DeGoey v. M.F. Arnsby Property Management Ltd., 2015 HRTO 876

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Jenny DeGoey Applicant

-and-

M.F. Arnsby Property Management Ltd. and Essex Condominium Corporation No. 67 Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Mark Hart Date: June 30, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 876 Indexed as: DeGoey v. M.F. Arnsby Property Management Ltd.

APPEARANCES

Jenny DeGoey, Applicant Self-represented

M.F. Arnsby Property Management Ltd. and Essex Condominium Corporation No. 67, Respondents B. Clint Cadden, Counsel

1This is an Application dated April 7, 2014, alleging discrimination with respect to the occupancy of accommodation because of disability, marital status, age, association with a person identified by a protected ground and reprisal contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code").

2The respondent Essex Condominium Corporation No. 67 ("ECC No. 67") is a duly registered condominium corporation and the owner of a condominium building in Windsor, Ontario. The respondent M.F. Arnsby Property Management Ltd. ("Arnsby") is a real estate services company that at all material times was acting as the property manager for ECC No. 67.

3The applicant has been a resident of the building owned by ECC No. 67 for about 16 years. She states that the unit in which she resides was first owned by her mother, and subsequently owned by the applicant from approximately 2008 until May 1, 2012. Since May 1, 2012, the applicant states that the unit has been owned by her father, although the applicant continued to reside there.

4The hearing in this matter was held in Windsor on February 25, 2015. At the hearing, I heard the entirety of the applicant's testimony in support of her allegations, and she was cross-examined by respondent counsel. At the conclusion of the applicant's evidence, I directed the parties to provide submissions, based on the applicant's testimony, the documents entered into evidence before me and the proposed evidence of the applicant's other witness, on the issue of whether the applicant has a reasonable prospect of success in establishing a link or connection between the factual allegations she has raised in her Application and any of the grounds of discrimination alleged in the Application. At the applicant's request, the parties agreed to provide these submissions in writing.

5On February 27, 2015, I issued a Case Assessment Direction ("CAD") to the parties to confirm the direction that I had given at the hearing and established a schedule for the parties to provide their written submissions.

6This Tribunal has held that at any appropriate time during the course of a hearing, it may assess whether or not there is a reasonable prospect of success that an applicant will be able to make out her or his case of a violation of the Code, on the basis of the evidence heard or received to that point in the hearing and any proposed evidence to be called by the applicant that has not yet been heard: Pellerin v. Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud, 2011 HRTO 1777 at paras. 9 to 32.

7In assessing whether an applicant has a reasonable prospect of success in proving her or his claim, one of the issues that often arises is whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground: see Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at para. 9.

8This Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal's process, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant can show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds set out in the Code: see Forde v. Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389 at para. 17.

9The issue upon which I requested the parties' submissions was whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant would be successful in establishing a link or connection between the factual allegations she has raised in her Application and the grounds of discrimination cited in her Application, which can be supported by evidence and not just by mere speculation or accusations.

The January 2, 2013 letter and its aftermath

10The first main allegation raised by the applicant arises from the issues raised with her in a letter dated January 2, 2013 sent by the then property manager, and the sequence of events that ensued in addressing and dealing with these various issues. In her evidence before me, the applicant recognized that the individual issues raised with her, such as issues with her garburator and her washer and a noise complaint, are not in and of themselves issues properly raised under the Code. However, the applicant takes the position that the respondents' decision to pursue these issues with her at the time they did and in the manner they did constitutes a violation of her rights under the Code, on the basis either that she is being treated differently than other building residents in relation to some issues (e.g. the washer) or that issues are being raised with her that are not properly her responsibility (e.g. the noise complaint).

11While the applicant alleges that she was treated differently or disproportionately in relation to these various issues, that alone is not sufficient to establish a violation of her rights under the Code. The applicant must also prove that any such differential or disproportionate treatment was "because of" one of the grounds of discrimination protected under the Code and cited in her Application, which requires that there be some basis in evidence to establish a link or connection between the differential or disproportionate treatment and a Code-protected ground.

