HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Zhi Liang Zhao
Applicant
-and-
Pizza Nova Take Out Ltd.
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Josée Bouchard
Indexed as: Zhao v. Pizza Nova Take Out Ltd.
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Zhi Liang Zhao, Applicant
Self-represented
Introduction
1The applicant filed an Application on September 30, 2015, alleging discrimination in employment and contracts, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application contains allegations relating to incidents, the last of which allegedly took place on October 10, 2013.
2On December 2, 2015, the Tribunal sent a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) for delay. The applicant filed submissions in response to the Notice on January 11, 2016.
decision and analysis
3Section 34 of the Code is relevant to this case and states in part:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
4Section 34 of the Code provides that an Application must be filed within one year of the incident to which the application relates, or within one year of the last incident in a series of events. The first issue, therefore, that I must determine is the date of the last incident of discrimination.
5The Application identifies October 10, 2013, on or around the date of the sale of the Pizza Nova 340 franchise, as the date of the last act of alleged discrimination. However, in his written submissions, the applicant explains that in May 2015 he was a witness at the hearing of his son's human rights application against the respondent. He said he asked to testify for a second time in that case, but the Tribunal rejected his request. He raises concerns that the Tribunal's refusal to hear further evidence from him will negatively impact the outcome of his son's case. He maintains that the last incident in this case is the Tribunal's decision to refuse to hear from him in October 2015 in his son’s case.
6The applicant does not argue that the respondent continued to discriminate against him after October 2013, or that the respondent discriminated against him because of his participation in his son's case. The applicant has failed to show that the alleged series of discriminatory incidents by the respondent continued after October 2013.
7I find that the last incident of alleged discrimination in this case occurred in October 2013, nearly two years before the filing of this Application. I move now to the question of whether the delay was incurred in good faith.
8The Tribunal has the jurisdiction to accept an application filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination if it is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith. As noted in Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424, to determine that a delay in pursuing one's Code rights was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation for why he did not pursue his Code rights in a timely manner.
9However, the applicant has taken the position that he filed the Application within 12 months of the date of the last incident and has not asserted that any delay was incurred in good faith. In response to the NOID, the applicant discusses his involvement in his son's case, but he does not allege that this participation was a factor in the delay in filing his Application, nor has he filed documentation or particulars supporting such a position.
10Having reviewed the material filed by the applicant, I find there was nothing to prevent the applicant from filing his human rights Application in a timely manner. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the delay was incurred in good faith.
11The Tribunal has also held that where it is not satisfied the delay was incurred in good faith, it is not necessary to consider prejudice. See Esanu v. Georgetown Men’s Non-Contact Hockey League, 2009 HRTO 579.
12In the circumstances, I find that the Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it is untimely under s. 34 of the Code.
13The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 27^th^ day of January, 2016.
“Signed by”
Josée Bouchard
Vice-chair