HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Frank Fata
Applicant
-and-
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Brian Cook
Indexed as: Fata v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board
APPEARANCES
Frank Fata, Applicant John Bartolomeo, Counsel
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, Respondent Eric Kupka, Counsel
1This is a Contravention of Settlement Application filed under section 45.9(3) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application was heard on September 21, 2015 and March 29, 2016. The applicant appeared and was represented by John Bartolomeo, counsel. The respondent was represented by Eric Kupka, counsel. At the hearing on March 29, 2016, Greg Bullen was called as a witness by the respondent. He is a member of the respondent’s legal department and represented the respondent at the time of the proceeding (“the original Application”) that led to the settlement that is the subject of this Contravention of Settlement Application.
Background
2In the original Application, the applicant and the respondent attended a hearing at the Tribunal on September 22, 2014 and March 9, 2015. On the second day of the hearing, the parties settled the Application and signed Minutes of Settlement. In this Application, the applicant alleges that the respondent has contravened one of the articles of the Minutes.
3The applicant is an injured worker. He receives a permanent disability award or a pension from the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (“WSIB”) for injuries resulting from a work-related injury in 1985.
4Pursuant to Section 34 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, S.O. 1997, c. 16, as amended (“WSIA”) an injured worker is entitled to health care benefits. The relevant subsections are as follows:
- (1) A worker who sustains an injury is entitled to such health care as may be necessary, appropriate and sufficient as a result of the injury and is entitled to make the initial choice of health professional for the purposes of this section.
(2) The Board may arrange for the worker’s health care or may approve arrangements for his or her health care. The Board shall pay for the worker’s health care.
(3) The Board may establish such fee schedules for health care as it considers appropriate.
(7) The Board shall determine all questions concerning,
(a) the necessity, appropriateness and sufficiency of health care provided to a worker or that may be provided to a worker; and
(b) payment for health care provided to a worker.
5Section 50(1) of the “pre-1989 Workers’ Compensation Act” which applies to the applicant’s claim with the respondent because the applicant’s injury occurred in July 1985, provides:
50.(1) Every worker who is entitled to compensation under this Part or who would have been so entitled had the worker been disabled beyond the day of the accident is entitled,
6(a) to such health care as may be necessary as a result of the injury.
7The WSIB Operational Policy Manual Document No. 17-01-09 has provisions for a worker’s entitlement to expenses associated with visits for health care. It provides in part:
When required to lodge away from home while keeping an appointment or participating in a program authorized by the WSIB, accommodation expenses (hotel, or room and board) are paid at approved rates.
Meal allowances are paid at approved rates if workers are required by the WSIB to lodge away from home, attend scheduled appointments, out-patient health care programs, etc.
8As discussed in more detail below, there may be a difference between health care that is provided to treat a worker’s injury, and health care that the WSIB determines is “necessary as a result of the injury”. Under the legislation, to be entitled to health care benefits, the health care must not only be provided to treat the injury, it must also be health care that the WSIB determines is “necessary as a result of the injury”.
9At the time of the work-related injury, the applicant lived in the Toronto area and his treating physicians were also in Toronto. The applicant subsequently moved to Victoria Harbour. He continued to be treated in Toronto by his family doctor and a psychiatrist. This led to various issues about the applicant's entitlement to expenses for these medical treatments and to various decisions by WSIB decision-makers about the applicant's entitlement to expenses.
10The applicant filed an Application with this Tribunal about these issues. The Application included other allegations as well which are not relevant to this Contravention of Settlement Application.
11After reviewing the original Application, the Tribunal determined that a summary hearing should be held to determine if the Application should be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success because the allegations appeared to concern adjudicative decisions about entitlement to benefits under the WSIA.
12A summary hearing was held following which the Tribunal issued Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1213. According to that Interim Decision, the applicant explained that the decisions about his entitlement to travel expenses were decisions about accommodation of his disability and not adjudicative decisions about his entitlement to benefits.
13The Interim Decision concluded (at paragraph 17):
In my view, this matter cannot be resolved at this early stage in the proceeding on the basis of a finding of no reasonable prospect of success. Whether or not the applicant is able to demonstrate a distinction between the benefits he receives and what he alleges to be accommodations for his disability is an issue which should be determined after hearing evidence.
