Ren v. International Alliance of Healthcare Educators/Upledger Institute, 2015 HRTO 508

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Grace Ren Applicant

-and-

International Alliance of Healthcare Educators/Upledger Institute and Susan Steiner Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton Date: April 21, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 508 Indexed as: Ren v. International Alliance of Healthcare Educators/Upledger Institute

APPEARANCES

Grace Ren, Applicant Wade Poziomka, Counsel

International Alliance of Healthcare Educators/Upledger Institute and Susan Steiner, Respondents Lambert Boenders, Counsel

1This is an Application filed on October 31, 2012 under section 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination with respect to services because of race, colour, ancestry, ethnic origin, and reprisal. The applicant was self-represented when she filed her Application.

2The respondents filed a joint Response denying the allegations. The corporate respondent is located in Florida, United States, and it sends instructors all over the world to teach its courses and seminars. The personal respondent is one of its instructors and it would appear, from the Response, that she too is based in Florida. In a previous Interim Decision, 2013 HRTO 685, the Tribunal refused to remove the personal respondent as a respondent.

3This decision is about the applicant's standing to allege systemic discrimination, the timeliness of some of the allegations, and the Tribunal's jurisdiction over allegations that occurred outside of Ontario.

nature of the applicant's allegations

4There has been no hearing on the merits of the applicant's allegations, and accordingly, there is no determination about whether or not the applicant's allegations are founded and amount to discrimination under the Code. As noted above, the respondents have denied the allegations in their joint Response.

5In her Application, the applicant self-identifies as being a Canadian citizen, living in Canada over 20 years, and originating from China. She works in the registered massage therapy field and decided to pursue training and accreditation in craniosacral therapy in order to complement her current practice. To that end, she has taken a number of courses that the corporate respondent offers. These are expensive for the applicant as the courses are held in different locations across Canada and the United States, with some courses being held over 5 days. She incurs tuition costs, as well as related travel costs, including airfare, and does not earn any income while she attends the courses.

6In her Application, the applicant refers to taking the following courses:

• May 2010 in Toronto;
• August 2010 in Montreal, Quebec;
• September 2010 in Edmonton, Alberta;
• November 2010 in Toronto;
• April 2011 in New Hampshire, U.S.A.; and
• November 2011 in Toronto.

7The Application makes specific allegations about the discriminatory treatment to which she was subjected when she attended the courses in Montreal, New Hampshire, and, in November 2011, in Toronto. She characterizes the discrimination as systemic discrimination based upon her Chinese background. As the applicant is no longer relying upon her allegations that pre-date the April 2011 course in New Hampshire, a summary of those allegations is not needed.

8With respect to the New Hampshire course, the applicant alleges she was one of four participants, three of whom were Caucasians, and that the instructor told her to "be quiet, just listen" and "the Chinese are supposed to be humble, that is their philosophy".

9At the November 2011 course in Toronto, the applicant alleges that the personal respondent treated her and another female with an Asian background differently from the other, non-Asian, attendees, including telling them, "I can imagine how hard it is for both of you. I remember when I went to other countries traveling or teaching, it was very hard especially the first thing when I got off the air plane because I did not know their language and customs".

10Following her attendance at the November 2011 Toronto course, the applicant raised concerns about the personal respondent and other course instructors, and the discriminatory treatment to which she alleges she was subjected, with various members of the corporate respondent. She alleges that the corporate respondent dismissed her concerns without investigation and told her that the personal respondent decided that she must repeat all the courses she has taken with the corporate respondent and that there is no avenue of appeal beyond the instructor's opinion. The applicant attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain a copy of her file, particularly the notes from the instructors. She asserts that the corporate respondent's policies to not set out any standards, criteria or methods to assess a student's level of understanding, which is unfair and contrary to the Code.

11The applicant asserts that the respondents' conduct amounts to systemic discrimination because of her Chinese background.

procedural background

12The hearing was initially scheduled for February 26 and 27, 2014. The applicant sought an adjournment, which was granted. The Tribunal rescheduled the hearing for later in 2014.

