HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Rose Marie Thomas
Applicant
-and-
Domenico Marcone
Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Michelle Flaherty
Indexed as: Thomas v. Marcone
INTRODUCTION
1This Interim Decision addresses the applicant’s request to defer consideration of this Application pending the completion of her request for a judicial review of an earlier decision.
2In an earlier Interim Decision dated June 30, 2015, I dismissed the Application in part: 2015 HRTO 872. The allegations against the applicant’s union, her former employer, and a number of personal respondents were dismissed because they had no reasonable prospect of success. The Application is proceeding against the personal respondent, Domenic Marcone.
3The applicant filed a Request for Reconsideration of the June 30, 2015 Interim Decision. In a Reconsideration Decision dated October 26, 2015, I held that there was basis under Rule 26.5 to reconsider the conclusions reached in the Interim Decision: 2015 HRTO 1425.
4The applicant has now requested a judicial review of the Reconsideration Decision.
5On January 15, 2016, the applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”), asking that the Tribunal defer consideration of the remaining issues in this Application pending the outcome of the judicial review proceedings. In essence, the applicant’s submissions as to why the Application should be deferred are a summary of the arguments she has advanced in support of the judicial review application.
6In an earlier case assessment direction, I advised respondents that unless directed to do so by the Tribunal, they need not respond to the RFOP’s filed by the applicant. The Tribunal did not direct the respondent to address to the RFOP in question and he has not done so.
ANALYSIS
7The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1). It is a discretionary measure that the Tribunal exercises on the basis of the circumstances of each case.
8As the Tribunal has frequently stated, the purpose of deferral is to ensure that proceedings dealing with the same facts or issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. Deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings, including a judicial review: see K.M. v. Kodama, 2014 HRTO 1074 (“K.M.”).
9For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that the Application ought to be deferred pending the outcome of the judicial review proceedings.
10First, in determining the remaining issues in this Application, there is no risk that the Tribunal’s decision will be inconsistent with whatever decision may be made by the Divisional Court. This is because the Tribunal has already rendered its decision on the issues the applicant seeks to have addressed in the judicial review proceedings. Deferring the Application would serve no purpose. There is no basis to defer an application where the Tribunal has already issued its decision on the matter being addressed elsewhere.
11Second, as the Tribunal explained in K.M., supra, the courts and this Tribunal have held that proceedings before administrative tribunals, such as this one, should not be delayed or interrupted by judicial review proceedings except in exceptional circumstances: see also Washington v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO 640, at paras. 8 to 11.
12In the case at hand, deferring the Application pending the outcome of the judicial review application would certainly interrupt the proceedings and delay the hearing of the Application on its merits. There are no exceptional circumstances to justify a delay. The request to defer is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 26th day of February, 2016.
“signed by”
Michelle Flaherty
Member