14In a subsequent Interim Decision, 2013 HRTO 1992, which denied the respondent’s request that the Application be deferred because of a pending appeal at the WSIB about the issue of the applicant's entitlement to expenses, the Vice-chair commented (at paragraph 10):
In this case I am satisfied that it would not be fair, just and expeditious to defer this Application. The applicant alleges that he is not challenging the benefits which were conferred on him but an accommodation which assists him in accessing the benefits. Framed in that way, this may be one of those unique cases where the Tribunal is the better forum for adjudicating whether the WSIB has failed to accommodate the applicant. In addition, only one of two issues engaged by this Application is before the WSIB whereas this Tribunal can adjudicate the discrimination allegations underlying both issues.
15The Application was accordingly scheduled for a hearing. On the second day of the hearing, the parties signed Minutes of Settlement which provided for a “full and final settlement of the Application”. The Minutes provided for a payment of money by the respondent to the applicant as general damages. They included a number of provisions about what would happen when the applicant went for medical treatment from his family doctor and his psychiatrist, what would happen if the applicant needed to change physicians in the future, and an agreement that the applicant would try to schedule visits with the two doctors at the same time, and what would happen in regards to expenses if he was or was not able to do so.
16Paragraph 3 of the Minutes of Settlement reads as follows:
In the event the applicant has a medical visit with his psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Rehaluk, the Respondent will reimburse the applicant for one night’s hotel accommodation, mileage to and from the applicant’s home in Victoria Harbour and three meals (consisting of one each of breakfast, lunch and dinner) over the two day period.
17It is this provision that the applicant says has been contravened.
18The respondent does not dispute that it has not paid the applicant the expenses contemplated in the Minutes for all of the applicant's subsequent visits to Dr. Rehaluk. The respondent says that the reason for this is that it has determined that not all of the visits to Dr. Rehaluk were necessary as a result of the injury.
19Prior to the signing of the Minutes of Settlement in March 2015, the applicant had been going to his psychiatrist for treatment approximately once a month. He had been seeing this psychiatrist on this basis for several years. In the month prior to the signing of the Minutes, the psychiatrist retired. The applicant was referred to Dr. Rehaluk who agreed to take the patient on as a patient.
20After the Minutes were signed, the applicant began to go to Dr. Rehaluk on a more frequent basis. Instead of monthly appointments, Dr. Rehaluk saw the applicant approximately weekly.
21The WSIB decision-makers determined that the applicant was not entitled to benefits for increased psychiatric treatment because they determined that the medical evidence did not show that there had been any change in the applicant’s compensable psychological condition and that the increased treatments were therefore not necessary as a result of the injury.
22There is an ongoing dispute between the parties about whether the increased visits to Dr. Rehaluk are in fact necessary as a result of the injury. The applicant submits that the frequency of medical treatments is properly determined by the treating physician. In the absence of any suggestion that Dr. Rehaluk is treating the applicant for something other than his compensable injury, it is obvious to the applicant that Dr. Rehaluk believes that the increased treatments are necessary for the treatment of the injury. Dr. Rehaluk has provided a letter dated August 13, 2015, which confirms that he started seeing the applicant on February 19, 2015. This was only a few weeks before the Minutes of Settlement were signed. In his report, he indicates that he has seen the applicant for the most part on a weekly basis and that the applicant has benefited from treatment. He mentions a special program that the applicant may be eligible for which may help the applicant “immensely” but that there is a waiting list.
23The respondent asserts that while the issue of the extent of treatment offered by a health care provider is a matter to be determined by the health care provider, the determination of whether treatment is necessary as a result of the injury is something that it has exclusive jurisdiction to determine. In doing so in this case, it has applied its policy which requires the WSIB decision-maker to determine if there has been a deterioration of the compensable condition that would justify an increase in treatment. The WSIB decision-makers have determined that there is no evidence that there has been a deterioration of the compensable condition and that the increased treatment is therefore not necessary as a result of the injury.
24In this Contravention of Settlement Application the applicant submits that the Minutes of Settlement do not provide that the respondent will pay expenses only for visits to Dr. Rehaluk that the respondent finds are necessary as a result of the injury. The applicant does agree that the respondent does not need to pay expenses if he were to visit Dr. Rehaluk for treatment of something other than his work-related injury, but he notes there is no suggestion that he is seeing Dr. Rehaluk for treatment of anything other than his work-related injury.