13The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings ("RFOP") seeking production of the following documents:

a. Un-redacted copies of the documents contained at Tabs 5 to 13 of the respondent's book of documents;

b. Student lists for all courses in which the applicant has taken part, including the names, telephone numbers, home addresses and email addresses of each student, instructor and teacher's assistant in the course;

c. Copies of evaluations for each student in each of the applicant's courses;

d. Copies of any and all emails, letters, and written or typed notes, mentioning the applicant's name; and,

e. Copies of any and all emails, letters, and written or typed notes, containing the words "Asians", "Chinese", "Foreign", "ESL", or "English as a second language" in the respondents' possession and/or control.

14The applicant also filed a Request for a Tribunal Ordered Inquiry, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure, as an alternative to her RFOP.

15Initially, the respondents did not file a Response to the RFOP or a Response to the Request for a Tribunal Ordered Inquiry. In a Case Assessment Direction, the Tribunal directed the respondents to file Responses to the RFOP, which they subsequently did.

16A case management conference call ("the call") was held for the Tribunal to hear the parties' submissions about the issues raised in the RFOP and the Request for Tribunal Ordered Inquiry.

17Subsequent to the call, and based upon the parties' positions during the call, the Tribunal issued a CAD seeking the parties' submissions on the following:

1. Does the applicant have standing to bring an Application alleging systemic discrimination about individuals other than herself?

2. Are the allegations pertaining to Montreal from August 2010, Edmonton from September 2010, and New Hampshire from April 2011 timely within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code, and, if not, whether there is a good faith explanation for the delay pursuant to section 34(2) of the Code?

3. Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction over allegations that pertain to other provinces (Quebec and Alberta) and/or another country (the United States)?

18The Tribunal also gave the parties the opportunity to discuss the applicability of Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572 ("Van Breda") to this Application.

19The parties have filed submissions in relation to Van Breda and the CAD which have been considered by the Tribunal.

The applicant's submissions

20The applicant submits that she is now limiting her allegations to what occurred in New Hampshire in April 2011 and Toronto in November 2011 and is not pursuing her other allegations for liability, although they are relevant to the proceeding and the grades that she received and may be presented as contextual evidence. The applicant's change in position occurred after the conference call was held and when the applicant filed subsequent written submissions.

21She experienced systemic discrimination, she asserts, based upon the discriminatory treatment she received from different instructors while in New Hampshire and Toronto. The respondents hold implicit stereotypes about Asians, she alleges, and she will present evidence about what she observed was happening to other Asians in her courses, which will be obtained once her production request is granted. The applicant confirmed that her Application is being brought on her own, not on behalf of anyone else, that she was not seeking a remedy for anyone other than herself, and that as a sole applicant she has standing to allege systemic discrimination.

22Furthermore, the applicant asserts that her allegations about New Hampshire are timely. They are indicative of the discriminatory attitude held by the corporate respondent and the instructor in New Hampshire about the applicant because of her Chinese background, which the applicant alleges is systemic between the New Hampshire and Toronto November 2011 allegations. Because her allegations are about systemic discrimination, the New Hampshire allegations constitute a "series of incidents" within the meaning of section 34(1)(b) of the Code. They are less than a year before the November 2011 allegations about Toronto and they are the same type or characterization as those pertaining to Toronto.

23If they are untimely, any delay in raising the New Hampshire allegations was incurred in good faith. She pursued her concerns internally with the corporate respondents, which, she recognizes, does not meet the "good faith" test by itself. However, it was not until she looked at the whole picture, meaning the experiences from New Hampshire, Toronto in November 2011, and the corporate respondent's failure to investigate into her allegations and address her concerns, did she realize that she had experienced systemic discrimination.

24As for whether or not the allegations pertaining to New Hampshire are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the applicant submits that they are because she is alleging systemic discrimination in services, rather than direct discrimination. She acknowledges that this is not the current state of the law in Ontario. However, if the Tribunal decides that it does not have this jurisdiction, it can lead to situations where respondents escape liability in systemic discrimination situations by stating that it happened outside of Ontario. The purpose of human rights codes would be frustrated, as no provincial tribunal could inquire into allegations of systemic discrimination in their totality and the purpose of human rights codes would be generally frustrated.

