HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Gilbert Gagnon
Applicant
-and-
George Stockfish Ford Sales (1987) Ltd. and Stephan Brunet
Respondents
A N D B E T W E E N:
Gilbert Gagnon
Applicant
-and-
Mister Transmission
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw
Indexed as: Gagnon v. George Stockfish Ford Sales (1987) Ltd.
APPEARANCES
Gilbert Gagnon, Applicant
Self-represented
George Stockfish Ford Sales (1987) Ltd., Respondent
Michael Stockfish, Representative
Stephan Brunet, Respondent
Self-represented
Mister Transmission, Respondent
Denis Larmand, Representative
Introduction
1These Applications allege discrimination with respect to services because of disability contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2Pursuant to a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated January 28, 2015, the Tribunal directed that a summary hearing be convened pursuant to Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure to determine whether the Applications should be dismissed, in whole or in part, on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of success that the Applications will succeed.
3All parties made oral submissions at the summary hearing by teleconference.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4The applicant alleges that each of the respondents declined to provide car transmission repair services to him because of his disability.
5The transmission in the applicant’s car was damaged during towing. The applicant alleges in the Application that he first took his car to the respondent, Mister Transmission (“Mr. Transmission”), where the applicant alleges it remained for 10 days with no work done and no contact from anyone.
6When the applicant followed up, the applicant alleges Mr. Larmand from Mr. Transmission gave the applicant his keys back and told him he did not want the job. Mr. Larmand submits he had no agreement from anyone to pay for the investigation or repair of the transmission and he therefore did not do it. The applicant alleges Mr. Larmand should have called him to see if he would pay.
7The day after he got his car back from Mr. Transmission, the applicant took the car to the respondent, George Stockfish Ford Sales (1987) Ltd. (“Stockfish”), where the applicant spoke to the respondent, Mr. Brunet, and he also refused to repair the car.
8The applicant alleges the respondents colluded with each other to deprive him of service. He also submits they did not accommodate him as a person with a disability. When asked if he advised the respondents he has a disability, he said he did not. He submits they may have refused to do the work on his car because he was in a bad mood that day or they did not like his personality.
9He submits the respondents are in the business of fixing transmissions and they discriminated against him and failed to accommodate him when they told him they would not fix his car.
10When asked what evidence he had that the respondents refused to serve him because of his disability, he stated the only evidence he has is that they would not serve him.
11With respect to the applicant’s allegation of collusion, he submits Mr. Larmand told the applicant he knew Mr. Baldwin from Ford very well, which is evidence they colluded.
DECISION
12The Application is dismissed on the basis that it does not have a reasonable prospect of success.
ANALYSIS
13This hearing was conducted pursuant to Rule 19A of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. Rule 19A directs the Tribunal to determine is whether the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994 at paras. 9-10 the Tribunal provided the following guidance:
In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.
In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground. [Emphasis added]
14Other than alleging that the applicant had a feeling that the respondents denied him service because of his disability, the applicant could point to no evidence that would make a link between the denial of service and the ground of disability claimed. In addition, the mere fact that Mr. Larmand and Mr. Baldwin knew each other, even if true, is not sufficient evidence of collusion to deny the applicant a service on the basis of his disability.
15The applicant did not identify any other evidence he might call to support his assertion that his disability was a factor in the respondents’ decisions not to service his car. The applicant did not advise the respondents of his disability, nor did the respondents have any knowledge of it. Other than the applicant indicating that maybe he was in a bad mood that day or the respondents did not like his personality, he pointed to no evidence that the respondents refused him services because of his disability.
16Even if the respondents were wrong not to service the applicant’s car, unfair treatment does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Code. As the Tribunal points out in Forde v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389 at para. 17:
The Tribunal does not have the power to deal with general allegations of unfairness. For an Application to continue in the Tribunal’s process there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code.
17The applicant’s assertion that his disability was a factor is nothing more than a bald assertion or, to use the words in Forde, “mere speculation and accusations.”
18In addition, the Tribunal repeatedly has said that an applicant’s belief, even if honestly held, is not evidence upon which the Tribunal might find that discrimination has occurred. See, for example: Leong v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2014 HRTO 311.
19Given the absence of any proposed evidence, or any evidence that may be reasonably available to the applicant, on which a link might be established, I must conclude that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of success of proving discrimination on the basis of the alleged ground.
ORDER
20The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 2nd day of June, 2015.
“Signed by”
Dawn J. Kershaw
Vice-chair