White v. City of Greater Sudbury, 2015 HRTO 88

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Catherine White

Applicant

-and-

City of Greater Sudbury, Mark Simeoni, David Green, William Tanos and Tom Endleman

Respondents

-and-

Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4705

Intervenor

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw

Date: January 21, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 88

Indexed as: White v. City of Greater Sudbury

Introduction

1This Application filed on September 26, 2014 alleges discrimination with respect to employment because of disability, sex and family status contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). This Interim Decision deals with the issue of whether the Application should be deferred pending the completion of a related grievance proceeding.

2On December 15, 2014, the Tribunal sent the parties a Notice of Intent to Defer (the “Notice”), which indicated that it may be appropriate to defer the Application pending the resolution of the grievance. The Tribunal directed the parties to file by no later than January 14, 2015 submissions regarding whether the Tribunal should defer the Application pending the completion of the grievance proceeding.

3The applicant and the respondents filed submissions. The respondents submitted the Application should be deferred, while the applicant objected.

decision and analysis

4The Application is deferred pending resolution of the outstanding grievance.

5The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of a party (Rule 14.1). Deferral of an application seeks to ensure that proceedings dealing with the same facts or issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. The Tribunal will generally defer an application where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and issues. However, the Tribunal must also consider whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding with the application.

6The Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and human rights issues. In explaining this approach, the Tribunal has referred to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement (Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42).

7The Supreme Court thus confirmed that human rights tribunals are not the only decision-makers that can decide human rights claims. Where the parties are engaged in a concurrent legal proceeding in which they are raising the same human rights issues before a decision-making body with the authority to make determinations about those issues, the orderly administration of justice favours deferral to the other proceeding. In such a scenario, the Tribunal’s normal approach is to defer to the other proceeding.

8As stated in Melville v. Toronto (City) 2012 HRTO 22:

Deferral avoids two simultaneous proceedings that may result in conflicting determinations, ensures that the respondent need not be actively defending the same matter in two legal proceedings at the same time, and focuses the Tribunal’s limited resources on cases where it is the only process being pursued. In my view, it is consistent with the Tribunal’s mandate to interpret its rules in a fair, just and expeditious manner to defer a case when a grievance is ongoing, whether or not that grievance has yet been referred to arbitration. The grievance process is a stage in dispute resolution before the matter is referred to an independent third party, but that does not mean that there is no proceeding ongoing. Fairness supports avoiding the duplication of proceedings.

9In this case, it is apparent that there is substantial overlap between the facts and human rights issues covered by the Application and those referred to in the ongoing grievance, and potentially in past grievances. Some of the matters are still live as the arbitration process has not concluded. I am cognizant of the applicant’s submissions that the arbitration process will achieve little and her allegations that the respondent employer will continue to treat her unfairly. However, these are not reasons to refuse deferral and the fact remains that the grievance is outstanding. Deferral will be the most expeditious way of proceeding because the grievance is scheduled for arbitration on February 17, 2015.

10If the applicant believes, on conclusion of the arbitration process, that her human rights issues have not been adequately addressed, she may ask to have her Application brought back on before the Tribunal (“reactivation”).

11The respondents also have raised the issue of timeliness and potential issues relating to s. 45.1 of the Code, which they wish to have determined once the arbitration process is complete and this Application is reactivated.

12The Application will therefore be deferred pending the completion of the arbitration process.

13The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which the Application may be brought back on after the conclusion of the arbitration process.

order

14The Application is deferred pending the completion of the arbitration process.

15The parties’ attention is drawn to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, which address how the Application may be brought back on before the Tribunal, following conclusion of the arbitration process.