Smith v. London Animal Care Centre, 2016 HRTO 1154

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Gaylene Smith

Applicant

-and-

London Animal Care Centre

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Naomi Overend

Date: August 31, 2016

Citation: 2016 HRTO 1154

Indexed as: Smith v. London Animal Care Centre

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Gaylene Smith, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This Interim Decision deals with the applicant’s Request for Interim Remedy.

2The applicant filed this Application on August 22, 2016, alleging discrimination on the basis of creed contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O.1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”). The allegations in the Application concern a requirement imposed by the respondent that the applicant microchip her dog. Although the applicant identifies the area of discrimination under section 6 of the Application as “membership in a vocational association” it is more properly services.

3On August 21, 2016, the applicant received a fine of $205, delivered by the respondent, which she says she cannot afford to pay. She seems to be under the belief that, as long as she is not in compliance with the micro-chip requirement, the respondent is able to continue to fine her every 15 days and/or seize her dog.

4The applicant seeks an order from the Tribunal preventing the respondent from issuing further fines or enforcing the August 21, 2016 fine. She also asks that it be prevented from visiting her home and “harassing” her and her dog in the interim.

DEcision

5Rule 23 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states in part:

23.2 The Tribunal may grant an interim remedy where it is satisfied that:

a) the Application appears to have merit;

b) the balance of harm or convenience favours granting the interim remedy requested; and,

c) it is just and appropriate in the circumstances to do so.

23.3 A Request for an Interim Remedy must include:

a) a detailed description of the order sought;

b) one or more declarations signed by persons with direct first-hand knowledge detailing all of the facts upon which the Applicant relies; and,

c) submissions with respect to the merits of the Application, the balance of harm or convenience and why an interim remedy would be just and appropriate in the circumstances, in accordance with the Rule 23.2.

6The applicant has not attached a declaration to her Request for Interim Relief, as she is required to do pursuant to Rule 23.3, nor has she made submissions on the balance of harm or convenience. On this basis alone, the Request must fail.

7In any event, the applicant may be operating on mistaken information with respect to whether the respondent can continue to fine her every 15 days. Moreover, her belief that the respondent will continue to do so (in the event that it can) is premature. She also indicates in her Application that the information on the fine indicates that she has 15 days to pay it, book a trial or talk to a prosecutor. It is not clear to me why the applicant cannot choose the trial option and address her religious concerns about micro-chipping in that process.

8In TA v. 60 Montclair, 2009 HRTO 369, the Tribunal states that interim remedies are extraordinary and are only granted when an applicant is able to demonstrate that such a remedy is necessary to ensure a complete, appropriate and effective remedy at the end of a hearing. In the instant case, the applicant has failed to articulate why such a remedy is necessary at this stage of the proceedings.

9In the circumstances, her Request for Interim Remedy is denied.