Weekes v. Home Starts Inc., 2017 HRTO 1504

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Sharon Weekes

Applicant

-and-

Home Starts Inc., The Regional Municipality of Halton (Housing Services Division), Paul Hastie, Vita Isherwood and Andrew Balahura

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: November 16, 2017

Citation: 2017 HRTO 1504

Indexed as: Weekes v. Home Starts Inc.

1This Application, filed under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleges discrimination with respect to housing because of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, disability, family status, marital status, age and reprisal.

2In a Case Assessment Direction issued on September 28, 2016 the Tribunal directed that a preliminary hearing be held to determine whether this Application should be dismissed, in whole or in part, on the basis that:

a. it appears that some or all of the allegations may be untimely; and/or

b. there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.

3The preliminary hearing was held by telephone on October 2, 2017. All parties participated.

4The applicant made brief submissions on the delay issues. She asserted without any particulars that she experiences harassment to this day. I invited her to explain how the harassment related to the Code grounds she has claimed. In response the applicant reiterated her claim that a rental subsidy was withdrawn in 2012 because when she was attending her father in the hospital on a daily basis, the respondents assumed that she was employed. The subsidy was reinstated at some point but this issue remains a source of considerable concern for the applicant.

5The applicant also made submissions about a prior Decision of the Tribunal, 2011 HRTO 1169, reconsideration denied 2011 HRTO 1767. The applicant also submitted that if the Tribunal dismissed this Application she would re-file a further Application.

Decision

6The Application is dismissed.

7As indicated one issue in this case is the fact that its substance appears to be out of time. Section 34 (1) and (2) of the Code, read as follows:

(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

8In my view this Application must be dismissed because it relates to events from 2012 and/or 2013. The parties disagree about the genesis of the dispute about the rent subsidy. It does not matter who is right about that because at the latest, the final incident of alleged discrimintation occurred in 2013 and the Application was filed on July 30, 2015. It is on the face of it out of time having been filed well beyond the one year time limit provided for in section 34(1) of the Code.

9There is no good faith explanation for the delay. At the hearing the applicant offered no explanation for the delay other than to say that the harassment is ongoing but as indicated when I asked her to elaborate the applicant made submissions about events in 2012. In the Application, the applicant appears to have acknowledged that the Application was out of time. In large part this Application appears to be an attempt to revive the Application disposed of by the Tribunal’s Decision above.

10In my view this Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide because it was filed beyond the one year time period provided for in section 34(1) and there is not good faith explanation for the delay.

11Having come to this conclusion there is no need to consider whether some or all of the Application should be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success. I would observe however that on the face of the Application there are no facts alleged that would link what is alleged to have occurred to any of the Code grounds claimed. At the preliminary hearing the applicant offered nothing that would make that link.