HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Dianne Charlton
Applicant
-and-
The Corporation of the Municipality of Meaford, Denyse Morrissey, Robert Tremblay, Darcy Chapman, Barbara Clumpus and Mike Poetker
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Josée Bouchard
Indexed as: Charlton v. Meaford (Municipality)
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Dianne Charlton, Applicant
Self-represented
The Corporation of the Municipality of Meaford, Denyse Morrissey, Robert Tremblay, Darcy Chapman, Barbara Clumpus and Mike Poetker, Respondents
Aynsley Anderson, Counsel
Introduction
1These Applications were filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”). The purpose of this Interim Decision is to determine whether these Applications should be consolidated.
2Rule 1.7(d) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states that, in order to provide for the fair, just and expeditious resolution of any matter before it, the Tribunal may consolidate or hear applications together.
3In Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 25, the Tribunal adopted the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Lattey v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2002 CanLII 45928 (CHRT), which sets out the factors that should be considered in deciding whether to consolidate or hear proceedings together:
a. The public interest in avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings, including considerations of expense, delay, the convenience of the witnesses, reducing the need for the repetition of evidence, and the risk of inconsistent results;
b. The potential prejudice to the respondents that could result from a single hearing, including the lengthening of the hearing for each respondent as issues unique to the other respondent are dealt with, and the potential for confusion that may result from the introduction of evidence that may not relate to the allegations specifically involving one respondent or the other; and
c. Whether there are common issues of fact or law.
4The applicant opposes consolidation. She argues that although both Applications address the use and availability of the internet, the Applications are entirely different. She maintains that in the first Application, she was personally discriminated against because of her age and physical condition. She alleges that because she does not have access to the internet at home and it is difficult for her to travel to a location where the internet is available, she was a few days late in requesting compliance audits for two successful candidates in the October 2014 Meaford municipal election. She maintains that the second Application is related to the method of voting in the October 2014 Meaford municipal election. She alleges that some voters, including herself, were discriminated against because of their age and a physical condition, their hearing, because they were not able to use the phone or internet to vote. The applicant also maintains that the alleged discriminating actions occurred at different times.
5The respondents support the request to consolidate. They maintain that both Applications deal with the same subject matter (the 2014 municipal election) and the same type of discrimination (age and physical condition). They argue that both Applications arise out of the same set of facts (the municipal election process) and the same piece of governing legislation (the Municipal Elections Act). Both Applications contain a significant amount of overlap and rely on the same materials.
6I find that these Applications involve the same parties, the same subject matter, the same type of alleged discrimination that arises out of the same set of facts and piece of governing legislation. There is a compelling public interest in avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and, accordingly, the Tribunal orders these Applications consolidated.
7I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 25th day of August, 2016.
“Signed By”
Josée Bouchard
Vice-chair