HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Raija Suomela
Applicant
-and-
Canadian Urban Institute
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Suomela v. Canadian Urban Institute
APPEARANCES
Raija Suomela, Applicant
Taina Suomela, Representative
Canadian Urban Institute, Respondent
Peter Halsall, Representative
1This Application alleges discrimination with respect to employment contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2On August 10, 2015, the Tribunal directed that a preliminary hearing be held to determine if the Application should be dismissed on the basis that the applicant has settled the matter with the respondent. This preliminary hearing was convened on December 14, 2015 via telephone conference and all of the parties participated.
Background
3The applicant was employed with the respondent for seventeen years. During the conference call the applicant stated that her last day of work was March 9, 2014. On January 14, 2014, the respondent issued a letter terminating the applicant’s employment effective February 7, 2014. The applicant retained counsel who wrote to the respondent on January 20, 2014. Thereafter, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations.
4On March 14, 2014, the respondent made an offer to settle which was accepted by the applicant. The applicant executed the following clause on March 14, 2014:
Acceptance and Release Clause
I have read and understood the above. By my signature below, I confirm that the Canadian Institute and I have reached a full settlement on the terms and conditions set out in this letter, in full and final satisfaction of all of the Canadian Institute’s obligations to me arising from my employment or the termination of my employment. I also hereby release the Canadian Urban Institute and its officers, directors and employees from any and all claims or proceedings of any sort from my employment or the termination of my employment. This is a full settlement, and the Canadian Urban Institute has no other obligations to me.
5The applicant also signed on the same day an authorization and direction that a certain sum be paid directly to her legal counsel.
6On May 21, 2015, the applicant filed this Application alleging discrimination and harassment contrary to the Code. Though it appears that the Application was not filed within one year of the last incident of discrimination, that was not an issue before me at the preliminary hearing so I need not address the delay issue.
Decision
7Section 23 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedures Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 22, provides that “a tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.”
8Though the applicant filed numerous emails and letters exchanged between the parties during their negotiations, my task is to review the agreement that was finally reached between them. The respondent’s March 14, 2014 letter and the “Acceptance and Release Clause” signed by the applicant are the final product of these negotiations and these terms are clear and unambiguous. The applicant represented and agreed that all claims with respect to her employment and termination from employment were being released by her and that the respondent had no further obligations to her.
9The applicant makes a number of arguments in support of her position that the release is not effective. First, the applicant argues that the release language does not reference the Code. I note however, that the Tribunal has dismissed Applications even in circumstances in which the settlement documents did not even contain a release or refer to the Code. See for example: In Messiah v. Snap-on Tools of Canada, 2010 HRTO 1151 and Holowka v. Ontario Nurses Association, 2010 HRTO 2171, and Zu v. Hamilton (City), 2010 HRTO 2461.
10Further, in Better Beef Ltd. v. MacClean 2006 CanLII 17930 (ON SCDC), 80 OR (3d) 689 the Divisional Court held that even though the release, which was very simply drafted, did not expressly release claims under the Pay Equity Act the releaser could not bring a claim under that Act. Similarly, in this case though the Release signed by the applicant does not expressly refer to the Code, I am of the view that the applicant having released all claims arising out of her employment has released the respondent of any claims under the Code. In these circumstances, I do not accept the applicant’s submission that she thought that she could proceed with claims under the Code when she has agreed that all matters between the parties had been settled and that she was releasing all claims relating to her employment. The applicant’s belief is simply irrelevant to the interpretation of the release especially in circumstances in which she was represented by counsel.
11Secondly, the applicant argued that she faced financial pressures and that these were part of the reason she chose to accept the respondent’s offer upon termination of her employment. The Ontario Court of Appeal described the elements of economic duress in Taber v. Paris Boutique & Bridal Inc. (Paris Boutique), 2010 ONCA 157, as follows at paras. 8-9:
There is no doubt that economic duress can serve to make an agreement unenforceable against a party who was compelled by the duress to enter into it. Nor is there any doubt that the party can have the agreement declared void on this basis.
However, not all pressure, economic or otherwise, can constitute duress sufficient to carry these legal consequences. It must have two elements: it must be pressure that the law regards as illegitimate; and it must be applied to such a degree as to amount to a ‘coercion of the will’ of the party relying on the concept.
12Even if I accept that, at the time the applicant’s employment was terminated she had significant financial pressures it is clear that economic pressure alone is not sufficient to establish duress. As stated in Kailani v. Securitas Canada, 2009 HRTO 1183, at paragraph 35:
…Each case must be considered on its own merits and economic duress is a factor that may be considered. However, it seems apparent that the test for economic duress is high. Most people who have had their employment terminated are faced with economic difficulty. Financial difficulty alone cannot therefore be sufficient. If it were, almost every settlement arising out of the termination of employment could be violated.
13The applicant also argues that she was experiencing emotional pressures at the time. The applicant provided no medical evidence in support of this argument. Even if I accepted that the applicant had been treated for depression in the past, I would not accept that this is sufficient to conclude that the applicant was coerced or compelled under duress to agree the respondent’s offer to settle (see Parma v. Stoney Creek Lifecare, 2010 HRTO 501, at paras. 11 and 30). This is especially so in circumstances in which the applicant was represented throughout the negotiations by legal counsel.
14Having considered the matter, I am of the view that the applicant has released the respondent from all claims arising out the employment and termination of her employment and that it would be an abuse of the Tribunal’s processes to permit the Application to continue.
15The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 17th day of December, 2015.
“Signed by”
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair