Cara v. York Catholic District School Board, 2015 HRTO 458

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Giuseppe Cara Applicant

-and-

York Catholic District School Board Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Mary Truemner Date: April 8, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 458 Indexed as: Cara v. York Catholic District School Board

APPEARANCES

Giuseppe Cara, Applicant Brenda Culbert, Counsel

York Catholic District School Board, Respondent John-Paul Alexandrowicz, Counsel

1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment because of age contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). In particular, the applicant alleges that he was not offered a department head position because he is old (late 50’s). The applicant alleges that the respondent prefers young people for its department head positions.

2After a review of the Application, the Response and Reply, the Tribunal directed a summary hearing, which was held by telephone conference call on January 21, 2015.

3At the summary hearing, the applicant argued that he was more qualified than the successful and much younger candidate, and pointed to evidence that will establish this is true. He also argued, amongst other things, that he will adduce evidence to demonstrate that the respondent has systemically trained and provided qualifications to young teachers only, and then incorporated questions into the interview for the department head position which would prefer those young teachers.

4The applicant also argued that the reasons for not hiring him provided by the respondent in its Response were inadequate: 1) the respondent faulted him for not working on certain feedback from a previous unsuccessful job application for a similar position in 2012, but he states that he did not receive feedback; and 2) the respondent faulted him for not having sufficient “leadership experience”, but he states that he does have sufficient leadership experience.

5The respondent denied the preference and argued that the applicant’s case is built only upon assumptions.

6The issue before me is whether the Application should proceed or whether it should be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success. The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Summary Hearings states:

A summary hearing usually considers:

• whether, assuming all of the allegations are true, the Application has no reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation; and/or
• whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated by the respondent(s). The applicant has to show that he or she can make a link between the event that led to the Application and the alleged ground(s) of discrimination.

7At the summary hearing stage, the Tribunal does not hear evidence, and a finding that an Application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success means only that the Application will continue to be processed. It is not a finding that there is a reasonable prospect of success.

8Rule 19A.6 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure states that where the Tribunal decides not to dismiss an Application following a summary hearing, it need not give reasons. In this case, I am satisfied that the Application cannot be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

next step

9The Tribunal will proceed to schedule a two-day hearing. A Notice of Hearing will be issued and describe the steps that the parties are required to take prior to the hearing.

10At the commencement of the first day of the hearing, the parties will be offered mediation-adjudication. If the parties do not wish to try mediation-adjudication or if it does not succeed in settling the Application, then the applicant must be prepared to testify in the morning. His witnesses must be available in the afternoon. The respondent’s witnesses must be prepared to testify on the second day of the hearing.