Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Viktoriya Stepanova
Applicant
-and-
The Corporation of the City of Windsor and The Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Ministry of Community and Social Services
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Mark Hart
Indexed as: Stepanova v. Windsor (City)
APPEARANCES
Viktoriya Stepanova., Applicant
Self-represented
The Corporation of the City of Windsor, Respondent
Patrick Brode, Counsel
The Queen in right of Ontario (as represented by the Ministry of Community and Social Services), Respondent
No one appearing
1This is an Application dated December 30, 2014 alleging discrimination with respect to services because of race, place of origin, citizenship, ethnic origin, disability, and reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2In brief, this Application arises out of the applicant’s application for and receipt of social assistance in the form of Ontario Works benefits from the respondent City of Windsor. There are two main aspects to the Application. First, the applicant alleges that she experienced discrimination as a result of the deduction from her Ontario Works benefits of a disability pension that had been awarded to her in the Ukraine as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster. Second, the applicant alleges discrimination with regard to the manner in which she alleges she was treated by City of Windsor staff in the context of her application for and receipt of Ontario Works benefits.
3By Case Assessment Direction dated July 23, 2015, this Tribunal directed that a teleconference hearing be held to hear oral submissions from the parties on two issues: (1) whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code on the basis that proceedings before the Social Benefits Tribunal already had appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application; and (2) whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part as having no reasonable prospect of success.
4The teleconference hearing in this matter took place on November 6, 2015, and I heard oral submissions from the applicant and counsel for the City of Windsor. I also have considered the Application, Responses and Reply filed in this matter, together with the applicant’s written submissions for the summary hearing. No one appeared at the summary hearing on behalf of the Ministry of Community and Social Services.
5In her written submissions for the summary hearing, the applicant made a request for anonymization of this Decision, which I also will address.
[Section 45.1](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h19/latest/rso-1990-c-h19.html#sec45.1_smooth) of the [Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-h19/latest/rso-1990-c-h19.html)
6Section 45.1 of the Code states:
The Tribunal may dismiss an Application, in whole or in part, in accordance with its rules if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application.
7Section 45.1 requires a two-part analysis: (1) whether there was another “proceeding” and, if so, (2) whether it “appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application”.
8There is no question that an appeal before the Social Benefits Tribunal (“SBT”) is a “proceeding” within the meaning of s. 45.1 of the Code: see Volnyansky v. Peel (Regional Municipality), 2014 HRTO 1716 (“Volnyansky”).
9As a result, the only remaining issue is whether the substance of the Application was appropriately dealt with in the other proceeding.
10In British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 (“Figliola”) at para. 34, the Court summarized the principles to be applied when considering whether another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of a human rights application as follows:
It is in the interests of the public and the parties that the finality of a decision can be relied on;
Respect for the finality of a judicial or administrative decision increases fairness and the integrity of the courts, administrative tribunals and the administration of justice; on the other hand, re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in an appropriate forum may undermine confidence in this fairness and integrity by creating inconsistent results and unnecessarily duplicative proceedings;
The method of challenging the validity or correctness of a judicial or administrative decision should be through the appeal or judicial review mechanisms that are intended by the legislature;
Parties should not circumvent the appropriate review mechanism by using other forums to challenge a judicial or administrative decision; and
Avoiding unnecessary re-litigation avoids an unnecessary expenditure of resources.
11In assessing whether the substance of an application already has been “appropriately dealt with” in another proceeding, the Supreme Court of Canada in Figliola identified the following three factors (at para. 37):
. . . whether there was concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues; whether the previously decided legal issue was essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal; and whether there was an opportunity for the complainants or their privies to know the case to be met and have the chance to meet it, regardless of how closely the previous process procedurally mirrored the one the Tribunal prefers or uses itself.