12Accordingly, at the hearing I questioned the applicant at length in an attempt to discern whether and on what basis she was alleging that the raising of these various issues with her was linked to or connected with any of the grounds cited in her Application. In her evidence before me, the applicant's contention was that, while the January 2, 2013 letter was issued and signed by the property manager, he did this as the direct result of the issues being brought to his attention by the building superintendent (M.C.) and her husband (G.C.). The applicant contends that this was done because on December 24, 2012, about a week prior to the issuance of the letter, a tenant in the building who was being evicted went down to the superintendent's office and told M.C. and G.C. that she had been told by the applicant that M.C. and G.C. were engaged in illegal activity (the applicant testified as to the specific nature of this alleged illegal activity and also testified that this was raised by the tenant with M.C. and G.C., but it is not necessary for me to include this information in this Decision). The applicant's contention is that M.C. and G.C. feared that the disclosure of this alleged illegal activity might result in the loss of M.C.'s employment, and so they wanted to take steps to drive the applicant out of the building in order to avoid any such disclosure.

13It is not my role at this stage of the proceeding to determine whether or not any of this is true. I have not yet heard evidence from M.C. or G.C. or the property manager, and so have not yet heard their response to these allegations. The question for me to address at this stage is, even if I were to accept the applicant's evidence on this point, whether this provides any basis to support a violation of the Code. As I raised at the hearing, it is not clear to me how the applicant's evidence on this point is linked or connected to any of the grounds cited in her Application. The applicant is not alleging that any disability she may have was a factor in M.C., G.C. or the property manager raising these issues.

14With regard to the cited grounds of age and marital status, my understanding of the applicant's evidence is that other building residents are jealous towards her as a younger, single woman who has been able to own her own condominium unit mortgage-free. In her evidence before me, the applicant did not specifically attribute this jealousy to M.C., G.C. or the property manager, or suggest in her testimony that any such jealousy played any role in the issues raised with her on January 2, 2013.

15In the written submissions filed by her, the applicant alleges that she has been treated differently in relation to her washer because there are other residents of the building who have not been dealt with in the same manner. She states that this is based on her knowledge of other residents who she knows have washers in their units, and have not been asked to have them removed. She states that these other residents are men or married couples. Accordingly, she believes that this differential treatment is related to her marital status as a single woman.

16There are two problems with this submission. First, it is not based on any evidence provided by the applicant at the hearing. As previously stated, I questioned the applicant directly at the hearing in order to try to discern the basis upon which she was alleging a violation of her rights under the Code and gave her every opportunity to identify the basis for her allegations. At no time in her evidence at the hearing did the applicant identify an allegation that other building residents who were not required to have their washers removed were men or married couples or that she believed that she was being discriminated against as a single woman. At the hearing, she did not (and also did not in her written submissions) identify specifically who she alleges has been allowed to keep their washers. By not raising this in her evidence at the hearing, the respondents were deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine her on this point. In my view, it is not appropriate for the applicant to now try to supplement the evidence she gave at the hearing on the basis of bald allegations made in her written submissions.

17Moreover, even if I were to accept as true the applicant's assertion that other building residents who are male or married couples have been allowed to retain washers in their units and have not been treated in the way the applicant says she has been treated, this is not sufficient to establish that the applicant was asked to remove her washer "because of" her marital status, as required by the Code. Rather, based on her testimony before me, the applicant's allegation is that this issue, along with several others, was raised with the property manager by the building superintendent and her spouse as a result of the feared disclosure of their alleged criminal activity. Prior to that, the building superintendent and her spouse had been aware that the applicant had a washer in her unit and had not taken steps to require her to remove it.

18In her written submissions, the applicant also asserted that the building superintendent was in fact jealous of the applicant as a woman who is able to live quite well without a spouse. The basis for this assertion is certain comments the building superintendent is alleged to have made to the applicant in the context of renovations being undertaken by her, where the building superintendent is alleged to have said that the applicant is "too picky" and asked "why are you spending so much money on the renovation?" I see nothing in these alleged comments that relates to the ground of marital status under the Code or that connects these alleged comments to the letter that was issued to the applicant on January 2, 2013.

19As a result, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that she experienced discrimination because of marital status or age in the context of this allegation.

20The primary contention of the applicant appears to be that she has experienced discrimination because of her association with a friend who is a Black man (D.B.). D.B. was criminally charged with attempted murder in April 2010 (for which he ultimately was acquitted). The applicant testified that even prior to D.B. being charged, M.C. had expressed her displeasure with the applicant's relationship with D.B. In her written submissions, the applicant alleges that M.C. has said directly to her that she did not approve of the applicant's relationship with D.B. because of the status of D.B.'s marriage. The applicant also testified that M.C. was very opinionated about the criminal charges against D.B. once they had been laid. The applicant further testified that, due to her association with D.B., there were rumours and gossip among residents in the building about the applicant being a "drug dealer" and D.B. being a "murderer", although the applicant in her evidence did not specifically attribute these rumours and gossip to M.C., G.C. or the property manager.

