Rogers v. NABET 700-M, UNIFOR, 2016 HRTO 996

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Douglas Rogers

Applicant

-and-

NABET 700-M, UNIFOR

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: July 28, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 996

Indexed as: Rogers v. NABET 700-M, UNIFOR

1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2The applicant is self-represented. On his Application, he provided alternate contact information, including a name, address, telephone number and email, of another individual whom he agreed he wanted the Tribunal to contact him through. The direction on the Application form, pertaining to alternative contact information, says “If you complete this section, all of your correspondence will be sent to you in care of your Alternative Contact”.

3The respondent filed a Request for Summary Hearing on March 8, 2016, along with a book of documents and case law. The applicant did not file a response to the respondent’s request.

4The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction dated April 15, 2016 (“CAD”) granting the respondent’s request for summary hearing. It stated that a notice of summary hearing would be subsequently issued by the Tribunal. That notice was issued on June 17, 2016 advising that the summary hearing would be scheduled for August 5, 2016 by teleconference (“the Notice”). The Notice was sent by regular mail and email to the applicant’s alternate contact person.

5On July 18, 2016, an individual other than the applicant’s alternate contact person emailed the Tribunal. She advised that she was contacting the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant, identified herself as an associate of the applicant, and wrote that the applicant was seeking an adjournment of the summary hearing. She wrote that the applicant “…would like more time to review the materials before presenting his complaint”. She advised that he currently does not have convenient access to a computer and requests that “any contact information be made by phone to his personal cell number [cell number set out]. Please follow up any calls and provide information via regular mail”. The email ended with the writer requesting that the applicant be allowed time to receive and review printed materials before receiving a reply.

6The Tribunal requested that the respondent file submissions addressing the applicant’s request, which the respondent subsequently did.

7The respondent opposes the adjournment request. It submits that the applicant failed to request an adjournment within 14 days after receipt of the Notice, as is required in the Notice. Further, it submits that the applicant has had sufficient time to review the “materials”. The materials that it filed with the Tribunal were sent to the applicant on March 8, 2016.

analysis

8The Tribunal has made it clear on numerous occasions that adjournments are not automatically granted, even on consent. The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Scheduling of Hearing and Mediations, Rescheduling Requests, and Requests for Adjournments states:

Requests for adjournments, particularly at the last minute, are a significant impediment to fair and timely access to justice. Therefore, the HRTO will only grant adjournments in extraordinary circumstances such as illness of a party, witness or representative. Absent exceptional circumstances, the HRTO will not grant adjournments, even when all parties consent.

9In Vallentyne v. Royal Canadian Legion, 2009 HRTO 600 at para. 4, the Tribunal explained why, even when there is consent, an adjournment of a scheduled hearing will not be granted absent exceptional circumstances:

The Tribunal is committed to the fair, just and expeditious resolution of proceedings before it. It expects to receive thousands of applications each year. The Tribunal has a responsibility to ensure that public resources are used effectively to meet the demands of all parties before the Tribunal. Therefore, when an adjournment request is made, it is not only the interests of the parties to the particular proceeding must consider, but the fact that Tribunal time reserved for the resolution of those parties’ dispute will no longer be used. For that reason, among others, the Tribunal’s Information Bulletin on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediation, Rescheduling Requests and Requests for Adjournments indicates that even adjournment requests made on consent of the parties more than five [now fourteen] days after the hearing is scheduled may be denied. The Tribunal has balanced the interests of parties in having hearings scheduled according to their and counsel’s availability with these broader interests by requiring that a party advise within five [now fourteen] days that they are unavailable, and providing that requests for adjournment will not otherwise be granted, absent exceptional circumstances.

10I have concerns that the applicant’s request is being made by someone other than the applicant or his alternate contact person. On that basis alone, his request to adjourn the summary hearing could be denied.

11Notwithstanding that concern, on the basis of the request filed, I do not find that exceptional reasons exist to justify adjourning the summary hearing. The CAD was issued April 15, 2016 and it set out the procedure for the summary hearing, including a time frame of 14 days before the summary hearing for the parties to file materials. In the CAD, the Tribunal referred to its Rules of Procedure and Practice Direction on Summary Hearing Requests, noted both were on its website, and referred to case law. The respondent submits that its materials were filed on March 8, 2016, along with their request for summary hearing.

12I agree with the respondent that the applicant has had ample time to review its materials and prepare for the summary hearing. Accordingly, his request to adjourn is denied.

13The summary hearing will take place as set out in the Notice. If the applicant does not call in, then his Application will be dismissed as abandoned.