25The respondent does not agree that the settlement has been contravened. The respondent submits that an implied term of the Minutes is that the medical treatments that would involve travel costs would be treatments that the WSIB determines are necessary as a result of the injury. Since the WSIB has determined that the weekly visits were not necessary as a result of the injury, the respondent argues that the applicant is not entitled to travel costs for them. The respondent has paid the applicant travel costs for one visit to Dr. Rehaluk per month because that is the treatment schedule the applicant had in the past.
26In an alternative argument, the respondent submits that the settlement should be voided because it was induced to sign the Minutes on the basis of bad faith misrepresentation. The respondent claimed that at the mediation session that preceded the signing of the Minutes, the applicant led the respondent to believe that he anticipated that he would be seeing the psychiatrist less often in the future. The respondent submits that the applicant knew that this was not true and that the applicant should have known that the treatments were going to increase and misled the respondent by not disclosing this.
27The respondent’s position on whether there was the Minutes were contravened is set out in the Response to the Contravention of Settlement Application in the following terms:
It is submitted that the Minutes of Settlement have not been breached. It is submitted that the Settlement cannot vitiate WSIB’s role as an adjudicator of benefits, and cannot override the WSIA. Instead the settlement should be viewed in the context of the WSIA and the WSIB’s role as an adjudicative decision maker – specifically that the Settlement should be interpreted not as overriding the WSIB but instead as establishing what travel expenses will be paid when the applicant travels to Toronto for compensable medical visits. Thus in order for the settlement to have effect, the WSIB still has to determine that the medical visit requested by the Applicant is a compensable medical visit – that is that it is a medically necessary visit that is related to the workplace injury.
28As the applicant points out, the first difficulty with this argument is that it does not reflect the language of the Minutes of Settlement. As noted above, paragraph 3 of the Minutes concerns the expenses that the respondent will pay “In the event the applicant has a medical visit with his psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Rehaluk”. It does not say that the expenses will only be paid following an adjudicative decision by the WSIB that the visit is necessary as a result of the applicant's injury.
29The respondent says that an implied term of the Minutes is that the visits to Dr. Rehaluk must be necessary for the injury because otherwise, the WSIB might have to pay for visits that are entirely unrelated to his workplace injury.
30The applicant’s counsel notes that, at least at present, this concern is entirely hypothetical. There is no evidence that the applicant is seeing Dr. Rehaluk for things that are entirely unrelated to his workplace injury and the respondent is not arguing that this is happening. Instead, the WSIB decision-makers have determined that the more regular treatments are not necessary as a result of the injury.
31The applicant testified that the visits to the psychiatrist are for treatment of his compensable psychological condition. The applicant testified that his expectation at the time he signed the Minutes of Settlement was that he would expect to be paid travel expenses only for treatments from his psychiatrist and his family doctor that were for treatment of his compensable condition. He testified that he has visited his family doctor for medical issues that are not related to his compensable condition and that he has never expected the WSIB to pay travel costs for those visits.
Analysis
32In my earlier Interim Decision in this case, Fata v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2015 HRTO 1449, I found that there is some ambiguity in the terms of the Minutes concerning the intended circumstances under which the respondent would pay the applicant’s expenses when he visited his psychiatrist.
33I also found that if the respondent can prove its allegation that the applicant misled the respondent during the mediation, this could be evidence of bad faith which could impact the validity of the Minutes.
34I directed that in these circumstances it was necessary to hear evidence about the circumstances surrounding the agreement about payment of expenses, including knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at or before the date of contracting. It is also necessary to hear evidence regarding the respondent’s allegation of bad faith on the part of the applicant.
35An important consideration surrounding the agreement about the payment of expenses and whether that agreement has been contravened is what were the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time of the settlement?
36The applicant testified that at the time he signed the Minutes of Settlement, he was clear that he would only expect to be paid travel costs for treatments by Dr. Rehaluk and his family doctor that involved treatment of his compensable injuries. He said, for example, that when he visits his family doctor for treatment of other things, he does not expect to be paid travel costs. He testified that the only reason for the visits to Dr. Rehaluk is treatment of his compensable injuries, and specifically the psychological disability that the respondent has found is a result of the applicant's work-related injury.