21The difficulty I have with the applicant's evidence on this point is that she acknowledges that, up to the point of the events of late December 2012 or early January 2013, she had an amicable and even friendly relationship with M.C. and G.C. While the applicant testified that she was told by M.C. that there was a thick file of complaints that had been made by residents against the applicant, the applicant's evidence is that prior to January 2, 2013, any such complaints had not been pursued against her in such a formal manner as with the January 2, 2013 letter and the subsequent correspondence on the issues raised. In light of this history, and whether or not M.C. approved of the applicant's relationship with D.B., I find that there is the applicant has no reasonable prospect of establishing that her association with D.B. was a factor in M.C., G.C. or the property manager causing the issues to be raised with her on January 2, 2013, or in how these issues were subsequently addressed.

22In her written submissions, the applicant also addresses the noise complaint addressed in the January 2, 2013 letter and makes the point that she was not the person who let the individuals who caused the disturbance into the building. In her evidence before me, the applicant testified that these individuals did come and knock on her unit door on the morning of December 31, 2012, that they were loud and screaming in the hallway, that she looked through the peephole and did not recognize these individuals, and that she does not know whether they knocked on anyone else's unit door. In her written submissions, the applicant asserts that these individuals were screaming, "the n----- robbed me". This was not stated in her evidence before me, at which the most she could testify to was that these individuals said "something about a Black guy".

23In her written submissions, the applicant asserts that she was blamed for the noise disturbance because of her association with D.B. as a Black man. In my view, there is simply no evidence beyond mere speculation to support this. Rather, it seems to me that the noise issue more likely was raised with the applicant because a group of loud individuals had come into the building and were causing a disturbance in the hallway outside her door. Whether or not someone else let them into the building or whether they simply followed another resident into the building has no bearing on the issue of whether the applicant can establish that raising the noise complaint with her amounts to discrimination against her contrary to the Code. In my view, there is simply no reasonable prospect that the applicant will successfully be able to establish that the noise complaint, or any of the other issues raised with her in the January 2, 2013 letter, were raised "because of" her association with D.B. as a Black man.

The disability accommodation issue

24The second main allegation raised by the applicant relates to her need for security in her condominium unit as a result of her post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). The fact that the applicant has PTSD is supported by medical evidence before me, and there is no issue that PTSD is a disability within the meaning of the Code. The issue to be addressed in this proceeding is whether the applicant has experienced discrimination "because of" her PTSD or a failure to accommodate her needs for personal security arising from her PTSD. The applicant's evidence is that, over the course of the many years that she has lived in the building, she has disclosed her PTSD to various superintendents and property managers, including M.C. and G.C. She states that in order to ensure her personal security in her unit, she has installed a deadbolt lock which goes into her floor and is not capable of being operated from outside the unit. She further states that, while the building has a practice of requiring residents to provide the superintendent with a key to enable them to access the units, she has not been required to do so as a result of the disclosure of her PTSD.

25One of the issues raised in the January 2, 2013 letter is that the applicant remove the deadbolt lock and provide building management with a key to her unit. The applicant's evidence is that, on January 10, 2013, she discussed this issue with the property manager (along with the other issues raised in the letter) and disclosed her PTSD to the property manager and the arrangements that she had up to that point. Her evidence is that on this phone call, she agreed to provide building management with a working key to her unit on the basis that she would not be required to remove the deadbolt. The applicant's evidence is that she did provide a working key to M.C. on January 29, 2013, and invited M.C. to test the key at any time during that day, as the applicant would be in her unit all day. The applicant's evidence is that M.C. did not come to test the key on January 29, 2013, but instead came to the applicant's unit on the following day in the morning when the applicant was still in bed. The applicant states that she heard M.C. turn the key and open the door, although she does not know whether M.C. actually entered her unit. The applicant states that a short time afterwards, she changed the lock to her unit so that the key she had provided to building management was no longer operable.

26The applicant subsequently received a series of letters regarding the issue of the removal of her washer and garburator. These letters set out deadlines by which the applicant was told to make her own arrangements to have these appliances removed, failing which building management would enter her unit to remove them and charge her with the cost of having to do so. As I understand it, the applicant takes the position that the threat to enter her unit to remove these appliances if she had not done so by the deadline constitutes discrimination against her because of her PTSD. I do not agree. The issue of whether or not a condominium corporation can require a unit owner to provide a working key to her or his unit and the issue of in what circumstances a condominium corporation has the right to enter a unit without the owner or resident's consent are not issues that are within this Tribunal's jurisdiction. The only issue within this Tribunal's jurisdiction is whether or not the respondents' actions are capable of amounting to discrimination against the applicant because of disability or a failure to accommodate her disability-related needs.

