Hutchinson v. International Ladies Garment Worker Union Co-Op, 2015 HRTO 1618

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Claudette Hutchinson

Applicant

-and-

International Ladies Garment Worker Union Co-op and Community First Development

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson

Date: November 30, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 1618

Indexed as: Hutchinson v. International Ladies Garment Worker Union Co-Op

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Claudette Hutchinson, Applicant

Olanyi Parsons, Counsel

International Ladies Garment Worker Union Co-op, Respondent

Cory Wanless, Counsel

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to occupancy of accommodation. The hearing of this matter is scheduled to resume on December 14, 2015.

2This Interim Decision addresses a request to adjourn the next hearing date from the Applicant

The Applicant’s Request

3In a letter dated November 24, 2015, counsel for the applicant requested that the Tribunal adjourn the hearing date on December 14, 2015. Counsel stated that neither he nor the applicant is available on the scheduled date. Counsel submitted that the applicant understood that the hearing was to continue in 2016 and she is not available in the month of December. Counsel also explained that he had assumed carriage of this matter from his colleague in his firm, because she is no longer working on active files.

4Counsel for the respondent replied to the adjournment request in a letter dated November 26, 2015. The respondent opposes the request and submitted that the Tribunal set December 14, 2015 as the next hearing date based on the available dates provided by both sides. The respondent submitted that the Tribunal informed the parties on the continuation date by a Notice of Hearing (Continuation) dated September 30, 2015. The Notice also advised the parties of the process for rescheduling hearing dates, including that rescheduling requests coming more than 14 days after the date of the Notice will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. The respondent submitted that there are no exceptional circumstances in this case.

Analysis and Decision

5For the reasons that follow, the request to adjourn is denied.

6The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediations, Rescheduling Requests and Requests for Adjournments provides that requests to reschedule must be made within 14 days of receiving the Confirmation of Hearing and that outside that time adjournments will be granted only in extraordinary circumstances, such as illness of a party, witness or representative. Accordingly, the Tribunal grants adjournment sparingly regardless of the consent of the other parties. In Vallentyne v. Royal Canadian Legion, 2009 HRTO 660, The Tribunal stated at paragraph 4:

The Tribunal is committed to the fair, just and expeditious resolution of proceedings before it. It expects to receive thousands of applications each year. The Tribunal has a responsibility to ensure that public resources are used effectively to meet the demands of all parties before the Tribunal. Therefore, when an adjournment request is made, it is not only the interests of the parties to the particular proceeding must consider, but the fact that Tribunal time reserved for the resolution of those parties’ dispute will no longer be used. For that reason, among others, the Tribunal’s Information Bulletin on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediations, Rescheduling Requests and Requests for Adjournments indicates that even adjournment requests made on consent of the parties more than five days after the hearing is scheduled may be denied. The Tribunal has balanced the interests of parties in having hearings scheduled according to their and counsel’s availability with these broader interests by requiring that a party advise within five days that they are unavailable, and providing that requests for adjournment will not otherwise be granted, absent exceptional circumstances.

7The Tribunal has consistently refused to grant adjournment requests where a party retains counsel shortly before a hearing and has expressed the expectation that counsel retained after a notice of hearing has been issued will be available on the dates previously scheduled. See for example, Vallentyne, above, Riad v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2013 HRTO 1370; Simone v. Amazing Custom Fabricators Inc., 2013 HRTO 285 and Stone v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 2014 HRTO 414. In my view, this analysis applies equally to the circumstances of this case. The lawyer previously representing the applicant is no longer acting on the file and the applicant was required to choose new counsel. As is clear in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, the Tribunal’s expectation is that the new representative will be available for the scheduled date. The fact that the applicant’s new counsel is not available for the previously scheduled hearing dates does not amount an exceptional or extraordinary circumstance.

8As noted by respondent’s counsel, the Tribunal set December 14, 2015 as the next hearing date in this matter in a Notice of Hearing (Continuation), dated September 30, 2015. The date was selected based on the available dates provided by the parties on the previous day of hearing, which was September 14, 2015. Whatever the applicant’s understanding may have been, she has known that December 14, 2015 is the next hearing date since early October 2015 and I do not find the applicant’s explanation to be convincing. I also note that applicant’s counsel has stated only that the applicant is “unavailable” in December, but provides no reason for her unavailability. In these circumstances, I find that the applicant’s stated unavailability does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance that would justify rescheduling the hearing date.

9The request to adjourn is dismissed.