Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Yohannes Adamsu Applicant
-and-
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 997 Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Laurie Letheren
Indexed as: Adamsu v. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 997
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Yohannes Adamsu, Applicant
Shannon Sproule, Counsel
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 997, Respondent
Fiona Brown, Counsel
Introduction
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to housing because of ancestry, disability, race, colour, place of origin and ethnic origin contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2The purpose of this Interim Decision is to address the respondents’ request to remove the named personal respondent as a party to this Application.
3By Request for Order During Proceedings (“RFOP”), the respondents requested that the Tribunal remove the named personal respondent as a party to this proceeding. The applicant consented to the removal of the personal respondent.
4In their RFOP, the respondents rely upon Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 14 in which the Tribunal set out the general approach to this issue, stating as follows (para. 42) :
The unnecessary naming of personal respondents is a practice to be discouraged, as this serves to unnecessarily add to the complexity of proceedings and can often operate as a roadblock to resolution. Pursuant to section 45(1) of the Code, a corporation is deemed to be liable for “any act or thing done or omitted to be done in the course of his or her employment by an officer, official, employee or agent”. Where there is no issue as to the ability of a corporate respondent to respond to or remedy an alleged Code infringement and no issue raised as to a corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the actions of an individual who is sought to be added as a personal respondent, then in my view the individual ought not be added as a personal respondent in the absence of some compelling juridical reason. A compelling juridical reason may exist, for example, where it is the individual conduct of a proposed personal respondent that is a central issue as opposed to actions which are more in the nature of following organizational practices or policies or where the nature of the alleged conduct of a proposed personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found.
5The respondent submits that the personal respondent was at all times acting within the proper scope of his duties as a director of the Board. The Application focuses on the conduct of the Condominium Corporation and the personal respondent’s conduct is not of chief importance to the Application. The personal respondent is therefore not a proper party to the Application.
6Given that the personal respondent was acting in his capacity as the director of the Board of the Corporation and was acting in the scope of his duties, I find that it is appropriate to remove the personal respondent as a party. This will allow for a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the Application. The applicant will not be prejudiced by the removal of the personal respondent.
ORDER
7The respondents’ request to remove the personal respondent to this Application is granted. The style of cause is amended accordingly.
Dated at Toronto, this 10th day of November, 2016.
“Signed By”
Laurie Letheren
Vice-chair