27The issue of the respondents' duty under the Code to accommodate the applicant's disability-related needs was raised by the applicant in an e-mail dated February 28, 2013 and again by a lawyer retained by the applicant in correspondence dated April 19, 2013. A lawyer retained by the respondent condominium corporation responded by correspondence dated May 9, 2013 expressly acknowledging its obligations under the Code, but noting that a request for disability-related accommodation required the applicant to work cooperatively with building management. This respondent's lawyer requested "any relevant documents to support [the applicant's] claim for accommodation for consideration by the Board of Directors".

28The issue of the applicant providing a working key to her unit was next addressed in an e-mail from the property manager to the applicant dated July 25, 2013. The property manager states that, through the building's lawyer, he had agreed to offer the applicant a concession on the matter of supplying a workable door key in return for the applicant agreeing to comply with the other documented requests, including removal of the washer and garburator. The property manager notes that, to the date of the e-mail, the applicant had not complied with these requests, and expressed his view that building management may have to rescind the "key offer" unless they began to see some concessions on the applicant's part. This was to be addressed through their respective lawyers.

29Further correspondence was exchanged between the lawyers in late July 2013. In correspondence dated July 29, 2013, the lawyer acting for building management again requested documentation to support how the applicant's disability requires accommodation measures to be provided. While the applicant's lawyer replied by letter dated August 28, 2013 to address some of the issues raised, no documentation supporting the applicant's disability or request for accommodation was provided at that time. This documentation ultimately was provided by the applicant's lawyer by letter dated February 28, 2014. By response dated March 18, 2014, the respondents acknowledged the medical documentation indicating that the applicant's symptoms were consistent with PTSD, and expressed their understanding that the addition of the deadbolt lock would be important to the applicant. This letter also confirmed that the applicant would take responsibility resulting from any lawful entry to her unit. This previously had been proposed by the applicant's lawyer in lieu of providing building management with a working key to the applicant's unit. The applicant still retains her deadbolt lock and still has not provided building management with a working key to her unit, and this issue has not been pursued further by the respondents.

30Once again, this gives rise to the issue of whether these events are capable of supporting an allegation of discrimination against the applicant because of disability or any failure to accommodate her disability-related needs.

31In her written submissions, the applicant asserts that she should have been given the benefit of the doubt as a result of the informal arrangement that had existed in her building for many years, and should not have been required to provide medical documentation to support the existence of her disability or that her needs arising out of her disability required her to have a deadbolt lock and not provide a key to her unit to building management. In my view, this is an insufficient basis upon which to support an allegation that the applicant experienced discrimination because of disability simply on the basis that the respondents ultimately asked for medical documentation to support her disability and the needs arising from it. It is well-established that it is the responsibility of the person seeking accommodation for a disability to not only make their needs known but to cooperate in providing reasonable information to support these needs: see for example Sugiono v. Centres for Early Learning, 2013 HRTO 1976 at para. 36. The fact that the respondents had not previously requested such documentation does not mean that it is discriminatory for them to request it at a later time, after the issue of accommodation had been formally raised by the applicant and her legal counsel and was being addressed in a more formal manner. Further, the reality is that, except for a very brief period of time when the applicant agreed to provide the building superintendent with a working key to her unit, the respondents have not had a key that enables them to enter the applicant's unit and the applicant has never removed her deadbolt lock. Accordingly, the accommodations requested by the applicant have never been denied to her.

32The applicant also takes issue with the e-mail sent to her by the property manager on July 25, 2013 indicating that he needed to see some concessions from the applicant regarding the removal of the garburator and washer from her unit, or he may have to rescind the "key offer". I agree with the applicant that a request for accommodation of a disability should never become a bargaining chip in relation to other issues. Rather, it is the right of a person with a disability to receive accommodation where required under the Code, and it is the responsibility of the party from whom accommodation is sought to provide the required accommodation unless this would cause undue hardship. At the same time, I note that at the point which this correspondence was exchanged between the property manager and the applicant, the parties already had retained and involved legal counsel to address this very issue. A request had been made by counsel acting for ECC No. 67 for the applicant to provide medical documentation to support her accommodation request, but this documentation had not yet been provided. In addition, the respondents never did in fact rescind the "key offer" and to this day the applicant has not provided building management with a working key to her unit or removed the deadbolt and the issue has not been pursued further. In my view, in these specific circumstances, the property manager's July 25, 2013 e-mail, while unwise, is not in and of itself sufficient to support a finding of a violation of the applicant's rights under the Code.

