Carol Gibson v. City of Hamilton, 2015 HRTO 234

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Carol Gibson

Applicant

-and-

City of Hamilton

Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw

Date: February 25, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 234

Indexed as: Gibson v. Hamilton (City)

Introduction

1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on December 16, 2014.

2On January 19, 2015, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (“NOID”) on the basis that the Application appears to be outside the Tribunal’s power to decide. The applicant was directed to respond to the issues raised in the NOID by no later than February 18, 2015. The NOID advised the applicant that failure to respond to the NOID may be considered an abandonment of the Application and it might be dismissed for that reason.

3The NOID also stated:

a review of the Application and the narrative setting out the incidents of alleged discrimination fails to identify any specific acts of discrimination within the meaning of the Code allegedly committed by the respondent [and] you allege discrimination based on “reprisal or threat of reprisal” but have failed to explain how the respondent’s behaviour was related to any of the following: claiming or enforcing a right under the Code; instituting or participating in proceedings under the Code; or, refusing to infringe the right of another person under the Code [s. 8]. See for example Mirea v. Canadian National Exhibition, 2009 HRTO 32; Chan v. Tai Pan Vacations, 2009 HRTO 273.

4The applicant wrote to the Tribunal on February 15, 2015, after the NOID was delivered to her, and provided essentially the same information as in the Application.

5The applicant alleges the respondent assigned her a caseworker who in the past had stolen money from the applicant’s father and by doing so had assigned her to work with a criminal. The applicant alleges the respondent discriminated against her on the basis of association because of the past interaction between the applicant’s father and the applicant’s caseworker, as well as on the basis of race, age, colour, marital status, ancestry, citizenship, disability and family status.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

6An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage, before it is delivered to the respondent, if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381.

7Having considered the applicant’s Application and her subsequent filing, I find that the applicant has failed to make any allegations of Code-related discrimination.

8I find that it is plain and obvious that the alleged acts do not come within the scope of the Code’s protections against discrimination. The applicant did not explain how any of the alleged incidents relate to any Code grounds.

9The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is based on the Code, which prohibits discrimination in specific areas (for example, employment, services, contracts, etc.) on the basis of specific protected grounds listed in the Code. The Tribunal does not have a general power to inquire into claims of unfairness outside of the grounds listed in the Code.

10The applicant also has not alleged any facts that make any link between her claims and a Code ground. Even in the face of a prior interaction between the applicant’s father and her caseworker, there is no allegation that the interaction between the applicant and the caseworker is grounded in the Code.

11Based on the information before me I find it plain and obvious that the allegations of discrimination, which are not linked to a Code ground, do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

12This Application is dismissed.