Jacqueline Bell v. Peel Regional Police Service, 2015 HRTO 1480

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Jacqueline Bell

Applicant

-and-

Peel Regional Police Service, Crisis Outreach Support Team, Canadian Mental Health Association, St. Elizabeth Health Care, The Salvation Army – Territorial Headquarters for Canada and Bermuda, The Salvation Army Corporation and Anna Pita

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Douglas Sanderson

Date: November 4, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 1480

Indexed as: Bell v. Peel Regional Police Service

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Jacqueline Bell, Applicant

Self-represented

1This Application, filed on September 9, 2015 under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleges discrimination with respect to goods, services and facilities because of disability.

2The Application concerns an incident the applicant alleges occurred on November 18, 2012. The applicant alleges that she fell asleep on a bench inside the Bramalea City Centre Brampton bus terminal while waiting for a bus. The applicant awoke and boarded the bus, but was required by security to exit the bus. The police arrived shortly afterward, apprehended her and took her to the hospital. The applicant remained in hospital until February 2013 where she alleges she was drugged and abused. The applicant sought an explanation from the police, Brampton Transit and the City of Brampton, but received no response. The applicant received a police report from the Peel Regional Police following a Freedom of Information request, which she states contains grossly fabricated information.

3By letter dated October 6, 2015, the Tribunal provided the applicant with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Application (the “Notice”) because it appeared that the Application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination. The Notice also advised that the applicant did not appear to have cited facts that constitute “good faith” within the meaning of the Tribunal’s case law. In the Notice, the Tribunal directed the applicant to file written submissions addressing these issues by no later than November 6, 2015.

4The applicant filed her submissions on October 22, 2015. The applicant submitted that she experienced delays in filing this Application because the City of Brampton did not inform her where to obtain the information required and she was also not aware of the Office of the Independent Police Review Director. The applicant also submitted that she contacted Corporate Security for the City of Brampton and Brampton Transit she was impeded by several years of delays and that she was recently hospitalized.

Analysis and Decision

5Section 34 of the Code provides as follows:

34. (1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

6The Tribunal’s approach to delay is set out in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241 at paragraphs 24 and 25:

In my view, where an applicant seeks to establish that a delay in filing an application was “incurred” in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith. Otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period. The Code requires a person who wishes to pursue a claim of discrimination to bring the claim forward by filing an Application within one year of the alleged incident, or where there is a series of incidents, within one year of the date of the last incident. This is a mandatory provision, subject only to section 34(2). The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.

In dealing with requests that applications be considered outside the one-year limitation period, the Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances, often related to the human rights claim itself, that justifies exercising the discretion under section 34(2). For example, in Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241, the Tribunal held that an applicant cannot justify a delay on the basis that they only later discovered evidence which would assist in proving their claim. In Lutz v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 1137, the Tribunal held, referring to a number of Court decisions, that a delay may be found not to have been incurred in good faith where a party says simply that they were not aware of their rights, and made no inquires about options for pursuing the alleged wrong.

7At this stage in the processing of the Application, the Application may be dismissed if it is plain and obvious that it was not filed in accordance with section 34 of the Code. In this case, the applicant filed her Application almost three years after the alleged incident in which her rights were infringed. In my view, it is plain and obvious that the applicant does not have a good faith explanation for her delay in filing this Application. The applicant had been apprehended and brought to a hospital where she was confined for several months. Clearly, both the police and the hospital concluded that she was unwell and required hospitalization. Equally clearly, the applicant objected to being treated this way and believed it was unjustified and improper. Rather than pursue the enforcement of her human rights by filing an Application in a timely manner, the applicant waited until she received a report from the police following a Freedom of Information Request. This was not a case where an Application is delayed because the applicant belatedly learned of the violation of his or her rights. In my view, the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for her delay in filing the Application and it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

8The Application is dismissed.