Kasirye Kabala v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2017 HRTO 1116

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Kasirye Kabala

Applicant

-and-

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel

Date: August 29, 2017

Citation: 2017 HRTO 1116

Indexed as: Kabala v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Kasirye Kabala, Applicant

Self-represented

1The applicant alleged that the respondent reprised against him contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19, as amended (the “Code”). Specifically, the applicant alleged that a Vice Chair of this Tribunal reprised against him when she denied his request for reconsideration in Decision, 2017 HRTO 658.

2On July 14, 2017, the Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) his Application as being outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction due to the doctrine of adjudicative immunity.

3The applicant submitted that the respondent is not immune from liability in tort, e.g. discrimination. The applicant submitted that the Proceedings Against the Crown Act gives him the right to sue the respondent for discrimination at the Tribunal.

finding

4An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381.

5The Tribunal is not a court that can adjudicate tort claims. Rather, it is a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal created by statute (the Code) to deal with applications alleging violations of the Code, including discrimination or reprisal.

6It is clear on the face of the Application that the applicant’s allegations concern the adjudicative decision to deny his reconsideration request. The doctrine of adjudicative immunity prohibits legal proceedings against judicial and quasi-judicial actors that are based on their actions as adjudicators or decision-makers. The doctrine is rooted in the principle of judicial independence, the purpose of which is to ensure that judicial and quasi-judicial actors are free to execute their decision-making duties with independence and without fear of consequences. See Taucar v. University of Western Ontario, 2013 HRTO 597; Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180; and Cartier v. Nairn, 2009 HRTO 220. The doctrine of adjudicative immunity applies to quasi-judicial decisions of this Tribunal. Consequently, I find that it is plain and obvious that this Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

order

7For the reasons set out above, the Application is dismissed.