HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Sujen Sivarajasingam
Applicant
-and-
Metroland Media Group Ltd.
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Naomi Overend Date: January 15, 2016 Citation: 2016 HRTO 68 Indexed as: Sivarajasingam v. Metroland Media Group Ltd.
APPEARANCES
Sujen Sivaranjasingam, Applicant Self-represented
Metroland Media Group Ltd., Respondent Michelle C. Folliott, Counsel
introduction
1The applicant alleges that the respondent discriminated against him in employment because of age contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). By Case Assessment Direction, the Tribunal directed that the matter be scheduled for a summary hearing in person.
2The summary hearing process is described in Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure as well as the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Summary Hearing Requests. The purpose of a summary hearing is to consider, early in the proceeding, whether an application should be dismissed in whole or in part because there is no reasonable prospect that it will succeed.
3For the reasons set out below, I find that there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant will be able to establish a connection between the respondent’s actions and the ground of age alleged in the Application.
Decision and analysis
4The applicant was fired from his job as a machine “operator” in the respondent’s warehouse following an altercation with a co-worker and two supervisors. He asserts that his termination was unfair, and that the respondent failed to give him adequate warnings before ending his employment. The respondent disputes this, but for the purpose of a summary hearing, it is not necessary to resolve whether the applicant was subject to unfairness. The issue before me in this proceeding is whether the applicant will be able to call evidence that will link that treatment to a protected ground under the Code.
5With respect to the ground of age, the applicant states that, at 21, he was the youngest person working in the machine operation division. The respondent states that they employed younger employees at the time, which the applicant does not dispute, but states that they worked in the printing division. The respondent submits that the fact that employees work for one division or another is not significant, because they are all warehouse employees, but for the purpose of the summary hearing, I cannot rely on this assertion.
6In any event, the fact that the applicant is the youngest does not establish that age was a factor in his treatment. There is always going to be a youngest and an oldest employee in any workforce of two or more individuals, and this fact alone does not establish that the relative youth or maturity of these employees is linked to any treatment they receive in the workplace. The only other evidence the applicant intends to call is that his immediate supervisor once called him a “young punk” in relation to an earlier incident at work.
7At the summary hearing, the applicant acknowledged there were issues with respect to his reliability as a worker. He states that he arrived to work late, but said that one of the senior supervisors tacitly allowed this. He also said that his use of recreational drugs resulted in him having work-related problems and showing signs of paranoia in the months leading up to his termination.
8Although in his Application, he suggests that his workplace conduct was not a problem, and that he had not received any warnings, at the summary hearing, the applicant did not dispute the respondent’s submissions that he had received warnings about his workplace conduct during his employment. While he alleged that a senior supervisor condoned recreational drug use (at least on personal time) the applicant did not suggest in either his Application or his oral submissions that he had ever suggested to the respondent that he had work problems relating to his recreational drug use.
9In the face of the acknowledged problems concerning his performance, the applicant’s proposed evidence that he was the youngest employee in his division and had once been called a young punk by his immediate supervisor would not allow an inference that age was a factor in the termination of his employment to be drawn.
10Although he did not select any other grounds under the Code, the applicant speculated that the fact that he was from Scarborough, while most of the other employees were from York Region, may have been a factor in his treatment. However, even if true, this type of distinction is not prohibited by the Code.
11The Tribunal has held on many occasions that it does not have jurisdiction over general claims of unfairness unrelated to the Code. See, for example, Arias v. Centre for Spanish Speaking Peoples, 2009 HRTO 1025 at para. 27 and Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777 at para. 10. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to claims of discrimination and reprisal under the Code.
12Having reviewed the applicant’s allegations and his proposed evidence, I find that he has no reasonable prospect of success of establishing a link between the respondent’s alleged and actual conduct and the ground cited in his Application or any of the grounds enumerated in the Code.
order
13The Application is dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.
Dated at Toronto, this 15th day of January, 2016.
“Signed By”
Naomi Overend
Vice-chair

