Chatham v. Ralston Metal Products Limited, 2016 CanLII 44266

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Andrew Chatham Applicant

-and-

Ralston Metal Products Limited and Theresa Pfaff Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel Date: July 15, 2016 Citation: 2016 HRTO 929 Indexed as: Chatham v. Ralston Metal Products Limited

APPEARANCES

Andrew Chatham, Applicant Self-represented

Ralston Metal Products Limited and Theresa Pfaff, Respondents Pamela Connolly, Counsel

1The applicant filed an Application alleging that the respondents discriminated against him contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. c. H. 19, as amended (the “Code”). In their Response, the respondents requested that the Tribunal dismiss the Application due to a full and final release signed by the applicant that covers the allegations contained in the Application.

2The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to address this preliminary issue. Based on the parties’ submissions at the preliminary hearing and the written materials, I find that the Application must be dismissed, as proceeding with it in light of the full and final release would amount to an abuse of process.

Factual Background

3The applicant was employed by the corporate respondent from September 2012 until it terminated the applicant’s employment on January 4, 2016. On that day the applicant met with Stephen Berry, the corporate respondent’s Vice-President of Sales and Marketing. Mr. Berry provided the applicant with a termination letter and a release. Mr. Berry provided the applicant with a cheque covering the termination pay the applicant was entitled to under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 (“ESA”). He advised the applicant that he would only receive the enhanced severance package provided for under the termination letter if and when he signed the release attached to that letter. The corporate respondent provided the applicant with five business days to sign the release.

4The release specifically addresses human rights claims and states in its relevant part as follows:

I acknowledge and I have discussed or otherwise canvassed any and all human rights complaints, concerns, or issues, arising out of or in respect of my employment with Ralston, if applicable. Further, I agree that this agreement constitutes a complete settlement of any existing, planned or possible complaint or complaints against Ralston under the Human Rights Code arising out of or with respect to my employment with Ralston.

5The release also advises the applicant to obtain legal advice.

6The applicant signed the release the next day, January 5, 2016. He e-mailed Mr. Berry the morning of January 5, 2016 to say that he would sign the release and asked Mr. Berry if they could meet on Friday January 8, 2016. Mr. Berry agreed. The applicant and Mr. Berry met on that day and the applicant provided Mr. Berry with the release. In return, Mr. Berry provided the applicant with a cheque for the additional amounts referenced in the termination letter.

7On Monday January 11, 2016, the applicant contacted Mr. Berry to ask about outstanding vacation pay. He also asked about his entitlements under the corporate respondent’s profit sharing plan and reimbursement for some expenses he incurred while employed. On that date, he also filed a claim under the ESA for an unpaid car allowance. The applicant and Mr. Berry corresponded on January 15-16, 2016 about the outstanding amounts owed to each other by the applicant and the corporate respondent. The applicant informed Mr. Berry that he would be in the hospital as of January 20, 2016. The parties resolved the outstanding employment related issues on January 18, 2016.

8The applicant submitted that he should not be bound by the release due to mental health issues he was experiencing at the time he signed the release and pressure applied by Mr. Berry. In the preliminary hearing, the applicant stated that he did not remember the meeting with Mr. Berry. However, in his Reply, he provided an account of the meeting. He stated that Mr. Berry provided him with no reason for his dismissal. He stated that, when he asked Mr. Berry why he was being dismissed, Mr. Berry stated that it did not matter and that if he had any issues he should deal with the corporate respondent’s insurance carrier. The applicant also stated that there was no witness present during his meeting with Mr. Berry and that Mr. Berry told him that he had to sign the documentation or he would withhold the payments referred to in the termination letter.

9Both in his Reply and at the preliminary hearing, the applicant stated that he went to the emergency room on January 4, 2016. According to the applicant, the doctor stated that he was “guarded” and provided him with a note. The note stated that the applicant was seen on January 4, 2016 and that he was totally disabled on that day. The letter stated that the estimated time until the applicant could return to work was two months. The applicant filed a Short Term Disability (“STD”) claim with the corporate respondent’s insurance carrier. In February 2016, the carrier advised the applicant that his claim was incomplete as the corporate respondent had not signed the required Plan Sponsor Statement (“Statement”). The applicant contacted Mr. Berry about submitting the Statement. Mr. Berry signed a Statement and dated it January 5, 2016. The applicant’s claim for STD benefits was approved after the Statement was submitted to the insurance carrier.

applicable law

10Section 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22, as amended, provides the Tribunal with the power to make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes. The Code does not explicitly bar applications where a release has been signed by an applicant. However, in several cases, the Tribunal has found that filing a human rights application after signing a full and final release in respect of the subject-matter of the application may constitute an abuse of the Tribunal’s process and, where that is the case, such applications should be dismissed.