25She submits that the notes of the New Hampshire course, where she alleges direct discrimination occurred, were present in her file and may have influenced the personal respondent's assessment of the applicant in Toronto. This position further supports her allegation that she was subjected to systemic discrimination.

26With respect to the application of Van Breda, the applicant submits that while she only needs to present one factor, there are a number of presumptive connecting factors in her Application that bring the allegations about New Hampshire within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. They include: she was living in Ontario are the time of the alleged Code infringements; the respondent regularly carries on business in Ontario; the Code allegations about Toronto were committed in Ontario; she enrolled for services being provided in Ontario, thus establishing a service contract within Ontario; the situs of the damages from which the applicant suffered occurred in Ontario; and, the allegations outside of Ontario are between the applicant and the respondent. Furthermore, the applicant submits that the Tribunal ought to adopt a new presumptive factor where some of an applicant's allegations take place outside of Ontario. The new presumptive factor ought to be: where a clear violation of the Code has been alleged in Ontario, other violations, even if occurring outside of Ontario between the same applicant and respondent will be presumed to be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

27As for her RFOP, the applicant submits that the test for producing documentation is "arguable relevance", which is a low threshold, and the documentation she requests is arguably relevant to her allegations of direct and systemic discrimination. She undertakes not to use the personal information contained within them for any purpose other than a hearing into her Application. She narrowed her request in para. 11 e to documentation or emails that suggest that Asians are struggling, as she is not trying to make more work for the corporate respondent's staff.

28If the Tribunal refuses the applicant's production request, she requests that the Tribunal appoint an investigator, pursuant to section 44(1) of the Code, to conduct an inquiry wherein the investigator will explore the corporate respondent's documents and files and interview any necessary witnesses to determine whether discrimination has occurred and whether the applicant and other individuals of Asian ethnicity have experienced differential treatment. The applicant's allegations are serious and they impact a number of individuals beyond herself.

the respondents' submissions

29The respondents submit that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to hear the allegations about locations outside of Ontario, including New Hampshire, as they do not have a sufficient connection to Ontario. The courses are not accredited in Ontario and there is no Ontario regulatory body overseeing them. The corporate respondent's offices are located in Florida and it does not have offices in Ontario or in Canada. The courses held outside of Ontario are subject to the laws of that location.

30Furthermore, the respondents submit, any witnesses associated with the courses held outside of Ontario are located in different regions and the Tribunal has no power to compel their attendance. It would prejudice the respondents' ability to respond to the applicant's allegations if its witnesses could not attend. In addition, the respondents would incur great costs in having the witnesses voluntarily attend a hearing in Ontario.

31The respondent's submissions about the timeliness of the Montreal and Edmonton allegations are moot as the applicant is not pursuing them. With respect to the New Hampshire allegations, the respondents submits that they are untimely as they are before the one year limitation period established by section 34(1) of the Code. The applicant has not discharged her burden of proof that there is a good faith explanation for the delay. Given the passage of time, the memories of the witnesses will be affected. The individual who instructed the New Hampshire course is no longer affiliated with the respondents and they are not in contact with him. These latter points will cause the respondents prejudice if the applicant is permitted to pursue the New Hampshire allegations.

32The applicant does not have standing, the respondents submit, to bring an Application alleging systemic discrimination, or to bring an Application in the public's interest. She has not made an application on behalf of any other individuals, and has not obtained the consent of other individuals to submit her Application on their behalf.

33With respect to the RFOP, the respondents submit that a variety of documentation has already been produced to the applicant, including the evaluations for all the courses she has attended and the evaluations of other students, with their names and addresses redacted, although their cities are not redacted. The respondents are uncomfortable producing the names and addresses of the other course attendees because of, amongst other reasons, privacy concerns.

34Furthermore, the name of an individual attending a course does not necessarily identify his or her ethnic background, specifically whether or not he or she is of Asian descent. For example, someone with an apparent Asian sounding name, but does not have an Asian background, could be married to someone with an Asian background. Years after the courses concluded, the respondents cannot now contact the attendees and ask about their ethnic background. The names of the attendees indicates, based upon names, diverse backgrounds, with apparent Greek, French Canadian, Spanish and African sounding names. The address of the attendees may no longer be current.

