Mihai Codrin v. Commissionaires Great Lakes, 2015 HRTO 535

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Mihai Codrin

Applicant

-and-

Commissionaires Great Lakes

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Keith Brennenstuhl

Date: April 24, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 535

Indexed as: Codrin v. Commissionaires Great Lakes

APPEARANCES

Mihai Codrin, Applicant

Mindy Noble, Counsel

Commissionaires Great Lakes, Respondent

Phillip Day, Representative

1A hearing into this matter was held on April 21, 2015. Mr. Phillip Day sought to represent the respondent. At the outset the applicant took the position that Mr. Day was not entitled to represent the respondent pursuant to the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1999, c. L.8 as amended and its by-laws ("LSUC").

2The applicant's counsel indicated that Mr. Day's appearance at the beginning of the hearing was when she first learned that Mr. Day would be representing the respondent and that up to this point she had always dealt with another person within the respondent organization. Mr. Day stated that this other person was acting under his direction.

3Pursuant to s. 26.1 of the Law Society Act no person other than a licensee of the Law Society of Upper Canada ("LSUC") may practice law or provide legal services in Ontario subject to the exceptions in the LSUC by-laws.

4Rule A9.1 of the Social Justice Tribunals Ontario Common Rules provides as follows:

Parties may be self-represented, represented by a person licensed by the Law Society of Upper Canada or by an unlicensed person where permitted by the Law Society Act and its regulations and by-laws.

5Mr. Day conceded that he was, indeed, an unlicensed person. He submitted, however, that while he was unlicensed he fell within one of the exemptions provided by the LSUC, namely "individuals employed by a single employer, for example, [...] [an] employee of a corporation appearing on behalf of the corporation".

6Mr. Day acknowledged that while he was employed by the respondent in the past and did represent the respondent before this Tribunal he was no longer an employee of the respondent, having taken his retirement. He indicated that following his retirement, he entered into a consultant-like contract with the respondent wherein he was retained by the respondent for a fee to advise the respondent on a number of matters, including this Application.

7I found that while Mr. Day likely fell into the exemption while he was employed by the respondent prior to his retirement, his current arrangement with the respondent did not fit within that exemption. Mr. Day could not otherwise identify any LSUC exemption category to which he belonged.

8Under the circumstances I ruled that Mr. Day is not entitled to act as the respondent's representative before this Tribunal.

9Following my ruling, the respondent promptly requested an adjournment in order to retain legal counsel.

10The applicant objected to any adjournment. However, in my view, denying an adjournment in the circumstances would be tantamount to denying the respondent legal representation. There is no concrete evidence that the applicant will be prejudiced by the delay in hearing the case.

11Accordingly, the respondent's request to adjourn the hearing in order to retain legal counsel was granted.

12The Tribunal directs the parties to communicate with each other, and advise the Registrar by no later than two weeks from the date of this Interim Decision, as to their availability for a rescheduled two-day hearing in the fall of this year. If no communication is received from the parties, the Tribunal may set the hearing dates without further consideration with the parties. The rescheduled hearing dates shall be peremptory to the respondent, meaning that no further adjournment requests will be granted to the respondent.

13I am not seized of this matter.