Myers v. Sage Recruiting Inc., 2015 HRTO 815

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Andrea Myers Applicant

-and-

Sage Recruiting Inc. Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel Date: June 18, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 815 Indexed as: Myers v. Sage Recruiting Inc.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Andrea Myers, Applicant Self-represented

Sage Recruiting Inc., Respondent Nadine Cote, Representative

1The applicant filed an Application alleging discrimination because of place of origin and citizenship contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). She filed her Application on January 30, 2015, more than one year after the alleged incident of discrimination.

2In its Response, the respondent requested that the Application be dismissed on the basis of delay.

3In her Reply, the applicant submitted that she did not file her Application within the one-year time period because she was unaware of the Tribunal until late January 2015.

4Under the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381, and Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121.

5For the reasons set out below, I have determined that it is plain and obvious that the Application is untimely and should be dismissed for delay.

ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO DELAY

6Section 34 of the Code provides that an Application must be filed within one year of the incident to which the Application relates, or within one year of the last incident in a series of events. Subsection 34(2) allows for a filing of an Application outside of the time limit if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any of the respondents.

7The Tribunal may accept an Application that is untimely if it is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice would result from accepting the Application. In order to satisfy the Tribunal that a delay was incurred in good faith, an applicant must provide the Tribunal with a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner.

8As stated in Miller v. Prudential Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, in order for an applicant to establish that a delay in filing an application was incurred in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith; otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period. The mandatory one-year limitation period for filing an application is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence to file an application within one year when pursuing a human rights claim.

9Although ignorance of one’s rights may in some circumstances amount to good faith, the applicant must establish that he or she had no reason to make inquiries about his or her rights. See Simmons v. Ontario (Transportation), 2010 HRTO 1884; Stewart v. Mitten Vinyl, 2010 HRTO 1628; Arcuri v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2010 HRTO 578.

10In the circumstances, I find that the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation as to why she did not pursue his rights under the Code in a timely manner. Although she states that she was unaware of the Tribunal and her rights under the Code until late January 2015, she has not established that she had no reason to make inquiries about her legal rights earlier.

11For the reasons set out above, I find it is plain and obvious that the applicant’s delay was not incurred in good faith, as that term has been interpreted by the Tribunal. Therefore, her Application does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and it is not necessary to address the question of prejudice.

ORDER

12For the reasons set out above, the Application is dismissed.