12This Tribunal addressed the application of the Figliola decision to the interpretation and application of s. 45.1 of the Code in Gomez v. Sobeys Milton Retail Support Centre, 2011 HRTO 2297, which concluded (at para. 4):
. . . the Court’s reasoning in Figliola applies equally to the interpretation of s. 45.1 of the Ontario Code, and to whether an application should be dismissed when the issues have previously been addressed in another proceeding in which the parties have had the opportunity to know the case to be met and meet it. Figliola instructs this Tribunal not to consider the procedural or substantive correctness of the other proceeding or decision when deciding whether the application or part of the application can proceed. If the reasons in the other decision dispose of the human rights issues before the Tribunal, the application or part of the application must be dismissed on the basis that it was appropriately dealt with in the other proceeding.
13In Okoduwa v. Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd., 2012 HRTO 443, this Tribunal stated (at paras. 25-26):
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Figliola provides guidance as to the interpretation of “appropriately dealt with” as it appears in s. 45.1. The Court makes clear that the Tribunal’s role is not to sit in appeal of other decision-makers in their determination of human rights issues. Nor is it appropriate for the Tribunal to use s. 45.1 as a vehicle for a collateral attack on the merits of another decision-making process; the appropriate route for challenging another decision is through the appeal or judicial review routes available in the other decision-making process.
Thus, the Tribunal’s principal concern in applying s. 45.1 is not whether parallel litigation has correctly determined the human rights issues, but whether the applicant has already had an opportunity to have the human rights claim considered by an adjudicator who had jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Code . . .
14As a result of the more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, this Tribunal has held that, at least in the context of the statutory discipline processes, the factors to be considered when determining whether the substance of a human rights application has been “appropriately dealt with” extend beyond consideration of the three factors identified in Figliola: see Claybourn v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2013 HRTO 1298 aff’d at Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. De Lottinville, 2015 ONSC 3085 (Div.Ct.); K.M. v. Kodama, 2014 HRTO 526 as also aff’d by the Div.Ct. in the same decision previously cited; Ormesher v. Schwarz Law LLP, 2014 HRTO 1757.
15In light of this more recent jurisprudence, this Tribunal in Volnyansky, above, expanded the three factors to be considered in the application of s. 45.1 of the Code to include consideration of fairness in contexts beyond statutory discipline proceedings, as follows (at para. 52):
… once it has been confirmed that concurrent jurisdiction exists to decide the human rights issues, there are three primary questions to consider in order to determine if another proceeding has appropriately dealt with the substance of the Application. These are:
whether there was an opportunity for the complainants or their privies to know the case to be met and have the chance to meet it;
whether the previously decided legal issue was essentially the same as what is being complained of to the Tribunal; and
would it be unfair to apply the doctrine of issue estoppel in the particular circumstances of the case?
16Accordingly, in determining the issue under s. 45.1 of the Code raised in the instant case, I will consider the three factors identified in Figliola as well as the additional consideration of fairness as identified in Volnyansky.
17There are two SBT decisions at issue in the instant case. The first is a decision dated January 8, 2014, which addressed the question of whether the benefits administrator correctly decided to reduce the amount of financial assistance provided to the applicant by $120.00 per month due to the disability pension from the Ukraine. The SBT held that, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant to the benefits administrator, the most obvious conclusion for the administrator to reach was that the applicant was entitled to receive $120.00 per month from her country of origin and that she had chosen to direct those funds to be paid toward utilities for an apartment in the Ukraine in which she had some legal interest. The SBT determined that this monthly payment was income and was not exempt, and that the administrator was correct in deciding that it ought to be deducted.
18The SBT noted that it was the applicant’s burden to prove that the administrator’s decision was wrong and that she failed to meet that burden. The SBT noted that, while the applicant asserted her belief that the disability pension from the Ukraine would not be available to her as a Convention refugee in Canada, she failed to produce any evidence that she ever made any attempt to claim those funds or investigate whether they were still being diverted to pay for apartment fees or whether any such arrangement could be changed and the funds sent directly to her.
19Nonetheless, while the applicant had failed to meet her burden of proof, the SBT indicated that it was not convinced that she had an adequate opportunity to do so in light of certain impediments she had identified, including limited language skills and abuse from the government in her country of origin. As a result, the SBT allowed the applicant a three month period in which to produce evidence with respect to her entitlement to the disability pension, such as a legal opinion or correspondence with the government in her country of origin requesting that the disability pension be paid to her directly. Any such further information was to be provided by the applicant to the administrator, who would then review and make a further decision regarding the deduction, which the applicant could then appeal to the SBT.
