Celetti v. March of Dimes Canada, 2015 HRTO 1521

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Shannon Celetti Applicant

-and-

March of Dimes Canada, Karen Hachey, Joan Teresinski, Chris Harrison Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Keith Brennenstuhl Date: November 13, 2015 Citation: 2015 HRTO 1521 Indexed as: Celetti v. March of Dimes Canada

1This is an Application filed on June 29, 2015 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). This Interim Decision deals with the issue of whether the Application should be deferred pending the completion of a related grievance proceeding.

2The applicant indicates in the Application that the facts of the Application are part of two union grievance proceedings that are still in progress, the grievances having been filed on her behalf by CUPE Local 1880 (the “union”).

3The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, and on its own initiative (Rule 14.1). The Tribunal has stated that deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings. It is a discretionary measure that the Tribunal exercises on the basis of the circumstances in each case. Absent good reason, applicants and respondents before the Tribunal are entitled to expect the Tribunal to take timely action to resolve complaints of discrimination brought before it.

4The Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and human rights issues. In explaining this approach, the Tribunal has referred to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42.

5The Supreme Court thus confirmed that human rights tribunals are not the only decision-makers that can decide human rights claims. Where the parties are already engaged in a concurrent legal proceeding in which they are raising the same human rights issues before a decision-making body with the authority to make determinations about those issues, the orderly administration of justice favours deferral to the other proceeding. In such a scenario, the Tribunal’s normal approach is to defer to the other proceeding.

6In this case, it is apparent that there is substantial overlap between the facts and human rights issues covered by the Application and those referred to in the grievances. I am satisfied that the concerns the applicant raises about the Union’s position on her grievances do not justify a departure from the Tribunal’s normal approach. The matter is still live and the grievance processes have not concluded. It is not yet apparent whether or not the applicant’s grievances will be referred to arbitration. But if the applicant believes, on conclusion of the processes, that her human rights issues have not been adequately addressed, she may ask to have her Application brought back on before the Tribunal.

7The Application will therefore be deferred pending the completion of the grievance process.

8The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which the Application may be brought back on after the conclusion of the grievance processes. The Union’s Request to Intervene will be dealt with by the Tribunal if the Application is brought back on.