HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Jennifer Adams
Applicant
-and-
SNC-Lavalin O&M Inc. and Bill Mindenhall
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Indexed as: Adams v. SNC-Lavalin O&M
APPEARANCES
Jennifer Adams, Applicant
Self-represented
SNC-Lavalin O&M Inc. and Bill Mindenhall, Respondents
Andrew McCreary, Counsel
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to goods, facilities or services because of disability contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2In a Case Assessment Direction issued on May 13, 2016 the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be held in this case.
3On August 17, 2016 the applicant sought an adjournment of the Application. This request was denied in Interim Decision 2015 HRTO 1147 issued on August 29, 2016.
4On October 1, 2016 the applicant sought a three week adjournment of the summary hearing citing the late filing of two Decisions the respondent intends to rely on at the summary hearing. This request was denied in 2015 HRTO 1289 issued on October 4, 2016.
5On October 11, 2016, the applicant again sought an adjournment citing her having being locked out of an email account for a period of time and therefore unable to retrieve certain unidentified material, but which appeared to be materials previously filed by the applicant. I note that it appears that the applicant is now able to access the materials and in any case it appears that they have been filed with the Tribunal and have been reviewed.
6This request was denied in an Interim Decision, 2016 HRTO 1330, issued on October 13, 2016.
7The summary hearing proceeded as scheduled on October 14, 2016 by telephone conference call. Both parties participated.
Analysis and Decision
8Rules 19A.1 and 19A.2 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure read as follows:
19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.
19A.2 Rules 16 and 17 do not apply to summary hearings. The Tribunal may give directions about steps the parties must take prior to the summary hearing, including disclosure or witness statements.
9Details about the nature of a summary hearing were set out as follows in Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, at paras. 8 and 9:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.
10The Tribunal does not have the general power to deal with allegations of unfairness. It can only deal with alleged discrimination or harassment on the grounds set out in the Code. To succeed in an Application, an applicant must be able to prove discrimination on the basis of a Code ground on a balance of probabilities. To show discrimination, an applicant must prove a link between a respondent’s alleged actions and a Code ground.
11The Application is dismissed.
12In her Application the applicant made the following allegations:
While attempting to enter the Regional Court House my entrance was stopped by WRPS officers Simpson and Grandy. Mr. Simpson stood directly in front of me very close and said, "we are going to serve papers to you." It was clear he was not going to allow me to enter (I was there to try and get an order of protection against a local prostitute who had spit on me and knocked my ebike over). This incident was used by Mr. Mindenhall to issue an order of trespass. I have advised Mr. Mindenhall that I suffer PTSD as a result of a [criminal act] by a WRPS officer, [AB] and a physical assault by an officer at the court house last year, [XY]; and that this action is creating a great deal of stress and anxiety. Obviously, I wish to file a small claims court law suit against [XY], and Mr. Mindenhall's actions make it very difficult to enter the court house.
13In the Case Assessment Direction issued on May 13, 2016 the Tribunal described the issue raised by the applicant’s Application and the respondents’ Request for a Summary Hearing in the following terms at paragraph 7 and 8:
In this case, the Tribunal has decided to hold a summary hearing because it appears that the applicant may be unable to prove that there is a connection between what the respondent is alleged to have done and the grounds cited in the Application. That is, although the applicant may believe that the decision to issue the trespass notice was related to her disability, it is not clear that there is evidence available to the applicant to prove the connection. The focus of this inquiry is on the evidence the applicant has or may be able to obtain.
As noted, the allegations are that the respondents issued a trespass notice despite knowing that doing so would have a negative impact on her, and that the trespass notice was issued specifically to exacerbate the symptoms of her disability.
14The applicant provided written submissions prior to the Summary Heaing and made oral submissions on the conference call. Several emails received subsequent to the summary hearing were received and reviewed.
15In my view the applicant has not met the relatively low burden of showing that there is evidence reasonably available to her that would tend to establish her contention that the respondents together with the local police service issued a trespass notice deliberately because they knew it would cause her harm or simply because they knew that she was a person with a disability. Although the applicant appears to believe that this is the case she was unable to point to any evidence which would tend to establish her claim. At this stage the Application includes mere assertions of the applicant’s beliefs about what happened and why.
16In her written submission and at the summary hearing the applicant asserted that the respondents would have had access to prior occurrence reports which might have disclosed that she was a person with a disability. Assuming that this is a fact it is not at all clear how any particular inference could be drawn from this fact. The remaining facts alleged are that the applicant is a person with a disability who was subject to a trespass notice – these facts taken together do not establish a violation of the Code. Essentially the applicant’s position is that because she believes it to be true the Tribunal should hold a full merits hearing and require the respondent to explain their actions. That is not the standard to be met.
17For these reasons the Application is dismissed because I am satisfied that it has no reasonable prospect of success.
Dated at Toronto, this 7th day of December, 2016.
“Signed By”
David Muir
Vice-chair

