HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Bradley Truax Applicant
-and-
George Brown College Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Truax v. George Brown College
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Bradley Truax, Applicant Self-represented
1The applicant filed an Application with the Tribunal alleging that the respondent discriminated against him because of disability and reprised against him contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Tribunal has not yet received a Response to the Application.
2The applicant has filed an Application alleging that the respondent has failed to accommodate his disability in accordance with his Student Accommodation Profile developed by the respondent’s disability office (the “accommodation plan”).
Decision
3The conditions for ordering an interim remedy are set out in Rule 23.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure:
The Tribunal may grant an interim remedy where it is satisfied that:
a) the Application appears to have merit;
b) the balance of harm or convenience favours granting the interim remedy requested; and,
c) it is just and appropriate in the circumstances to do so.
4Normally, the Tribunal’s power to order a respondent to do, or refrain from doing something, is contingent upon a finding that it has violated the Code. Interim remedies are extraordinary in that they constitute an order to do, or refrain from doing something, in the absence of a finding that the Code has been violated. For this reason, the applicant bears a significant onus in establishing that the Tribunal should award an interim remedy: See TA v. 60 Montclair, 2009 HRTO 369 at paras. 28-29 [“TA”].
5In TA, at para. 23, the Tribunal stated that since the Code is remedial legislation, the fundamental consideration in determining whether to award an interim remedy is “whether an interim remedy is necessary to ensure the Tribunal will be able to provide a full, effective and appropriate remedy should the application be decided in favour of the applicant, or is otherwise required to give effect to the remedial objects of the Code”.
6As well, the Tribunal has been more reluctant to order a proposed interim remedy that would create a new state of affairs than one which would preserve an existing state of affairs. Creating a new state of affairs is a more extraordinary and serious remedy than maintaining what exists. See Williams v. Iroquois Falls (Town), 2010 HRTO 2350 at para. 8.
7Assuming without deciding that the Application has merit, I am not persuaded that the applicant has established that the balance of harm or convenience favours granting the interim remedy or that it is just and appropriate to grant the remedy requested. The accommodation plan itself is subject to interpretation. For example, the applicant is entitled to extensions on an occasional basis and a number of requirements are subject to negotiation between the applicant and the respective professor. Having considered the matter I am of the view that the Tribunal will have to hear evidence with respect to the merits of this Application before granting any of the remedies sought by the applicant.
Order
8The Tribunal orders that the applicant’s Request for an Interim Remedy is denied.
9I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 7th day of June, 2016.
“signed by”
Geneviève Debané Vice-chair