33Finally, in her written submissions, the applicant takes issue with being required to disclose medical documentation prepared in the context of a civil action for sexual assault. In fact, this was not what was required of her. All that was required of her and all that was requested by counsel for ECC No. 67 was medical documentation to support that she had a disability, which she had already identified to the property manager, and to support that her needs arising from that disability required her to have a deadbolt lock and to not provide a working key to her unit to building management. Rather than providing such documentation, the applicant instead chose to release the report prepared for the civil action, which while supporting the applicant's PTSD diagnosis also contains a lot of information that is not relevant to the needs of the respondents.

34Accordingly, I find that the applicant has not established that she has a reasonable prospect of success in proving that she experienced discrimination because of disability or a denial of accommodation for her disability in violation of the Code arising from this allegation.

The parking issue

35The third main allegation raised by the applicant relates to the issues arising from her parking her vehicle in the service area on two occasions in late July 2013. At the hearing, I heard evidence from the applicant that she has problems with her back and knee as a result of various surgeries, which is supported by medical documentation. The applicant's evidence is that these problems make it difficult for her to climb stairs carrying any load. The underground parking where the applicant generally parks her vehicle does not have an elevator, and she can only access an elevator to her unit by climbing stairs. As a result, she parks in the service area for a short time if she has anything to unload. However, the applicant testified that she has not sought any disability-related accommodation from the respondents for this. Rather, her contention is not that she should be entitled to do something that other residents cannot (which is a common result of the duty to accommodate a disability), but that she is being treated differently than other residents who also park in the service area and that this amounts to discrimination against her. Once again, the difficulty with this contention is that the applicant needs to be able to prove not just that she has been treated differently than other residents, but that this differential treatment is "because of" one of the grounds protected under the Code and cited in her Application.

36With regard to the events of July 23, 2013, the applicant's contention is that she was treated differently or disproportionately by G.C. when he threatened to have her vehicle towed when it had been left in the service area. I appreciate that this incident led to the applicant calling the police and making a complaint to the board of directors of ECC No. 67. However, at the hearing, I explored with the applicant the basis upon which she is alleging that the actions of G.C. on this date were "because of" any protected ground. The applicant's evidence is that, on the previous day, she had sustained chemical burns on her feet and could not walk or drive. She states that she paid M.C. to drive her to get medication. The applicant's evidence is that M.C. later threatened to have the applicant's vehicle towed, as it was parked in the visitor's area. This outraged the applicant given her condition and the fact that M.C. knew she could not walk or drive, and her evidence is that she "got really mad" at M.C. The applicant testified that she believes that on the following day, she was treated in the manner she was by G.C. for parking in the service area, because G.C. did not like the way the applicant had spoken to his wife (M.C.). This does not support any link or connection to a protected ground under the Code relied upon in the Application. Accordingly, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing a violation of her rights under the Code arising out of this incident.

37With regard to the events of July 26, 2013, the applicant's evidence is that the then chair of the ECC No. 67 board of directors was intoxicated, profane and vulgar towards her when threatening once again to tow the applicant's vehicle from the service area. Once again, in the absence of hearing the respondents' evidence, I cannot make any determination as to whether or not this was the case. However, even if I were to accept the applicant's evidence, as supported by the proposed evidence of her witness, the issue remains as to whether the applicant can point to any evidence to establish that the chair's actions were "because of" a protected ground. In her evidence before me, the applicant clarified that her allegation is that this conduct amounts to discrimination or harassment against her because of her association with D.B. However, the only support for this raised in the applicant's testimony at the hearing was on the basis of "common talk" in the building about her relationship with D.B. The applicant was unable to provide any evidence at the hearing that the chair had expressed to her any views about her relationship with D.B., nor could she testify that any of the "common talk" in the building about this relationship was ever attributed to the chair. This evidence, even if accepted, is not capable of proving any link or connection between the chair's actions and any protected ground under the Code raised in the Application.