35The respondents also question what is meant by the word "Asian" and whether that would include someone from Thailand, Indonesia, China or other countries. They would be prepared to bring such documentation to the hearing and have the Tribunal determine whether the information should be produced.

36With respect to the request at para. 11 d., the respondents submit that it has produced the applicant's applications to attend courses, credit card information, and her evaluations. They could produce the emails that she sent to the corporate respondent. They are claiming privilege over other documentation that exists since she filed her Application.

37The applicant's request at para. 11 e., the respondents submit, is a fishing expedition and overly broad. They provide courses in over 100 countries, including China, to more than 120,000 students. It is very likely that there is documentation in which the word "Chinese" is used. For example, the corporate respondent provides courses in Hong Kong and there could be emails asking whether the instruction will be in Chinese or English.

38The respondents oppose the Tribunal ordered inquiry. They submit that it would be a lot of work, involving hundreds of students in other countries being contacted, and would not advance the issues very well.

analysis

The Applicant's Standing to Allege Systemic Discrimination

39I accept the applicant's submission that she is bringing her allegations of systemic discrimination on her own behalf and not on behalf of any other person and as such has standing to make these. See Carasco v. University of Windsor, 2012 HRTO 195 at paras. 5 and 15.

40As noted by the Ontario Human Rights Commission in its "Policy and guidelines on racism and racial discrimination", racism can exist at a number of levels, including (1) individual, (2) institutional or systemic, and (3) societal. It describes systemic discrimination as patterns of behaviour, policies or practices that are part of the structure of an organization, and which create or perpetuate disadvantage for racialized persons. In this particular case, whatever the source of the alleged discrimination (i.e. individual, systemic, or both), the scope of proceeding will none-the-less relate to the applicant alone.

Are the New Hampshire Allegations within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal?

41I appreciate that the applicant is alleging systemic discrimination against the corporate respondents, but, in my view, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the allegations pertaining to New Hampshire.

42The Tribunal is created by a provincial statute and the rights provided for in the Code are statutory in nature. As a provincial statute, the Code is subject to the constitutional limitation that provinces may not legislate "extra-territorially". The Constitution Act, 1867, makes it clear that provincial legislative jurisdiction is confined to "property and civil rights in the Province" (section 92(13)), and "generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the province" (section 92(16)). See, for example, Haskins v. Great-West Life, 2011 HRTO 1661 at para. 16 and Cohen v. Law School Admission Council, 2011 HRTO 703 at paras. 7 to 9.

43In employment cases, the Tribunal has found that incidents that occurred outside of Ontario, even if they are the primary allegations against the respondent, are within its jurisdiction where there is a sufficient connection with Ontario. See, for example, Sutton v. Jarvis Ryan Associates, 2010 HRTO 2421 at para. 102. It has also dismissed employment applications where allegations arise in Ontario, yet pertain to an employment relationship that is based in another province. See, for example, Cash v. Stryker Canada, 2009 HRTO 1738 at paras. 10 – 12 and Boswell v. Eichler Caldwell Barristers & Solicitors, 2012 HRTO 1187 at para. 4.

44In services cases, the Tribunal has dismissed outright an application where the only allegations arose from an interaction in another province. See East v. Vancouver Police Department, 2010 HRTO 54 at para. 4.

45In a recent case, Abbasi v. Sygenics Inc., 2014 HRTO 142, the Tribunal considered the application of Van Breda where the applicant alleged discrimination in employment and the respondent raised an objection about the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The respondent denied that there was an employment relationship between the parties, characterizing it instead as being a contractual one as the applicant was an independent contractor, and claimed that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to hear the application because the issues and the relationship were based in Quebec not Ontario.

46The Tribunal applied the principles from Van Breda, which held that the inquiry involves two stages:

a. First, the plaintiff has the onus of establishing that a "presumptive connecting factor" connects the litigation to the jurisdiction.

b. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that a presumptive connecting factor exists, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing that, on the facts of the particular case, the connection is insufficient to establish a real and substantial connection.

47The Tribunal dismissed the respondent's jurisdictional claim in Abbasa, finding that there was a "real and substantive connection" to Ontario given that the applicant resided and provided contractual services or employment in Ontario, presumptive factors the respondent could not refute.