37Mr. Bullen testified that the respondent agreed to the terms of the Minutes on the understanding that the overall payment of travel costs would not increase. The respondent assumed that the applicant would continue to see his psychiatrist about once a month as he had historically done. Since the applicant agreed to try and schedule visits to the family doctor for the same day as he saw his psychiatrist, and would not seek travel costs for visits to the family doctor that occurred at other times, the overall travel costs would remain more or less stable. Mr. Bullen testified that the respondent assumed that travel costs would only be paid for treatments the respondent determined were “necessary as a result of the injury.”
38It therefore appears that the parties had somewhat different assumptions about the implicit terms of the settlement. The applicant’s assumption was that travel costs would be paid provided the visits were for treatment of his compensable condition. The respondent’s assumption was that travel costs would be paid only for treatments that it determined were “necessary as a result of the injury”.
39This distinction raises the question of what capacity the respondent assumed at the time it settled the Application with the applicant. The respondent appears to say that it settled in its capacity as the administrator of the WSIA. In regards to the part of the settlement that involved payment to the applicant for travel costs the respondent submits that those payments are health care benefits and can only be paid under section 34 of the WSIA, set out earlier in this Decision, and the applicable policies of the WSIB.
40The respondent agrees that part of the terms of the settlement included things unrelated to the respondent’s obligation to adjudicate claims for benefits. The Minutes included a provision that the respondent would pay the applicant an amount of money as “general damages”. There is no provision for the payment of “general damages” as a benefit under the WSIA and the respondent agrees that this provision was made in its capacity as a respondent to an Application under the Code. The general damages were paid out of the respondent’s administrative funds and not out of the Insurance Fund which is where workplace and safety benefits are paid from.
41The applicant submits that if the respondent wanted to ensure that travel costs would only be paid for treatment that it determined was necessary as a result of the injury, it should have made sure that this was reflected in the Minutes. The applicant notes that other parts of the Minutes of Settlement did make this distinction. For example, paragraph 6 provided:
For clarity, this agreement does not preclude requests for hotel accommodation, mileage, parking and meals for visits:
(1) to the family doctor where there is
a. Reduction in frequency of visits to the psychiatrist such that it is no longer reasonable to schedule the appointments for the same trip; or
b. Increase in frequency of visits to the family doctor where the increase is approved as medically necessary by the WSIB; or
(2) To other health care professionals or treatments or assessments when the visit is approved as medically necessary by the WSIB.
In the case of any of the circumstances in (1) or (2) above, the WSIB will review the request in the normal course.
42As the applicant notes, this language explicitly incorporates the WSIB adjudicative role to determine whether treatments or assessments are “medically necessary”.
43This contrasts to paragraph 3 which, as noted earlier, provides:
In the event the applicant has a medical visit with his psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Rehaluk, the Respondent will reimburse the applicant for one night’s hotel accommodation, mileage to and from the applicant’s home in Victoria Harbour and three meals (consisting of one each of breakfast, lunch and dinner) over the two day period.
44In my view, it is also relevant to note that one of the issues in the original Application had to do with what travel costs would be paid in relation to the visits to Dr. Rehaluk. For some time the respondent had paid for accommodation for one night, mileage, and two meals. However, it then determined that payment for two meals was not always necessary. The respondent then started to adjudicate the applicant’s actual meal entitlement for each visit, to determine how many meals were necessary for each visit. The applicant alleged that this was discriminatory and filed the original Application.
45It is apparent that the provision in the Minutes about the payment of expenses for visits to see Dr. Rehaluk was intended by the parties to resolve that issue. The resolution was that the applicant would be paid for three meals and he did not have to prove each time that three meals were necessary.
46In its role as decision-maker under the WSIA, the respondent as a party to the Application was entitled to call evidence and make submissions about whether the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario had any jurisdiction to deal with the allegations at all. It also had the right to explain why its decisions were not discriminatory assuming the Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with the allegations.
