Eveleigh v. ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc., 2016 HRTO 279

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Alexander Eveleigh

Applicant

-and-

ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc.

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Laurie Letheren

Date: March 2, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 279

Indexed as: Eveleigh v. ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc.

APPEARANCES

Alexander Frederick Eveleigh, Applicant

Self-represented

ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc., Respondent

Amanda Lawrence, Counsel

Introduction

1This Application, filed under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleges that the applicant experienced discrimination in being terminated by the respondent.

Background

2On March 3, 2014, the respondent notified the applicant that his employment was being terminated on a without cause basis effective immediately. The applicant was notified of this decision through a meeting with the respondent where he was provided a letter that outlined the terms of the termination.

3The letter outlined the terms of the termination agreement and had a full and final release attached. The letter requested that the applicant review the letter and the full and final release that was attached to the letter. The letter further instructed the applicant that, if he chose to accept the offer as outlined, he was to return the full and final release by March 10, 2014.

4On March 10, 2014, the applicant signed the full and final release and returned the signed copy to the respondent.

5On March 2, 2015, the applicant filed his Application with the Tribunal.

6The respondent filed a Response in which it requested early dismissal of the Application on the basis that the applicant has signed a full and final release in respect of the subject matter of this Application and that to allow the Application to proceed would be an abuse of the Tribunal’s process.

7The Tribunal held a Preliminary Hearing on December 9, 2015, to address these issues.

Has Another Proceeding Appropriately Dealt with the Substance of the Application?

8The respondent asserts that the Application should be dismissed as the applicant signed a full and final release. In this release, it is specifically stated that “the parties have discussed or otherwise canvassed any and all human rights complaints … and I am not asserting any such rights or advancing any human rights claim or complaint.”

9The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider on a preliminary basis whether or not some or all of an application ought to be dismissed based on abuse of process. Section 23(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, as amended, provides that a tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.

10The Tribunal has held that the doctrine of abuse of process can apply in a variety of circumstances in which the Tribunal determines that it would be unfair to permit an application to continue. The circumstances that can give rise to an abuse of process may include circumstances such as delay, re-litigation, settlement, as well as certain issues of procedural unfairness. In attempting to preserve and promote judicial economy, consistency and finality, the focus of the doctrine of abuse of process is on the integrity and coherence of the adjudicative process. See Campbell v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 62 at para. 38, and Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180 at para. 46-47.

11The applicability of the abuse of process doctrine in the context of this Application is readily apparent when one considers that one of the principles on which the doctrine is based is the principle of finality, described as “so crucial to the proper administration of justice.” See: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 38.

12There is no dispute that the applicant signed the full and final release. The language of the release is clear and unambiguous. In signing the release, it is clear that the applicant agreed that he would not bring any claims under the Code with respect to his employment with the respondent or cessation of that employment.

13In situations like this, when the parties contract to settle legal matters between them by signing minutes of settlement, the principle of finality demands that the contract be given effect and prevents parties from litigating settled matters, unless there are compelling reasons to set the contract aside altogether. Thus, in determining whether it would be an abuse of process to permit the Application to proceed, the question is whether the full and final release is binding and final.

14In numerous decisions, the Tribunal has discussed reasons on how settlement and signed release agreements would be found to not be legally binding and final and, therefore, why the principle of finality might not be applied. These reasons include economic or psychological duress, fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the respondent, and the lack of capacity by the applicant to understand the terms of the release.

15The applicant has asserted that the release is not binding on him because he “did not have the cognitive skills to understand what he was signing” when he signed the release.

Capacity: Did the Applicant Understand and Appreciate the Termination Offer and Release?

16I find that the applicant has not provided evidence to support a finding that the settlement is not binding because he did not have the capacity to sign the release.

17In order to determine whether the applicant lacked the capacity to sign the release, I must consider whether the evidence provided in support of this claim demonstrates that, on March 10, 2014, the applicant was not able to understand the information that was relevant to making the decision on whether or not to sign the release, or that the applicant was not able to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of making the decision to sign or failing to make that decision.

18During the hearing, the applicant stated that “At the time of signing all I knew was that I had to sign to get my severance. I did not understand the contents of the document. I did look over it and read it over.”

19The applicant indicated that he had 7-10 days to look it over before he signed the release. He showed his wife the letter and the release and told her that he had to sign the release in order to get the severance pay. He stated that she did not really read the document. She just glanced over it and witnessed his signature because she understood that he had to sign to get severance pay.

20The applicant alleged the he was in no state to sign this document at the time. He did not, however, have any medical documentation to support this claim or any documentation to explain the extent to which his mental or physical state impacted his ability to understand what he was signing and understand the consequences of signing or not signing the release.

21When questioned by the respondent, the applicant stated that he was not being treated by any medical professional at the time of signing the release and agreed that any evidence he could provide about his physical or mental state at the time of signing would be pure speculation.

22When questioned about why his wife would let him sign if he did not have the ability to understand what he was signing or appreciate the consequences of signing the release, the applicant responded that they both understood that if he did not sign he would not have a continuation of health benefits and would not receive the severance payment that the respondent was offering and this would leave him in a difficult financial position.

23The applicant admitted that at the time of signing he was aware that he had the right to seek independent legal advice but because he was “not in a good state of mind,” he “did not consider the need to do that.”

24The issue of whether the applicant had the capacity to understand is distinct from the issue of whether he actually understood the release. In this case, the applicant has stated that he was aware of the need to sign the release in order to receive the severance payment and the continuation of some benefits. I adopt the statements made by the Tribunal in Perricone v. Fabco Plastics Wholesale, 2010 HRTO 1655 at para. 69, concerning the signing of an agreement without fully understanding:

[I]f, as the applicant contends, she chose to sign the Release without ensuring that she understood it, then she is responsible for that choice…. A party to a legal agreement cannot enter into it without taking the time and effort to understand it and then rely on her own actions as the basis upon which to resile from the agreement.

25In summary, the applicant has provided no evidence to support a claim that he was not capable of understanding and appreciating the termination agreement and release. He has made no claim that he was under economic or psychological duress at the time he executed those documents or that the respondent made representations to the applicant that were intended to deceive the applicant into signing the release.

26I find that the Application is an abuse of the Tribunal’s process.

27The Application is dismissed.