Larcher v. Kirkland Lake (Town), 2016 HRTO 1643

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Ryan Larcher

Applicant

-and-

The Corporation of the Town of Kirkland Lake

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Mark Hart

Date: December 20, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 1643

Indexed as: Larcher v. Kirkland Lake (Town)

APPEARANCES

Ryan Larcher, Applicant

Self-represented

The Corporation of the Town of Kirkland Lake, Respondent

Julie Richard-Gorman, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on September 8, 2015 alleging discrimination with respect to services because of sex contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).

2In brief, the applicant alleges that he is being treated differently by the respondent Town because of his sex in relation to its property tax collection efforts.

3The respondent filed a Request for Summary Hearing dated November 26, 2015, which was granted by Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated April 19, 2016.

4The summary hearing proceeded by teleconference on July 20, 2016, at which time I heard oral submissions from the parties regarding whether the allegations raised by the applicant in his Application have a reasonable prospect of success. I also have reviewed and considered all material filed by the parties for the purpose of the summary hearing.

5The basis upon which the applicant alleges discrimination because of sex relates to the difference he perceives in the efforts made by the Town to collect property tax arrears during the period of time when his mother owned the property, as opposed to what he perceives as more aggressive efforts to collect property tax arrears since he acquired the property in April 2013.

6There are some differences between the Town’s property tax collection efforts as between the applicant and his mother. During a period of approximately four years, the applicant’s mother received nine arrears notices, one letter, two registration warnings and three contacts. During this time period, the property taxes on the property were significantly in arrears, and the applicant’s mother made payments totalling $5,356.86. In contrast, during the two and a half year period when the applicant owned the property, the applicant received ten arrears notices, two letters, one registration warning and two contacts. During this time period, the applicant made a substantial payment of $18,100 towards the outstanding tax arrears. He did not pay the balance of tax arrears owing pending his appeal of the valuation of the property, which was ultimately successful and resulted in a reduction in his tax arrears.

7While there are some differences in the Town’s efforts to collect outstanding property taxes as between the applicant and his mother, this does not necessarily mean that these differences are attributable to discrimination because of sex as alleged by the applicant. Rather, on the basis of the material submitted and the applicant’s own oral submissions at the summary hearing, there was a significant difference as between the applicant and his mother in terms of their respective financial circumstances and ability to pay. At the relevant time, the applicant’s mother was not employed and was on some form of disability benefits. Based on her financial circumstances, the applicant acknowledged at the summary hearing that there was no way that his mother would have been able to bring her tax account with the Town current. In contrast, the applicant is not on disability benefits and is able to generate income, as the applicant acknowledged is evidenced by the fact the he made a substantial payment towards the outstanding tax arrears following his acquisition of the property.

8In my view, the comparison being made by the applicant with his mother is like comparing apples and oranges. There is a significant difference between these two individuals in terms of their respective financial means and ability to pay the property tax arrears. The fact that the Town may have shown some degree of compassion for the difficult circumstances of the applicant’s mother in my view not only fails to support the applicant’s allegation of discrimination against him because of his sex, but demonstrates a degree of discretion and flexibility on the Town’s part in its approach to tax collection which is commendable. In my view, the applicant has no reasonable prospect of demonstrating at a hearing that any difference in treatment as between himself and his mother is attributable to sex discrimination, as opposed to the Town’s compassionate treatment of an unemployed person on disability benefits with limited financial means.

9In his oral submissions, the applicant also raised an allegation that he had acquired other properties in the Town from elderly women where he says the Town’s tax collection efforts were more aggressive after he acquired these properties. The applicant had given no notice to the Town in advance of the summary hearing regarding this allegation, despite having been afforded an opportunity to file materials for the summary hearing pursuant to this Tribunal’s CAD. As a result, at the summary hearing, the applicant stated that he would not be relying upon his allegation regarding these other properties for the purpose of the summary hearing, and I accordingly place no weight on the applicant’s statement in this regard. Apart from this, the applicant did not point to any further evidence in his possession or that may be reasonably available to him that would assist in establishing that he was subjected to sex discrimination.

10The applicant also had filed a Request for Order dated March 2, 2016 seeking to amend his Application, which I indicated that I would consider for the purpose of the summary hearing. In this Request for Order, the applicant raises further allegations of discriminatory treatment by Town officials, which include having his DJ services cancelled by the Town for its annual Christmas party, two Town officials coming to his home regarding a complaint about the applicant’s home surveillance system, the driver of a Town vehicle slowing down and staring at him, the personal service of the Town’s Response to the Application to the applicant’s home address, being ticketed shortly after illegally parking his car, and a Town vehicle driving by his home.

11In my view, having reviewed and considered the allegations as set out in the applicant’s Request for Order, there is nothing in these allegations to connect them to discrimination because of sex as alleged in the Application. The only reference to differential treatment because of sex set out in the Request for Order is the alleged contrast between two Town officials coming to the applicant’s home and parking in a manner that blocked his driveway when dealing with the complaint about his surveillance system, as opposed to the applicant’s observation on another occasion that one Town official appeared to be delivering a document to a female resident and did not park in a manner that blocked her driveway. In my view, there is simply no basis of comparison between these two alleged incidents that would reasonably support a claim of sex discrimination against the applicant.

12While not specifically alleged by the applicant in his Request for Order, I have also considered whether there would be a reasonable prospect of success in alleging reprisal in violation of section 8 of the Code arising from these allegations. The reprisal section of the Code only applies to the actions of a respondent that are intended as a reprisal for any of the following: (1) claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; (2) instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, (3) refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code: see Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273, Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31. To proceed with the Application, there must be a reasonable basis to believe that the applicant could establish the respondent reprised against him for one of these three things.

13As stated above, the Application in this matter was filed on September 8, 2015. The Application was served on the Town by letter from the Tribunal dated October 23, 2015. The Response indicates that the first time the Town became aware of the applicant’s allegation of sex discrimination in violation of the Code was on October 28, 2015, when it received a copy of the Application. While the applicant met with Town officials on January 15, 2015 to complain about how he alleges he was being treated by the Town’s tax collector, the material before me does not indicate that the applicant sought to claim or enforce his rights under the Code prior to the filing of the Application.

14The cancellation of the applicant’s DJ services was communicated by text message dated July 16, 2015. The two Town officials coming to the applicant’s home regarding a complaint about his home surveillance system occurred on September 2, 2015. The allegation about the driver of a Town vehicle slowing down and staring at the applicant is alleged to have occurred the next day. All of these alleged events took place before the applicant sought to claim or enforce his Code rights, and therefore cannot constitute reprisal.

15There is no doubt that the personal service of the Response to the applicant’s home occurred after the Application had been served on the Town. However, personal service is a permissible and legitimate form of effecting service under this Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, and there is nothing about serving a document in this manner that is capable of constituting reprisal.

16The only events that are alleged to have occurred after the Town received the Application are the allegations that the applicant was quickly ticketed after parking his car illegally (which he acknowledges doing), that an unidentified individual was staring at the applicant while talking to someone in a Town vehicle who appears to have been the tax collector, and that a Town vehicle drove by the applicant’s home twice and circled back towards him later that day. In my view, there is nothing in these allegations to suggest reprisal beyond mere speculation by the applicant, which this Tribunal repeatedly has held to be insufficient to establish a reasonable prospect of success: see for example Perepelytsya v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2015 HRTO 805; Rector v. Greater Sudbury (City), 2016 HRTO 1538.

17As a result, even if I were to grant the applicant’s Request for Order seeking to amend his Application, I find that these allegations also have no reasonable prospect of success.

ORDER

18For all of the foregoing reasons, the Application is hereby dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.