38In her written submissions, the applicant raises her contention that she has been treated differently than other building residents, on the basis that she knows other residents who have parked in the service area for long periods of time who she believes were not treated in the same manner as she was. As already stated above, it is not enough for the applicant merely to identify differential treatment. She must also establish that this differential treatment was "because of" a protected ground under the Code. In her written submissions, the applicant once again asserts her belief that she is being discriminated against by the building superintendent and her husband because of her relationship with D.B. and because of their fear that the details of their alleged criminal activity would become public knowledge. These points already have been addressed above. The evidence before me simply does not support that the actions of the building superintendent or her husband from and after January 2, 2013 had anything to do with the applicant's relationship with D.B., and the alleged criminal activity is not related to any ground protected under the Code.

39In her written submissions with regard to the events of July 26, 2013, the applicant states that at the hearing, she was unable to answer my question as to the basis of her belief that the actions of the chair of the board of directors that day were linked to her relationship with D.B. The applicant states that she has now had an opportunity to review her detailed notes of the events at issue, and now states that when she tried to explain to the chair on that day that she was using the service area for its intended purpose, the chair told her to "shut up" and said that she was going to have the applicant's car towed. The applicant states in her written submissions that the chair then called her a "fat b----" and said something about the applicant being a "n----- lover".

40This is not the evidence that was given by the applicant at the hearing. At the hearing, I specifically asked the applicant on what basis she was alleging that the events of July 26, 2013 were related to her relationship with D.B. Clearly, an allegation that the chair had used the epithet "n----- lover" towards the applicant would be crucial evidence to support a link between the chair's actions on that day and the applicant's relationship with D.B. as a Black man. However, no such evidence was forthcoming from the applicant at the hearing. Moreover, no such allegation is raised in the Application, despite the applicant including a detailed account of the incident as part of her Application. Further, as part of the Application, the applicant was specifically asked to explain the basis upon which she believes that she had experienced discrimination because of her association with a person identified by a Code-protected ground. The applicant attached a separate page to her Application in order to address this question, and made no reference whatsoever to the chair or to any allegation that the chair used the term "n----- lover". Still further, the applicant proposed to call a witness at the hearing who was present for the entirety of the incident on July 26, 2013 and filed a witness statement setting out this witness' proposed evidence. While this witness statement refers to the chair telling the applicant to "shut up" and indicates that the chair used "other profanities", nowhere in this witness statement does the witness say that the chair used the epithet "n----- lover". The applicant herself had an opportunity to file a witness statement on her own behalf prior to the hearing, which could have included reference to this allegation. Instead, the applicant's witness statement merely states that her Application and the attached materials would stand as her witness statement, none of which make reference to any allegation that the chair used this epithet.

41Accordingly, I do not accept the assertion now made by the applicant in her written submissions that the chair used this epithet on July 26, 2013, or at any other time. If such a comment had been made, this would have been perhaps the most significant evidence upon which the applicant could have relied to support a link or connection between the chair's actions and her association with D.B. as a Black man. It defies understanding that the applicant could simply neglect to mention such a significant and serious allegation in her Application, in any material filed in support of her Application, in her witness statement, in the witness statement of the person who was present for this incident, and in her testimony before me at the hearing.

42Accordingly, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing that the chair's actions on July 26, 2013 were linked or connected to the applicant's relationship with D.B. or any other ground of discrimination raised in the Application.

Reprisal allegation

43I note that the Application also alleges reprisal. Under section 8 of the Human Rights Code, a reprisal must have been taken because the applicant sought to claim or enforce her rights under the Code as opposed to any other legal rights the applicant may have. In her Application, the applicant alleges reprisal on the basis of a report made to the police. This cannot properly be regarded as seeking to claim or enforce rights under the Code as opposed to under the Criminal Code.

44Accordingly, I find that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success in establishing that she experienced reprisal in violation of the Code.

Other matters

45In her written submissions, the applicant raised a number of matters that do not form the subject matter of her Application before this Tribunal and which did not form part of her evidence at the hearing. These other matters are not properly raised as part of this proceeding.

46The applicant's written submissions also purport to include requests for further accommodations from the respondents due to her PTSD, including that she be permitted to do laundry in her unit, and that due to her physical disabilities, she be temporarily permitted to park near the building entrance. Written submissions in response to the Tribunal's CAD are not the appropriate place to raise such requests. Any such requests should be directed to the respondents outside the context of this legal proceeding, together with any supporting medical documentation to establish that what the applicant is requesting represents a need or requirement due to her disabilities.

ORDER

47For all of the foregoing reasons, the Application is dismissed in its entirety on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success.