HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Tadesse Gebremariam
Applicant
-and-
Catholic Children’s Aid Society and Various Individual Respondents
Respondents
Tadesse Gebremariam
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Police Services Board and Various Individual Respondents
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Indexed as: Gebremariam v. Catholic Children’s Aid Society and Various Individual Respondents
1These are two Applications filed under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”) The Applications were filed on December 1, 2015 and relate to events said to have occurred from 1994 to 2012.
2On January 15, 2016 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss these Applications (“NOIDs”) on the basis that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
3The NOID noted that from a review of the Applications it appeared that it had been filed more than a year after the last incident of discrimination and that the applicant had not cited facts that constitute good faith within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code.
4Although given an opportunity to respond to the NOIDs the applicant did not address the delay issue but did copy the Tribunal on correspondence to parties in apparently related civil litigation.
5Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.
6I find that these Applications are out of time and it is plain and obvious that the applicant has plead no facts which would support a finding that the delay was incurred in good faith.
7Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Code provide:
34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
8These provisions have been found to be mandatory subject to section 34(2). The limitation period is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim. See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate 2009 HRTO 1241. The Tribunal has held on many occasions that where an applicant seeks to establish that the delay in filing their application was “incurred in good faith”, the applicant must show something more than the absence of bad faith. The applicant must at a minimum provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.
9This Application is out of time. As indicated above it appears to relate to events said to have occurred between 1994 and 2012 involving a child of the applicant who the applicant claims was abused by various of the respondents. The Applications themselves are difficult to follow but the attached Statements of Claim appear to describe events in 1994, 2006 and 2012. In his Applications the applicant appears to claim that the final incident occurred in December 2014 or September 2015 but there is no indication of what occurred at those times. The Statements of Claim which provide the narrative of the Applications are dated July 27 and August 6, 2014, more than a year prior to the filing of the Applications.
10In my view it is plain and obvious that the final allegation contained in these Applications occurred at some time in 2012 more than two years prior to them being fled on December 1, 2015. The applicant provided no explanation for the delay in his Applications and did not respond to the NOID. Accordingly I find that there is no explanation, reasonable or otherwise, for the delay.
11For all of these reasons I find that it is plain and obvious that this Application is outside of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide and accordingly it is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 25^th^ day of February, 2016.
“Signed By”
David Muir
Vice-chair