11The reason why the Tribunal may determine that it is an abuse of process to permit an applicant to proceed with an application where he or she has signed a full and final release relates to the principle of finality. When two parties agree to settle a legal dispute, the principle of finality demands that the contract be given effect and prevents parties from litigating settled matters, unless there are compelling reasons to set the contract aside. Most litigation ends in settlements and almost all settlements include a provision by which a claimant fully releases the respondent from future claims relating to the subject matter of the settlement. To be effective, settlements must be final. Otherwise, parties would have no incentive to enter into settlements to end litigation. It is for this reason that this Tribunal has held that it would be an abuse of process to proceed with an Application when its subject matter is covered by a full and final release, unless there are compelling reasons to set aside the release. See, for example, Perricone v. Fabco Plastics Wholesale, 2010 HRTO 1655 at paras. 38-39, Nolan v. Royal Ottawa Health Care Group, 2014 HRTO 1604 at paras. 42-45 and the numerous cases cited in those decisions.

Findings

12In my view, it would be an abuse of process for this Tribunal to proceed with the Application in light of the release signed by the applicant.

13The release covers the allegations of discrimination contained in the Application. The applicant submitted that he should not be bound by the release because he was experiencing some mental health issues in the form of anxiety at the time that he signed the release. As noted above, the applicant stated that he did not remember meeting with Mr. Berry on January 4, 2016. However, he included details of the meeting in his Reply. In addition, the applicant did not sign the release on January 4, 2016 but instead the next day. The applicant did not claim that he was incapable of understanding the content of the release or the consequences of signing it. Although the applicant submitted a doctor’s note signed January 4, 2016, the note simply stated that the applicant was totally disabled and unable to return to work for two months. The applicant confirmed that he provided this note to the corporate respondent’s insurance carrier to support his claim for STD benefits. The note said nothing about the applicant lacking capacity to understand any documents he was being asked to sign.

14I find it relevant that the applicant did not sign the release until the following day and that he did not in fact provide the signed release to Mr. Berry until three days later. He did not ask for an extension to consult legal counsel or because he was dealing with any mental health issues. Even if the applicant was dealing with anxiety and any other mental health issues, this does not in and of itself render a person incapable of understanding the consequences of signing a legal agreement. In this case, the applicant was capable of filing an ESA claim on the Monday after the Friday when he met with Mr. Berry to provide him the signed release. He also continued to advocate on behalf of himself by seeking certain reimbursement for certain expenses he had incurred. Based on all of the above, I am not persuaded that the applicant was incapable of understanding the content of the settlement agreement or the consequences of signing it.

15The second reason the applicant provided for why he should not be bound by the release was that Mr. Berry allegedly pressured him into signing it. According to the applicant, Mr. Berry told him that he needed to sign the agreement as soon as possible or he would withhold the amounts referred to in the termination letter. I fully understand that the termination of one’s employment is a stressful event and that the applicant was likely feeling some pressure at having to make a decision in relation to the release. This is common in all termination cases.

16However, it is only pressure amounting to duress that will justify setting aside a signed release. The circumstances of this case fall far short of duress which has been defined by the courts as “coercion of the will”. Taber v. Paris Boutique & Bridal Inc. (Paris Boutique), 2010 ONCA 157 paras. 8-9. In this case, the corporate respondent provided the applicant with five days to consider whether he wished to accept the amounts offered to him in the termination letter in return for a signed release. There is no sign in the applicant’s correspondence with the corporate respondent that he was experiencing pressure amounting to duress. He did not sign the release under protest. Although it is not clear whether he consulted legal counsel prior to signing the release, the applicant did have the benefit of legal advice shortly following his termination from a friend who was formerly a practicing lawyer. In all these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the applicant experienced duress within the legal meaning of that term. Therefore, I do not find that the release should be set aside for this reason.

Order

17For the reasons set out above, the Application is dismissed. I find that it would be an abuse of process to proceed with this Application due to the full and final released signed by the applicant.