HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Angele Valentino
Applicant
-and-
Chrysler Canada Inc., UNIFOR, Ardis Snow and Leon Rideout
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir
Date: February 12, 2015
Citation: 2015 HRTO 195
Indexed as: Valentino v. Chrysler Canada Inc.
[1] The purpose of this Interim Decision is to address the respondents’ request to remove an individual respondent as a party to this Application.
[2] In her Application, the applicant alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. The applicant believes that she was treated differently because, unlike others in the workplace, her injury did not occur in the workplace.
[3] The respondents filed a Response (“Form 2”) in which they deny the allegations. The applicant has not filed a Reply (“Form 3”).
[4] On April 28, 2014 Chrysler Canada Inc. (“Chrysler”) filed a Request for Order During Proceeding (“the Request”) seeking the removal of an individual respondent. The applicant opposed the Request.
[5] The Request is granted and the style of cause amended accordingly.
[6] Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules provides that the Tribunal may add or remove a party. In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 14 at para. 42, the Tribunal set out the general principles that apply to this issue:
The unnecessary naming of personal respondents is a practice to be discouraged, as this serves to unnecessarily add to the complexity of proceedings and can often operate as a roadblock to resolution. Pursuant to section 45(1) of the Code, a corporation is deemed to be liable for “any act or thing done or omitted to be done in the course of his or her employment by an officer, official, employee or agent”. Where there is no issue as to the ability of a corporate respondent to respond to or remedy an alleged Code infringement and no issue raised as to a corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the actions of an individual who is sought to be added as a personal respondent, then in my view the individual ought not be added as a personal respondent in the absence of some compelling juridical reason. A compelling juridical reason may exist, for example, where it is the individual conduct of a proposed personal respondent that is a central issue as opposed to actions which are more in the nature of following organizational practices or policies or where the nature of the alleged conduct of a proposed personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found.
[7] The Tribunal further expanded on these principles in Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31 at para. 5:
Applying these principles to the Tribunal’s power to remove a personal respondent from a proceeding, the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be helpful in assessing whether a personal respondent should be removed:
Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?
Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who sought to be removed?
Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?
Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?
Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?
In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.
[8] Chrysler argues that the individual respondent was employed as a Human Resources Specialist and that there are no allegations made which relate to this individual personally. The respondent argues that there are no allegations that the conduct of their employee was conduct of his own accord or independent from that of Chrysler.
[9] The applicant argued that the individual respondent should remain a party to the Application because she believes that he took a personal interest in her circumstances. There are no facts plead which support this belief.
[10] I agree with the respondents’ submissions. To the extent that its employee’s actions or inactions can be identified, it appears that his actions were taken in the course of his employment. In my view, considering all the circumstances, it is not necessary to involve Chrysler’s employee as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the Application.
[11] Chrysler’s Request to remove its employee as an individual respondent is granted and the style of cause is amended accordingly.
[12] I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 12th day of February, 2015.
“Signed by”
David Muir
Vice-chair