Tribunal will schedule a mediation in this case.

8I am not seized.