Anwar v. Seneca College Management, 2016 HRTO 1427

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Khaliq Anwar

Applicant

-and-

Seneca College Management

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jennifer Khurana

Date: November 3, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 1427

Indexed as: Anwar v. Seneca College Management

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Khaliq Anwar, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1The applicant filed an Application alleging that the respondent discriminated against him contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), with respect to services because of race, colour, place of origin and ethnic origin. Specifically, the applicant alleges that he was a student at Seneca College from 2004 to 2007 and that he was unlawfully removed from the respondent’s premises. He alleges he was made to leave the country and subject to harassment and intimidation by the respondent and security officials from the federal government.

2On September 26, 2016, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) on the basis that the Application appears to be outside the Tribunal’s power to decide. The applicant provided submissions in response to the NOID in which he repeats some of the same allegations and alleges that he has been the victim of arrests and torture in Pakistan as a result of the discrimination he faced in Ontario by the respondent.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

3For the reasons that follow, I find that it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and must be dismissed.

4Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121; and Furtney v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada Inc., 2014 HRTO 1343.

5Section 34 of the Code provides as follows:

34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

6As stated in Miller v. Prudential Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, in order for an applicant to establish that a delay in filing an application was incurred in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith; otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period. The mandatory one-year limitation period for filing an application is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. The Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence to file an application within one year when pursuing a human rights claim.

7I do not find that the applicant has provided a good faith explanation for the considerable delay in filing his explanation. Assuming the applicant’s allegations fall under the Code, the last incident involving the respondent occurred in 2008.

8The applicant states that following his alleged removal by the respondent and CSIS from the school and from Canada in 2008, he believed the discrimination had stopped and did not pursue the matter. In March 2016, the applicant alleges that he was subject to increasing harassment and attacks in Pakistan committed by the Pakistani Armed Forces, police and members of the public. The applicant filed his Application when he began to fear for his life and claims that the recent events are the continuation of the discrimination he faced when in Canada.

9The Tribunal has determined on many occasions that there is a distinction to be made between an incident with ongoing consequences and the situation where there is a fresh act or decision repeated over a period of time. Even assuming the allegations in the Application fall under the Code, the applicant relies on a consequence of a decision he alleges was made by the respondent many years earlier. See Garrie v. Janus Joan Inc., 2012 HRTO 1955. While the applicant argues that the decision to remove him from the school continued to have ongoing effects, these ongoing effects do not amount to further incidents of discrimination. See Visic v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2008 CanLII 20993 (ON SCDC).

10Because the applicant has not established a good faith explanation for the delay, I need not determine whether or not the respondent suffered any prejudice by the delay. See Colhoun v. Hydro One Networks Inc., 2014 ONSC 163 (Div. Ct.) at para. 12.

11For all of these reasons I find that this Application must be dismissed because it is plain and obvious that it is out of time and the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for the delay.

ORDER

12For the above reasons, the Application is dismissed.