48In this case, there is no doubt that the applicant's allegations as they pertain to Ontario are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. However, what happens in a services case, with allegations of systemic discrimination against the corporate respondent, like in this Application, where some of the allegations are based in Ontario and some in a location outside of Ontario?

49After reviewing the parties' submissions about Van Breda, I find that they are of limited assistance to me. If Van Breda is applicable before the Tribunal, rather than in common law situations of tort and contracts before the courts upon which the decision is based, in my opinion, it is applicable to situations where the Tribunal is considering the jurisdiction of an application as a whole, rather than determining if some of the allegations are within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and others are outside of it. See also Thomas v. Siemens Canada, 2011 HRTO 503 at paras. 23 – 24.

50Allegations of systemic discrimination cannot be isolated to a single event or statement. As set out in Association of Ontario Midwives v. Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2014 HRTO 1370, at para. 37 ("Midwives"), in the context of considering whether systemic discrimination allegations constitute a "series of incidents" within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Code, the Tribunal stated:

Further, as I have discussed above, the Courts have emphasized that in a claim of systemic discrimination, allegations cannot be isolated to a single event or statement. Alleged incidents, along with particulars of historical practices, policies and attitudes, must be viewed comprehensively and in aggregate. It is this interwoven amalgam of conduct, actions, inaction, policies, practices, systems and attitudes which is alleged to result in differential treatment and discriminatory impact. The connections between incidents may not always be obvious and may not be purely linear or continuous. But together, the interconnected web is what constitutes the series of incidents.

51In my view, regardless of whether or not the applicant has the ability to raise human rights concerns in another jurisdiction, this does not bring her New Hampshire allegations within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. If the respondent was based in Ontario, such as an Ontario university, and offered courses both within and outside of Ontario are part of an Ontario degree program, that might well establish a connection to Ontario with respect to the allegations of services offered outside of the province. If that were the case, the applicant's allegations, whether systemic in nature or otherwise, in locations within and outside of Ontario might be permitted to proceed as a whole.

52However, that is not the situation before me. The respondents are not located in Ontario, but instead in Florida, and the corporate respondent does not have an office in Ontario, even if it regularly provides courses in Ontario. There is no Ontario regulatory body overseeing its courses. I find that the corporate respondent's business is more analogous to the services that are provided by the Law School Admissions Council ("LSAC") which is based in the United States, yet regularly provides Law School Admission Test ("LSAT") courses within Ontario (and other Canadian jurisdictions). In the Tribunal decisions in which LSAC has been named as a respondent, an applicant has not alleged that he or she travelled to a jurisdiction outside of Ontario to take the LSAT where the discrimination occurred.

53However, in Cohen, above, amongst other allegations made, the applicant alleged that LSAC failed to accommodate his disability with respect to the writing of the LSAT and alleged that various law schools, including Dalhousie University ("Dalhousie") which is located in Nova Scotia, discriminated against him by denying him entry based on his LSAT score, even though they knew of the discrimination that was taking place. Dalhousie filed a Request for Order During Proceedings, and submitted in its Response, that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the allegations against it because it was located outside of Ontario and that the provisions of Nova Scotia's Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214 applied rather than the Code. The Tribunal agreed and dismissed the application against Dalhousie.

54Based upon the above, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the allegations that relate to New Hampshire and that part of the Application is dismissed. Given the applicant's representation that she is not pursuing the allegations that pre-date April 2011 for liability, those too are dismissed with respect to liability. The relevance and admissibility of contextual evidence about any allegations before the November 2011 Toronto course, will be left to be determined during the hearing.

Timeliness of the New Hampshire Allegations

55In light of my finding that the New Hampshire allegations are not within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, I do not need to determine whether or not they are timely, or, if untimely, the delay in raising them was incurred in good faith.

The Applicant's Production Request

56I agree with the applicant that the test for the production of documents is "arguably relevant", which is a low threshold. See Labao v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2013 HRTO 723 at paras. 17 to 19 and Lampi v. Princess House Products Canada Inc., 2008 HRTO 1 at para. 10. The Tribunal has held that finding that a document is arguably relevant for production does not mean that such information will necessarily be admissible as evidence at the hearing on the merits.

