HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Jeffrey Eamon
Applicant
-and-
Riley’s Valu-Mart
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Keith Brennenstuhl
Indexed as: Eamon v. Riley’s Valu-Mart
APPEARANCES
Jeffrey Eamon, Applicant
Self-represented
Riley’s Valu-Mart, Respondent
Leanne Fisher, Counsel
Introduction
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment because of disability, sex, gender identity, gender expression, age and that the applicant was subject to reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2The respondent filed a Request for Summary Hearing, Form 26. The applicant filed a Form 11, Response to a Request for Order During Proceedings, requesting that “the case should move along to the Tribunal and mediation.”
3The Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held by teleconference to determine whether the Application should be dismissed in whole or in part, on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed if the Application was to proceed or that the Application has not been filed in time.
4A half-day teleconference hearing was held on February 1, 2016.
5Although the parties made submissions on whether the Application should be dismissed on the basis of delay, given my findings on the issue of whether the Application should be dismissed on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that it will succeed, it is unnecessary for me to rule on this issue.
6For the reasons that follow, this Application is dismissed
no reasonable prospect of success
7In the instant case, the applicant has alleged that he was subjected to differential treatment on the basis of Code grounds that resulted in disadvantage to him.
8The applicant was employed at the respondent’s grocery store as a Stock Clerk from June 9, 2014 to July 10, 2014. His allegations are that he was pushed too hard at work, denied overtime, told to get back to work and unloaded “half the total workload by himself before lunch, subsequently the other two employees took a 1 hour lunch and was still forced to do more work.”
9The applicant says that he “feels” and “believes” that he was treated in this manner because of the grounds enumerated in his Application. Other than his feeling and belief that he was adversely treated by his employer because of the grounds enumerated in his Application, he does not provide evidence in his possession or that may be reasonably available to him upon which the Tribunal could rely on to draw such an inference. The lack of particulars render these allegations so vague as to make it of little use to the Tribunal in determining whether the respondent’s actions were due to the grounds identified in the Application.
10Expectations that an individual will work hard, perform the duties of his position, and only take breaks when allowed to do so, do not constitute a violation of the Code. The applicant may perceive such requirements as unfair, however, the Tribunal does not deal with allegations of unfairness, but only with treatment that is discriminatory on an enumerated ground under the Code.
11The applicant alleges that he was “talked down to” and told to “get back to work”. Even if true, the Tribunal has indicated that even “a demeaning tone” (Ahmed v. VPI, 2010 HRTO 1855 at para. 45) or “rudeness” (Fisher v. Sheidow, 2011 HRTO 2332 at para. 18) are not, in and of themselves, evidence of discrimination as opposed to frustration at the applicant.
12In short, the applicant provides bald allegations of discrimination devoid of any real or cogent particulars. There is no evidence that anyone concerned ever said anything directly or indirectly about his alleged disability, sex, gender identity, gender expression or age or any evidence that would allow the Tribunal to draw an inference of discrimination. There is no evidence that the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him that would show a link between the events he alleges and the grounds enumerated in the Application.
13The purpose of the summary hearing is to determine if there is evidence available to support the applicant’s belief that the disadvantageous treatment he experienced arises from discrimination under the Code. In order to warrant proceeding to a full hearing of the merits the applicant must have evidence in his possession or that may be reasonably available to him, which goes beyond the applicant’s feeling or belief that a prohibited ground of discrimination played a role in what he experienced.
14The applicant has not persuaded me that any evidence exists to establish such a connection beyond his strongly held belief that any and all disadvantage that he experienced is attributable to differential treatment because of the Code grounds he has identified. Nor is there evidence available to him of reprisal contrary to the Code.
15Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 3rd day of February, 2016.
“signed by”
Keith Brennenstuhl
Vice-chair

