D.G. v. Peel Children’s Aid Society, 2016 HRTO 1665

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

D.G. Applicant

-and-

Peel Children’s Aid Society and Family and Children Services of the Waterloo Region Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend Date: December 22, 2016 Citation: 2016 HRTO 1665 Indexed as: D.G. v. Peel Children’s Aid Society

APPEARANCES

D.G., Applicant Self-represented

Peel Children’s Aid Society, Respondent Carole G. Jenkins, Counsel

Family and Children Services of Waterloo Region, Respondent Maura Thompson, Counsel

Introduction

1The applicant filed an Application against the two respondents alleging discrimination in services on the basis of disability, contrary to the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The respondents asked that the Application be dismissed on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of success.

2By Case Assessment Direction, the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held. This took place on December 8, 2016. For the reasons that follow, I find that this Application has no reasonable prospect of success and should be dismissed.

DECISION AND ANALYSIS

3The applicant is the mother of a child who, at the time of the events giving rise to this Application, was 14 years old. The child’s father was awarded sole custody of the child in a 2003 court Order. However, at some points in his life, the child went to live with his mother for short periods. In August 2015, the child briefly lived with the applicant.

4The allegations in the Application are not entirely clear, but appear to relate to a period from August-December 2015. It is necessary for me to rely on the narrative in the respondents’ respective Responses to fill in some of the gaps in the information. The applicant did not take issue with much of the respondents’ chronology, although she does clearly challenge the respondents’ actions in relation to her child.

5It does not appear to be disputed that on or around August 12, 2015, the applicant was hospitalized involuntarily so that a mental health assessment could take place. I do not need to address the appropriateness of her being taken into care since the actions of the police or hospital are not part of this Application.

6The hospital notified the respondent Peel Children’s Aid Society (“Peel”), because the applicant was living in Mississauga. Peel contacted the child’s father, who lived in the Waterloo area. In light of the father’s comments about his strained relationship with the child, Peel made a referral to the Child and Family Services of the Waterloo Region (“Waterloo”).

7This was the sole extent of Peel’s involvement with the file. While Peel had earlier dealings with the family, including the applicant, these are historical and do not form part of the Application. The applicant does not separately describe the involvement of the two named respondents, instead collectively referring to them as the “CAS.” There is nothing in this narrative which would suggest that Peel treated the applicant adversely and, therefore, nothing on which any allegation of discrimination could be founded.

8Waterloo states that the applicant contacted it on August 16 and 17, 2015, demanding that her child live with her. It states that it advised the applicant that if she wanted change the custody order, it would be necessary for her to do this through the courts.

9It also wrote to the applicant on August 26, 2015, advising her that it wanted to do criminal checks on the persons over the age of 18 living with her. Case notes from the period indicate that it did not have sufficient information to assess the mental health stability of the applicant. The applicant did not have access to these notes, but the tenor of the allegations in her Application is that Waterloo expressed concerns about her mental health from the outset, and denied her access to her son because of these concerns.

10The Application refers to specific incidents occurring in November 2015. At a court hearing held on November 19, 2015, an interim order was issued placing the child in a group home in Hamilton, with the matter scheduled to return to court on December 29, 2015. Waterloo states that in January 2016, it was advised by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, which was representing the child, that he would be placed in London. Waterloo had no further involvement with the case.

11The applicant states that the November 19, 2015 court date was specifically set because it was known that she was unavailable on that date. Moreover, she states that on November 17, 2015, she had a conversation with someone at Waterloo and told this person that she wanted her son returned to her. She alleges that she was told that if she did obtain custody, that Waterloo would do an immediate apprehension. Finally, she alleges that on November 20, 2015, a person named Eileen stated:

... We feel that due to your Mental Health - PTSD, manic and depression, as well as the belief you’re addicted to drugs, we are not prepared to leave your son in your care.

12For the purpose of this proceeding, I am operating on the assumption that the applicant will be able to establish these allegations. However, that does not end my inquiry. Is it discriminatory for a child protection agency to be concerned about mental health issues and/or addictions possibly affecting the person who asks to be granted access to, or custody of, a child in its care?

13Waterloo was tasked with ensuring that the applicant’s son was placed in an environment in which he was adequately cared for, provided for, supervised and protected. (See s. 37(2) of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11.) It was necessary for it be concerned about the criminal record of the applicant’s adult roommates and the mental health stability/drug use of the applicant as these things could impact on the ability of the applicant to provide such an environment for her child.

14It is not for this Tribunal to inquire into whether Waterloo’s concerns were warranted, unless the applicant is able point to some evidence available to her that they were based on discriminatory factors, such as race or ethnicity, or prejudicial stereotypes about persons with disabilities.

15The applicant was given the opportunity to explain why she thought this might be so in her oral submissions, but was unable to point to anything but bald allegations that she was able to care for her child and, therefore, the service she received from Waterloo was discriminatory. In the absence of anything more, the allegations against Waterloo have no reasonable prospect of success.

ORDER

16The Application against the both named respondents is dismissed.