57Tabs 5 to 8 of the respondents' productions contain the evaluations of all participants and staff for courses the applicant attended between May and November 2010, with their names redacted but their cities disclosed, except for the applicant whose name is not redacted. The applicant has indicated that she is not pursuing allegations that pre-date the New Hampshire course for liability. Accordingly, I do not find that the names and addresses of the participants and staff in the documentation at Tabs 5 to 8 to be relevant to the issues that are before the Tribunal. Accordingly, I decline to order the respondents to produce unredacted documentation, or the names and addresses, as the applicant requests at para. 11 a – c above.

58Tabs 10, 11 and 13 contain evaluations of all participants and staff, again with their names redacted and their city disclosed, except for the applicant's name which is shown, for courses taken, respectively, in Toronto in May 2011, Boston in August 2011, and Toronto in December 2011. There are no allegations pertaining to these courses and I fail to see how such documentation, apart from the evaluations about the applicant, is relevant to the issues before the Tribunal. I decline to order that the respondents produce unredacted documentation, or the names and addresses, for Tabs 10, 11 and 13.

59Tab 9 contains evaluations for the four participants at the New Hampshire course, with the names of three participants redacted, but their city disclosed, and the name and city shown about the applicant. As I have determined that the allegations about New Hampshire fall outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction, I am not prepared to order the respondents to produce the names and addresses of the other participants who took the New Hampshire course.

60However, given the allegations of differential treatment towards the applicant and the other female from an Asian background at the November 2011 course in Toronto, I do find that information about this other female is arguably relevant to the applicant's allegations. The respondents have already produced the evaluation list of participants and staff, including evaluations about the participants' and staff's palpation skills and concept application, as well as what appears to be the location of their residence or practice. What the applicant has not been able to identify is the name of the other female whom she alleges she was paired.

61I order the respondents to produce the names of the female participants from the Toronto November 2011 course. This, along with the location of their residence or practice and evaluation mark, which has already been produced, should be sufficient for the applicant to identify the name of the female with whom she was partnered. I decline to order the respondents to produce the names and addresses for the other participants and staff.

62I decline to order that the respondents produce what the applicant has requested in para. 11 e. above. I find that this request is overly broad, even with the inclusion of the word "struggling" as later suggested by the applicant, and there is no temporal restriction on the request. I accept the respondents' explanation that in holding the courses in many countries in Asia would likely result in a large production, and, without the applicant being able to identify a particular document she believes is in existence, this request is more akin to what has been described as a "fishing expedition". It is not granted.

63With respect to the applicant's request at para. 11 d. above, I order the respondents to order any emails, letters, written or typed notes mentioning the applicant's name in relation to either the November 2011 Toronto course, or in relation to her claim that she raised concerns with the corporate respondent which failed to investigate into her concerns. I see that this request, as I have ordered, is arguably relevant to the applicant's allegations. If privilege is claimed over any of this material, the respondents can identify that and request further consultation with the Tribunal about whether or not it should be disclosed.

Tribunal Ordered Inquiry

64The Tribunal has the jurisdiction, under section 44 of the Code, to order an inquiry in certain circumstances, although it has never ordered one since the changes to the Code that occurred in June 2008. It has ruled that such an inquiry is not to be "a substitute for the usual production process contemplated by the [Tribunal's Rules of Procedure]". See Miraglia v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 1031 at para. 37.

65In this case, and in light of the determinations made about the production request, I decline to order an inquiry.

Order

66Accordingly, I order the respondents to disclose by May 8, 2015 to the applicant:

a. the names of the female participants who attended the November 2011 course in Toronto;

b. any emails, letters, written or typed notes, mentioning the applicant's name in relation to either the November 2011 Toronto course, or in relation to her claim that she raised concerned with the corporate respondent which failed to investigate into her concerns.

next steps

67Under separate cover, the Tribunal will canvass the parties' availability to schedule two consecutive hearing dates. The parties are reminded that the Tribunal offers voluntary mediation-adjudication in accordance with Rule 15A of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure. Once the hearing dates are scheduled, if the parties are interested in mediation-adjudication, they may write to the Tribunal advising of their interest.