HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Donna Wilson
Applicant
-and-
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Indexed as: Wilson v. Centre for Addiction and Mental Health
1The applicant filed an Application under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of disability. The Application was filed on February 24, 2015 and relates to allegations culminating in the applicant's dismissal on June 5, 2015.
2On January 21, 2015 the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application ("NOID") on the basis that the Application appeared to be outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
3The NOID noted that from a review of the Application it appeared that it had been filed more than a year after the last incident of discrimination and that the applicant had not cited facts that constitute good faith within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code.
4The applicant responded to the NOID and repeated her submissions made in the Application, that she chose to pursue another proceeding which she thought would deal adequately with her concerns but that process is ongoing without a result as of yet.
5Under the Tribunal's jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is "plain and obvious" on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.
6I find that that this Application is out of time and the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for the delay.
7Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Code provide:
34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
8These provisions have been found to be mandatory subject to section 34(2). The limitation period is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim. See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate 2009 HRTO 1241.
9This Application is clearly out of time. It was filed 20 or more months after the last alleged incident of discrimination. Accordingly it falls to the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith. The Tribunal has held on many occasions that where an applicant seeks to establish that the delay in filing their application was "incurred in good faith", the applicant must show something more than the absence of bad faith.
10There is no indication of bad faith on the applicant's part in this case but it is also the case that the Tribunal has consistently concluded that the pursuit of other legal proceedings in respect of the issues raised in an Application is not good faith. See Damiani v. Sobeys Capital Incorporated, 2014 HRTO 1397 and the case cited there.
11For all of these reasons I find that this Application must be dismissed because it is plain and obvious that it is out of time and the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for the delay.
Dated at Toronto, this 23rd day of June, 2015.
"signed by"
David Muir
Vice-chair