20The second SBT decision is dated May 28, 2014. Once again, the SBT addressed the issue of whether the administrator made the correct decision to reduce her Ontario Works income assistance by $120.00 per month as of April 1, 2013 because the applicant was entitled to the disability pension. Once again, it was determined that the administrator’s decision was correct as the disability pension did not fall within any of the exemptions. At the hearing, the applicant declined to make any oral submissions and relied solely on her written materials, which the SBT found were largely irrelevant to the issue on appeal.
21In her written submissions to the SBT, the applicant indicated that she had not received any disability pension since she had been in Canada and not received the benefit of any such payments since June 2010. She also stated that as a Convention refugee, this prevented her from taking the benefit of the disability pension from the country she was granted refuge from. She also stated that she assumed that her disability pension had been revoked due to her long absence from her country of origin.
22While the SBT found that the applicant’s evidence that she had not received the disability pension since coming to Canada was credible, the SBT found that the applicant had failed to produce evidence that she could not have the money directed to Canada, particularly if it was deposited each month to her bank account in her home country, as she had stated to her case worker. The SBT found that the applicant had not presented any new evidence since the time of her last hearing, such as a final pay stub or a letter from the pension indicating that it was no longer paying her or a letter from her bank to show that she no longer received the pension. The SBT found that the applicant further had failed to provide evidence that she had made any attempts to obtain such information.
23Applying the factors relevant under s. 45.1 of the Code as described above, there is no question that the SBT has concurrent jurisdiction to decide human rights issues, at least as they apply to the issue that was addressed by the SBT in its decisions: see Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) 2006 SCC 14, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513.
24It also is clear that, in the two hearings before the SBT, the applicant had an opportunity to know the case to be met and had the chance to meet it. In the instant case, in fact, the applicant was given two chances by the SBT to satisfy her burden of proving that the administrator’s decision was incorrect.
25The next question is whether the legal issue decided by the SBT was essentially the same as what is being alleged in the Application to this Tribunal. It is clear to me that the Application raises other allegations of discrimination by the respondent City of Windsor in the context of the applicant’s application for and receipt of social assistance benefits that do not relate to the issue of the deduction of her disability pension, which primarily consist of allegations about how the applicant alleges she was treated by City staff. These other allegations are not the same as what was addressed by the SBT and will be addressed below in the context of an assessment of whether these other allegations have a reasonable prospect of success.
26With regard to the issue raised in the Application that the deduction of the disability pension was discriminatory and in violation of the Code, it is my view that this issue is essentially same as the issue decided by the SBT. In her written submissions for the summary hearing, the applicant appeared to suggest that she was taking the position that some provision of the governing legislation or regulations was in violation of the Code. However, when asked for clarification on this point at the summary hearing, the applicant stated instead that she was challenging the SBT’s interpretation and application of the governing legislation to her individual circumstances.
27The applicant’s primary argument in support of her allegation that the deduction of her disability pension constitutes a violation of the Code rests on the contention that, given the situation in the Ukraine and particularly given the civil war in the Donbass region where she is from and given her status as a Convention refugee, it was unreasonable for the City to have required her to provide proof that she was not and could not receive her disability pension. In this regard, the applicant relies upon this Tribunal’s decision in Nemati v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2010 HRTO 1808 (“Nemati”) and the decision of the Divisional Court in Siadat v. College of Teachers (Ontario), 2007 CanLII 253 (ON SCDC), [2007] 83 O.R. (3d) 401 (“Siadat”), which found that it amounted to discrimination because of place of origin for the College of Teachers to require an applicant from Iran to obtain credentials from institutions in Iran and have them sent directly by the institution to the College, and that the College had failed to accommodate these applicants by accepting alternate proof of their credentials. In the same way, the applicant alleges that she too was incapable of obtaining the proof or evidence required by the City and the SBT to establish that she was no longer in receipt of the disability pension due to the political situation and state of war in the Donbass region and was denied appropriate accommodation.
