HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Francis Aboagye Applicant
-and-
Wellesley Place Employment and Social Services Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Keith Brennenstuhl Date: July 8, 2016 Citation: 2016 HRTO 899 Indexed as: Aboagye v. Wellesley Place Employment and Social Services
APPEARANCES
Francis Aboagye, Applicant Self-represented
Wellesley Place Employment and Social Services, Respondent Amy Murakami, Counsel
Introduction
1The applicant filed an Application alleging discrimination with respect to goods services and facilities because of ethnic origin, place of origin, colour, race and reprisal or threat of reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 19, as amended (the “Code”).
2By Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”), dated February 24, 2016, the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held in this matter by teleconference. The parties were directed to make arguments relating to whether some or all of the Application was outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by reason of delay under section 34(1) and (2) of the Code or whether it should be dismissed on the basis that the allegations had no reasonable prospect of success.
3The hearing took place by teleconference on July 6, 2016.
Summary Hearing Process
4The summary hearing process is described in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure (“Rules”) as well as the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Summary Hearing Requests. The purpose of a summary hearing is to consider, early in the proceeding and usually before a Response is filed, as in this case, whether an application should be dismissed in whole or in part because there is no reasonable prospect that the application will succeed.
5The Tribunal cannot address allegations of unfairness that are unrelated to the Code. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to claims of discrimination that are linked to the protections set out in the Code.
6The test that is applied at the summary hearing stage is whether an application has no reasonable prospect of success. At this stage, the Tribunal is not determining whether the applicant is telling the truth or assessing the impact of the treatment he or she experienced. The test of no reasonable prospect of success is determined by assuming the applicant’s version of events is true unless there is some clear evidence to the contrary or the evidence is not disputed by the applicant.
7However, and significantly, accepting the facts alleged by the applicant does not include accepting the applicant’s assumptions about why he or she was treated unfairly. The purpose of the summary hearing is to determine if the applicant is able to point to any information which tends to support his or her belief that he or she has experienced discrimination or reprisal under the Code. The question that the Tribunal must decide at a summary hearing is whether there is likely to be any evidence, or any evidence that may be reasonably available to the applicant to connect the unfair treatment allegedly experienced by the applicant with the Code’s protections.
8As the Tribunal indicated in Forde v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389 (“Forde”), for an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process following a summary hearing, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show a breach of the Code.
9Having set out the basic framework for determining whether an application should be dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success, I now turn to the facts of this particular case.
Factual Background
10The applicant applied for and received Ontario Works through the City of Toronto (the “City”) between April, 1997 and November, 2000. If a recipient receives monies in excess of the amount to which he/she is entitled, the excess amount is considered an overpayment which can be recovered through a reduction of assistance.
11Between 2001 and 2002 the City conducted an audit of the applicant’s Ontario Works file and determined that that the applicant had been overpaid in the amount of $3,500.00 (the “overpayment”).
12The City allegedly notified the applicant of the overpayment and explained that there would be a monthly deduction from any future benefits up to the amount of the overpayment.
13In 2007, the applicant received Ontario Works through the Region of Peel. His payments for June and July 2007 were reduced to recover the 2002 overpayment. The applicant complained to Region of Peel staff about the 2002 overpayment.
14In January 2005 the applicant started receiving Ontario works through the Region of Peel and his payments were again reduced to reduce the 2002 overpayment.
15The applicant maintains that he was singled out for the audit in 2002 and that there is no proof that there was an overpayment. He believes that “[t]he City is illegally collecting all the financial assistance given to the applicant due to a suspicion that he is a criminal”. He claims that “[t]he city is of the belief that the applicant, BLACK, and of AFRICAN origin, did not deserve any financial assistance because BLACKS are deemed criminal by nature”.
16The applicant believes the City’s treatment of him was discriminatory contrary to the Code.
analysis
17Even if I accept the facts put forward by the applicant as true and provable, I must find that the Application stands no reasonable prospect of success under the Code. I am unable to conclude that there is a link between those facts and discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, place of origin or ethnic origin.
18As opposed to pointing me to any evidence in the Application or that he could obtain that would support that his race and/or, colour, place of origin or ethnic origin was a factor in the respondent’s treatment of him, he suggested that that was the only conclusion that that I could draw from the facts. I respectfully disagree.
19There were literally no allegations that could form any basis for establishing a Code violation, beyond mere conjecture or speculation on the part of the applicant. Indeed, the applicant stated at the hearing that he had no evidence that would link his race to the treatment he received at the hands of the respondent other than he is black.
20As the Tribunal noted in Forde, noted above, at para. 17:
The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code ….
21As for reprisal, the reprisal section of the Code only applies to actions that are intended as a reprisal for asserting one’s human rights under the Code. See Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31. In this Application and in his submissions the applicant has not identified a reprisal or threat of reprisal for raising his rights under the Code.
22The applicant has not demonstrated a link between the actions of the respondent and his race, colour, place of origin or ethnic origin. He has also not identified a reprisal or threat of reprisal for raising his rights under the Code. In sum, he has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable prospect of success of the Application. Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
23In light of my decision that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the applicant is prevented from pursuing his Application on the basis of delay, pursuant to section 34 of the Code.
Dated at Toronto, this 8th day of July, 2016.
“Signed By”
Keith Brennenstuhl Vice-chair

