HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Stanley Rumleskie
Applicant
-and-
The Corporation of the Township of Madawaska Valley
Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw
Indexed as: Rumleskie v. The Corporation of The Township of Madawaska Valley
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Stanley Rumleskie, Applicant
David J. Spears, Counsel
The Corporation of The Township of Madawaska Valley, Respondent
Steven J. Menard, Counsel
Introduction
1This is an Application filed on March 11, 2015 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). This Interim Decision deals with the issue of whether the Application should be deferred pending the completion of a related grievance proceeding.
submissions
2The respondent indicates in the Response that the facts of the Application are part of two union grievance proceedings (2014-001 and 2014-002) that are still in progress, and encloses copies of each of the grievances filed by the union. The applicant also had provided a copy of two grievances, 2014-001 and 2012-001, in completing his Application.
3The respondent argues that the grievance deals with the same issues raised in the Application, specifically whether the respondent has failed to accommodate the applicant.
4The applicant counters that the grievances are not his, but are “owned” by the union, and that he has no input into decisions made with respect to them. He submits the union has the sole authority to proceed with or withdraw the grievances as it sees fit.
5The respondent disputes that, and submits that the grievances are filed on behalf of the applicant and cannot proceed without the applicant’s co-operation and participation.
6The applicant further submits that the respondent takes the position that the grievances were not referred in a timely manner and therefore are not arbitrable. Because of this, he argues this would delay, and perhaps prevent, the hearing of the grievances.
analysis and decision
7The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, and on its own initiative (Rule 14.1). The Tribunal has stated that deferral is not automatically invoked simply because the parties are involved in other legal proceedings. It is a discretionary measure that the Tribunal exercises on the basis of the circumstances in each case. Absent good reason, applicants and respondents before the Tribunal are entitled to expect the Tribunal to take timely action to resolve complaints of discrimination brought before it.
8The Tribunal has generally deferred applications where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and human rights issues. In explaining this approach, the Tribunal has referred to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement (Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42).
9The Supreme Court thus confirmed that human rights tribunals are not the only decision-makers that can decide human rights claims. Where the parties are already engaged in a concurrent legal proceeding in which they are raising the same human rights issues before a decision-making body with the authority to make determinations about those issues, the orderly administration of justice favours deferral to the other proceeding. In such a scenario, the Tribunal’s normal approach is to defer to the other proceeding.
10In this case, it is apparent that there is substantial overlap between the facts and human rights issues covered by the Application and those referred to in the grievances. The applicant’s grievances are his and proceed with his participation. His concern about the ownership of the grievances does not justify a departure from the Tribunal’s normal approach. The matters are still live and the grievance processes have not concluded. It is not yet apparent whether or not the applicant’s grievances will be referred to arbitration. But if the applicant believes, on conclusion of the process (whether that is arbitration or a determination that the grievances are not arbitrable) that his human rights issues have not been adequately addressed, he may ask to have his Application brought back on before the Tribunal.
11The Application will therefore be deferred pending the completion of the grievance processes.
12The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the procedure by which the Application may be brought back on after the conclusion of the grievance process. The Union’s Request to Intervene will be dealt with by the Tribunal if the Application is brought back on.
Dated at Toronto, this 4th day of September, 2015.
“Signed By”
Dawn J. Kershaw
Vice-chair