28My first observation is that the issue of the applicant’s ability to obtain proof or evidence regarding her ability to continue to receive the benefit of her disability pension was one of the primary issues addressed in both SBT decisions. While the SBT did not use the language under the Code to frame the question as being whether the administrator’s (and its own) requirement for such proof or evidence amounted to discrimination in violation of the Code, the SBT nonetheless addressed this question directly and on the basis of the written materials submitted and oral submissions made by the applicant. In the Nemati and Siadat decisions, this Tribunal and the Divisional Court, respectively, were satisfied not only that the relevant institutions in Iran would refuse to provide the required credentials directly to the College but also that even making such a request would cause harm to the applicants’ relatives still in Iran. In contrast, on the basis of the applicant’s evidence before it, the SBT was not satisfied that she had established that she was unable to provide the kind of proof or evidence being requested.
29The applicant further submits that the SBT failed to consider the question of whether she had been properly accommodated in relation to the obtaining of the proof or evidence required. Once again, while the SBT did not expressly consider the duty to accommodate issue in the manner addressed by the Divisional Court in Siadat, the applicant was first required to establish that she needed accommodation because of a protected characteristic covered by the Code. Given that the SBT was not satisfied that the applicant was unable to provide the kind of proof or evidence being requested, the applicant failed to establish that she had a need for accommodation that would trigger the duty to accommodate analysis. Further, and in any event, I note that the applicant was provided by the SBT with a form of accommodation by being granted an additional three months to obtain this proof or evidence and by being afforded a second opportunity before the SBT to either provide this proof or evidence or establish to the SBT’s satisfaction that it could not be obtained.
30As a result, to the extent that the Application alleges that the City discriminated against the applicant due to the deduction of the amount of the disability pension from her social assistance benefits, I find that the SBT dealt with essentially the same issue.
31The final consideration is whether it would be unfair to apply s. 45.1 of the Code in the particular circumstances of this case. In my view, it would not. In this regard, I note that the applicant already has been given two opportunities before the SBT to address this issue and to provide evidence and argument to support her contention that the amount of her disability pension should not be deducted. In my view, it would be unfair to the respondent City to allow the applicant yet a third opportunity to attempt to prove something she already twice has failed to prove. Further, I note that since the time of the filing of the Application, the City in March 2015 stopped deducting the amount of the applicant’s disability pension from her social assistance payments and also cancelled her outstanding overpayment, on the basis of information provided by the applicant to the City in February 2015. While the applicant submits that this administrative action was only taken by the City after she filed her Application and could be changed at any time, I note that if the City was satisfied on the basis of information provided by the applicant in February 2015 that the deduction was no longer appropriate, it would be difficult for the City to change its position in this regard unless it was in receipt of new information indicating that the applicant was in fact able to access her disability pension.
32As a result, upon careful consideration of all of the relevant factors, I find that the SBT proceedings did appropriately deal with the substance of part of the Application, to the extent that it alleges discrimination by the City due to the deduction of the disability pension from the applicant’s social assistance benefits. Accordingly, this aspect of the Application is dismissed pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code.
Reasonable prospect of success
33The first issue is whether the Application has a reasonable prospect of success as against the Ministry of Community and Social Services. In its Response, the Ministry states that it is at arm’s length from the City of Windsor, and has no knowledge of and has had no involvement with the applicant. The Ministry states that, in Ontario, financial assistance under the Ontario Works Act is provided directly by municipalities and the Ministry does not administer that legislation.
34At the summary hearing, the applicant acknowledged that she did not deal with anyone from the Ministry and was not making any allegations against the Ministry apart from the allegations she was raising against the City. She stated that when she filled out the Application, she thought it was the correct protocol to name the Ministry. In my view, it is clear that the Application does not raise any allegations of discrimination for which the Ministry or the Crown would be responsible. Accordingly, I find that the Application has no reasonable prospect of success as against the Ministry or the Crown, and the Application is therefore dismissed as against this respondent.
35Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure read as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
36Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at paras. 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
37The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with or remedy general allegations of unfairness. The Tribunal only has the power to deal with discrimination, harassment or reprisal that is prohibited by the Code. Discrimination in the legal sense requires proof that the respondents’ adverse treatment of the applicant is based, at least in part, on the applicant’s race, place of origin, disability or other prohibited ground under the Code. In other words, the prohibited ground must be connected to the adverse treatment.
38There are a number of reasons why the Tribunal may decide to hold a summary hearing. In this case the Tribunal decided to hold a summary hearing to determine:
a. Whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of proving that there is a connection between what the respondent is alleged to have done, and the grounds of race, place of origin, citizenship, ethnic origin, disability and reprisal cited in the Application. That is, although the applicant may believe that the conduct of the respondent is connected to the ground, the issue is whether there is evidence available to the applicant to prove the connection; and,
b. Whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of proving that the respondent reprised against her for one of the three things to which the reprisal section of the Code applies, namely actions of a respondent that are intended as a reprisal for: (1) claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; (2) instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, (3) refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code [s. 8]. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32, Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273, Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31.
39Apart from the issue of the deduction of the amount of the disability pension from the applicant’s social assistance benefits, the Application also raises the following alleged violations of the applicant’s rights under the Code:
a. That in February 2013, when the applicant applied for Ontario Works benefits, the City case worker treated her badly and expressed a threatening and rigid tone on the phone and at an in-person interview of the applicant on February 28, 2013. The applicant states that the case worker asked her about her country of origin and when she was going back there;
b. That when she returned to the office to continue the interview on February 29, 2013, the applicant was made to wait for two hours while the case worker served another person who the applicant alleges was of the case worker’s nationality and was not in line;
c. That during the period from April to August 2013, she was harassed by City staff to get off social assistance benefits as soon as possible;
d. That on July 19, 2013, she had a meeting with a new case worker. The applicant alleges in the Application that at this meeting, she asked the new case worker why she was being treated so badly, to which the case worker replied that it was because the applicant had stayed in Canada, which she should not have done. The applicant further alleges in the Application that the case worker at this meeting told her that it is Canada and she must become accustomed to rude treatment. At the summary hearing, when questioned about this alleged incident, the applicant stated that it was the deduction of her disability pension that was described as punishment for her staying in Canada. When specifically asked if these were the case worker’s exact words, the applicant stated that the case worker said, “it is because you stayed in Canada”, but that to her the intention was clear. The applicant also stated at the summary hearing that the conversation in July 2013 was about the suspension of her social assistance benefits because she had failed to file her tax assessment, and that the case worker had been rude by sending a note saying that she had to do this immediately. At the summary hearing, the applicant raised a further allegation that this case worker had said that she should work as a waitress and also said that the case worker’s occupation was better than the applicant’s former occupation as a teacher;
e. That on September 30, 2013, the applicant was given a package to apply for Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) benefits which did not include an Essential Wellness Status form, which the applicant says formed the basis of the refusal of these benefits in May 2014. The applicant alleges that the City case worker deliberately withheld this form from her;
f. That on January 2, 2014, her social assistance benefits were suspended because she did not have permanent resident status;
g. That in June 2014, she went for a psychiatric assessment and the doctor produced a report on July 17, 2014. The applicant alleges that this report was deliberately concealed by her case worker, and that the case worker improperly refused to disclose the report to her, requiring the applicant to formally request the report from the case worker’s supervisor; and
h. That on November 5, 2014, the applicant received an overpayment letter from the City. The applicant alleges that she was told that this was done to punish her because she had requested disclosure of the medical report. When asked at the summary hearing whether the case worker had in fact said that the applicant was being “punished” for requesting the medical report, the applicant stated that she did not recall if the case worker used that word.
40Based upon a review of the applicant’s allegations, it appears to me that the primary theme is that the applicant believes she was treated badly and even rudely by City staff in relation to her application for and receipt of social assistance benefits. As stated above, the Code does not provide protection against general allegations of unfairness, bad treatment or rude behaviour. These kinds of allegations are only potentially protected under the Code if the applicant is able to establish some reasonable link or connection to one of the protected grounds cited in the Application.