47However, once the respondent signed Minutes of Settlement, it had a different role. Its role then was a party to a legally binding contract. In that role, it agreed to a number of things, some of which overlapped with its other role as a decision-maker under the WSIA and some which did not. The agreement to pay the applicant an amount as general damages, for example, was clearly not an agreement that the respondent made in its role as a decision-maker under the WSIA. The arrangements described in paragraph 6 of the Minutes, quoted above, specifically invoke the respondent’s adjudicative function. The language of paragraph 3 in contrast, does not.
48Paragraph 6 provides, as an express term of the contract, that some payments were conditional on an adjudicative finding by the respondent that the medical visits were “approved as medical necessary”. In the absence of such wording in paragraph 3, it does not seem to me that it can be inferred that an implied term of the contract was that travel costs for visits to Dr. Rehaluk would only be paid if the visit was found by the WSIB to be “necessary as a result of the injury”. However, as noted, it can be inferred that the visits had to be for treatment of the injury, as opposed to treatment of something else.
49In addition, there is a distinction here between treatments by Dr. Rehaluk and travel costs associated with those treatments.
50The Minutes of Settlement do not take away the respondent’s right to determine whether the treatments by Dr. Rehaluk are “necessary as a result of the injury.” If it determines that treatment by Dr. Rehaluk is not necessary as a result of the injury, it can make that determination. The applicant is then not entitled to health care benefits for that treatment. In that event, Dr. Rehaluk would bill OHIP and could not bill the WSIB for the treatment.
51The Minutes do however oblige the respondent to pay for travel costs – as distinct from the cost of the treatment itself – when the applicant travels for treatment from Dr. Rehaluk.
52In other words, the WSIB is not precluded from making the adjudicative determination of whether a visit is “necessary as a result of the injury” under the terms of the WSIA or section 50 of the pre-1989 Workers’ Compensation Act. If it determines that a treatment is not necessary as a result of the injury, it is not obliged to pay for the treatment. However, it is obliged to pay for the travel costs associated with the treatment, even if it determines that the treatment is not “necessary as a result of the injury” under the legislation. The limitation on this is that an implied term of the Minutes is that the treatment must be for the injury, and not for something else. In this case, there is no suggestion that the treatments by Dr. Rehaluk or for something other than the injury,
The respondent’s alternative argument
53The respondent notes that the increase in visits to Dr. Rehaluk started shortly after the Minutes were signed. The respondent submits that this increase must have been expected during negotiations and the applicant’s failure to disclose this shows that he negotiated in bad faith or made a fraudulent misrepresentation. In its Response to the Contravention of Settlement Application, the respondent asserted that during the negotiations, the applicant said that the frequency of visits to the psychiatrist would not increase.
54During the first hearing of the Contravention of Settlement Application on March 29, 2015, the respondent asserted that at mediation, the applicant in fact assured the respondent that the frequency of his visits would decrease. The respondents advised that they could produce evidence to substantiate this and to show that the applicant negotiated in bad faith.
55At the reconvened hearing, Mr. Bullen testified that the applicant did not say anything in mediation to suggest that his visits for psychiatric treatment would change one way or another. He said that he and his client assumed that the frequency of visits would not change but confirmed that the applicant did not say that he anticipated a decrease in the number of visits.
56As noted earlier, Mr. Bullen testified that during the settlement discussions, there was an idea that the respondent would be willing to pay greater travel expenses if the total number of visits would decrease so that the total costs would be the same. This is reflected in paragraphs of the Minutes of Settlement that provide that the applicant will make reasonable efforts to schedule visits with his family doctor to take place during the trip to see Dr. Rehaluk. The Minutes go on to say that if the applicant has appointments with his family doctor at other times, he will not be reimbursed for travel expenses for those other visits.
57The applicant testified that at the time the Minutes were signed, he had seen Dr. Rehaluk only once. That was an introductory visit and Dr. Rehaluk told him that he had not yet received the applicant’s full medical record from the previous psychiatrist. Dr. Rehaluk told him that a treatment plan would be discussed at the next visit. The next visit was after the Minutes of Settlement had been signed and at that time, Dr. Rehaluk told him that he wanted to see the applicant on a weekly basis.
