HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Deborah Reyner
Applicant
-and-
G.E. Canada - Peterborough
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Leslie Reaume
Indexed as: Reyner v. G.E. Canada - Peterborough
APPEARANCES
Deborah Reyner, Applicant
Self-represented
G.E. Canada-Peterborough, Respondent
John Bruce, Counsel
1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). This Decision addresses the applicant’s request to reactivate her Application.
2On September 19, 2016, this Application was deferred without objection on the basis of an ongoing grievance proceeding. The letter from the Registrar directed the attention of the parties to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which the Application may be brought back on after the completion of the other proceeding:
Where a party wishes the Tribunal to proceed with an Application which has been deferred the request must be made in accordance with Rule 19.
Where an Application was deferred pending the outcome of another legal proceeding, a request to proceed under Rule 14.3 must be filed no later than 60 days after the conclusion of the other proceeding, must set out the date the other legal proceeding concluded and include a copy of the decision or order in the other proceeding, if any.
3The grievance was advanced through the grievance proceeding steps and to a Grievance Settlement Officer mediation (“GSO hearing”) as per the collective agreement. The GSO hearing did not resolve the grievance and the grievance proceedings were then completed on November 10, 2016. By letter dated November 10, 2016, the union advised the applicant that a decision had been made not to proceed further with her grievance. The applicant was provided with an opportunity to participate in the Union Stewards’ Council decision and to go before the Stewards’ Council to appeal its decision. The applicant chose not to participate.
4On May 1, 2017, the Tribunal wrote to the parties asking for information regarding the status of the other proceeding. On May 3, 2017, the applicant filed a Request seeking to reactivate the Application. The applicant also requested production of documents.
5On May 11, 2017, the respondent responded, objecting to the Request on the basis of delay. The respondent also objected to the applicant’s production request.
6On June 5, 2017, the Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction indicating that the applicant had not responded to the delay issue and setting the matter down for oral submissions. The applicant’s union attended the hearing but did not make submissions.
7The parties were advised to consider the principles outlined in the Tribunal’s case law regarding extending the time limit for requesting a reactivation of a deferred application. For example, in Marc-Ali v. Graham, 2012 HRTO 502, the Tribunal stated as follows at paragraphs 19-20:
The Rules require that a reactivation request be filed within 60 days of the conclusion of the other proceeding. The Tribunal has the discretion to vary time limits set out in its Rules “to facilitate an accessible process and to ensure the fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the matter before it” (Rule 1.1). In Baker v. Kingston Hospital, 2009 HRTO 2079 (“Baker”), at para. 6, the Tribunal stated that there “must be a good reason” to waive the time limits set out in the Rules. In addition, the length of the delay may be a factor in determining the appropriateness of extending the time limit. See, for example, Vonella v. Blake Jarrett and Company, 2010 HRTO 2158 (“Vonella”), where the delay was only two days.
The principles to apply in extending time limits under the Rules should be similar to the principles established under section 34 of the Code: has the delay in meeting the time limits in the Rules been incurred in good faith (in Baker, this requirement was worded slightly differently, but I see no significant difference between “good faith” and “a good reason”); and will any substantial prejudice to the respondents result from extending the time limit. The length of the delay is a factor in assessing the potential prejudice to the respondents. In addition, the Tribunal should be mindful of Rule 1.1 which sets out the need to facilitate an accessible process and to ensure the fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of an Application.
8The applicant did not file written submissions explaining the delay in requesting reactivation of the Application. During her oral submissions the applicant stated that she was not aware of the 60-day time limit. She also stated that she had to do a lot of soul searching and was not mentally prepared to go forward with her Application after the grievance proceeding concluded.
9The applicant was forthright in acknowledging that she did not take the steps necessary to inform herself of the Rules and attempt to reactivate this Application in accordance with those Rules. I certainly appreciate the applicant’s honesty, however, the six-month delay in this case is significant and not adequately explained for the purpose of extending the time limit. The applicant’s failure to take steps to inform herself of the requirements to reactivate her Application and her choice not to do so when the grievance proceeding ended, does not meet the test of good faith.
10Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 19th day of December, 2017.
“Signed by”
Leslie Reaume
Vice-chair