41With regard to the protected grounds of race, place of origin, ethnic origin and citizenship, the applicant’s allegation is that she was treated badly by City staff because she is a Convention refugee from the Ukraine. While that may be the applicant’s belief, she has not established in the material filed with the Tribunal or in her oral submissions that she has a reasonable prospect of proving such a link or connection. The applicant says that at her initial interview in February 2013, she was asked questions about her country of origin and when she was going back there. It seems to me that these are not unreasonable questions for a case worker to ask in the context of an application for social assistance benefits. She says that she was forced to wait while another person of the case worker’s “nationality” was served. The applicant did not provide any information about the basis upon which she alleges that she knows either the nationality of the case worker or the person who was served before her or that they are of the same nationality, or how that supports an allegation of discrimination against her as a person of Russian-speaking Ukrainian origin.
42Then there is the shifting allegation about the context in which the new case worker is alleged to have said “it is because you stayed in Canada” in July 2013. In the Application, the applicant alleges that this was said to explain why she was being treated so badly. At the summary hearing, the applicant stated that it was said in relation to the deduction of her disability pension. There is no reasonable prospect, in my view, of establishing that this was a discriminatory statement.
43There are also allegations about the deliberate withholding of forms or reports, and that the applicant was being intentionally “punished” because she requested disclosure of a medical report. Once again, there is nothing to link these allegations to the protected grounds of race, place of origin, ethnic origin and citizenship. Similarly, the allegation that she was told that the case worker’s occupation was better than being a teacher, if that in fact was said, also fails to reveal any link to these protected grounds.
44With regard to the issue of disability, once again there is nothing in the allegations raised in the Application that supports any link or connection to that ground. The applicant’s submission in this regard is that the City failed to accommodate her needs arising from her disabilities. There is nothing in the Application or other materials to support that the applicant requested accommodation for disability-related needs from City staff, or that any such requests were refused or denied. When asked at the summary hearing to provide the basis for her allegation that she experienced discrimination because of disability, the applicant stated that the City staff did not help her to succeed and created barriers for her. While the applicant may have experienced barriers in her ability to obtain a level of social assistance benefits that she desired and perhaps even required, this alone is not sufficient to establish a link between the specific allegations of adverse treatment raised in the Application and the applicant’s disabilities. And while the applicant may have hoped that City staff would help her to succeed, this is not a legal obligation under the Code.
45Finally, with regard to the allegation of reprisal, the applicant alleges in the Application that she was punished for attempting to access the medical report for the purpose of her ODSP application and for mentioning that she is a Convention refugee. For the reasons discussed above, the applicant has not pointed to any evidence to support a link or connection between the treatment she alleges she received and her status as a Convention refugee, beyond mere speculation by the applicant. With regard to the former allegation, even if the applicant was “punished” for requesting the medical report, this does not fall within any of the bases for the reprisal protection under the Code. Requesting a medical report for the purpose of an ODSP application is not: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code. Accordingly, there is no factual foundation to support the applicant’s allegation of reprisal.
46For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that the remaining allegations in the Application have no reasonable prospect of success.
Request for anonymity
47The applicant requests anonymization of her personal information on the basis of alleged danger to the safety and security of herself and her immediate family who still reside in the Donbass area. The respondent takes no position on this request.
48In my view, the applicant has not provided this Tribunal with a sufficient basis to support anonymization and depart from the “open court” principle. While the applicant has been recognized as a Convention refugee, which requires that there be a well-founded fear of persecution in the country from which she originated, she has not provided any credible basis to support that naming her in Ontario in a decision dealing with her claim for social assistance in Ontario would result in any potential persecution of herself in Canada or potential repercussions for her family still in the affected area. In this regard, I note that the applicant already has been identified in an Interim Decision in this matter that was issued on March 3, 2015 (2015 HRTO 252) and in a Reconsideration Decision issued on March 26, 2015 (2015 HRTO 400) and she has brought forward no indication that her fears as a result of her being named in these decisions have come to fruition.
49Accordingly, the applicant’s request for anonymization is denied.
ORDER
50The Application is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to s. 45.1 of the Code and as having no reasonable prospect of success.
Dated at Toronto, this 29th day of February, 2016.
“Signed by”
Mark Hart
Vice-chair