58Dr. Rehaluk has provided a letter dated August 13, 2015, which confirms that he started seeing the applicant on February 19, 2015. This was only a few weeks before the Minutes of Settlement were signed. Dr. Rehaluk indicates that he has seen the applicant for the most part on a weekly basis and that the applicant has benefited from treatment. He mentions a special program that the applicant may be eligible for which may help the applicant “immensely” but that there is a waiting list.
59I find that there is no basis for the suggestion that the applicant negotiated the settlement in bad faith or that he misled the respondent about his understanding of the frequency of his future treatments.
Conclusion
60I find that the respondent had contravened the Minutes of Settlement. The respondent has not paid the travel costs it agreed to pay associated with treatments by Dr. Rehaluk.
Remedy
6145.9(8) of the Code provides:
(8) If, on an application under subsection (3), the Tribunal determines that a party has contravened the settlement, the Tribunal may make any order that it considers appropriate to remedy the contravention.
62The primary order that is appropriate to remedy the contravention is that the respondent must pay the travel costs it agreed to pay for each occasion when the applicant has been treated by Dr. Rehaluk. I remain seized in the event that the parties are unable to agree on the calculation of the amount of money to be paid for past travel costs.
63The respondent is also directed to pay the travel costs agreed to for future treatments by Dr. Rehaluk that are treatments for the applicant’s work-related injury.
64If the respondent believes that visits are not “necessary as a result of the injury” within in the meaning of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, and the pre-1989 Workers’ Compensation Act, it is not obliged to pay for the medical treatment itself. However, provided that the visits are for treatment of the applicant’s injuries, and not for treatment of something else, the respondent is obliged to pay the travel costs it has agreed to pay in relation to the applicant’s visits to Dr. Rehaluk.
65The applicant seeks additional monetary compensation for the fact that the Minutes were contravened. The applicant's counsel suggested that $50,000 would be an appropriate amount of compensation.
66In C.H. v. C.W.C., 2016 HRTO 220, I recently reviewed the Tribunal’s authority to award monetary compensation as part of the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion. On the basis of the cases reviewed in that decision, I concluded at paragraphs 48 – 49:
It is clear that section 45.9 of the Code gives the Tribunal discretion to “make any order that it considers appropriate to remedy the contravention.” The Tribunal has held however that the exercise of this discretion is properly guided by the common law principles relative to contract law. In my view, this means, that in appropriate circumstances, compensation is payable for mental distress or harm arising out of the contravention of the settlement. The mental distress or harm may take the form of injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect and may be compensated as such.
In this case, I find that the application of these principles to this case means that the applicant must establish:
At the time of the settlement, it was reasonably foreseeable that harm, emotional damage or injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect would arise if a term of terms of the settlement were breached.
That harm, emotional damage, or injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect did in fact arise as a result of the contravention.
67In my view, it was reasonably foreseeable that the applicant would experience some harm if the Minutes of Settlement were breached. The settlement was supposed to be a resolution of a longstanding conflict relating to the applicant's medical treatments. There is no dispute that the resolution and terms of the settlement were important considerations for the applicant.
68At the same time, it is clear that the contravention of settlement was based on a disagreement of what it was that had been agreed to. This is not a case where the respondent wilfully ignored or repudiated its obligations under the settlement. Rather, it is a case where the respondent did what it thought it was required to do to implement the settlement, even though I have found that the respondent’s interpretation of its obligations was not correct.
69The term of the settlement that was breached in this case was the payment for travel costs associated with the applicant's treatment by his psychiatrist. The applicant’s counsel suggested that a consequence of the respondent’s refusal to pay travel costs was that the respondent was interfering with the applicant’s psychiatric treatment and that this would be reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the applicant.
70The applicant testified that he was very upset when the respondent refused to pay the travel costs that he thought they had agreed to. He said that this situation compounded frustrations that he has experienced over the years in his dealings with the respondent. The applicant agreed that he did not cancel appointments with Dr. Rehaluk because of the non-payment of travel expenses. However, he said that it did result in financial difficulties.
71I accept that the applicant experienced some injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect as a result of the contravention of the settlement by the respondent and find that the applicant is entitled to some compensation for that. In consideration of all of the circumstances, I find that compensation in the amount of $1,000 is appropriate.
72Dated at Toronto, this 4th day of May, 2016.
“Signed By”
Brian Cook
Vice-chair