Sewell v. Weston Property Management, 2015 HRTO 1170

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Cherraine Sewell

Applicant

-and-

Weston Property Management, Bert Anthony Susin, Housing Connections, Karen Pasea and 12 Division Police Officer

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Dawn J. Kershaw

Date: September 3, 2015

Citation: 2015 HRTO 1170

Indexed as: Sewell v. Weston Property Management

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Cherraine Sewell, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This Application, filed on June 17, 2015, alleges reprisal and discrimination with respect to housing because of race, colour, sex and receipt of public assistance contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code").

2On July 14, 2015 the Tribunal delivered to the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss ("NOID") and Notice of Incomplete Application indicating that the HRTO has determined that the application appears to be outside of its jurisdiction because:

the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in your Application and you do not appear to have cited facts that constitute "good faith" within the meaning of the HRTO's case law [s.34(1)]. See for example: Thomas v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2009 HRTO 1582 and see for example: Diler v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital, 2010 HRTO 1224 for a discussion of "good faith".

3The applicant had until August 14, 2015 to provide NOID submissions. On July 27 and August 5, 2015, the applicant provided information that appears to constitute those submissions.

4The applicant alleges in the Application and in her submissions with respect to the NOID that the applicant rejected the respondent, Bert Anthony Susin ("Mr. Susin") in 2008 and that Mr. Susin then violated her rights and destroyed her life to the present day. She further explains that the incident happened in 2012 when she was wrongfully evicted from her residence, and that even though it occurred in 2012, it was a criminal act.

5Specifically with respect to the delay, the applicant's submits she was made homeless and had to rebuild her life from the ground up and could not get her thoughts together in that time period. She then explains she found alternate accommodations in 2013, but that Mr. Susin bribed the tenant in the apartment below her to harass her with noise.

Law and analysis

6Sections 34(1) and (2) of the Code provide:

34(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under subsection 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

7Section 34(1) is a limitation period established under the Code. If an applicant seeks to rely on untimely allegations, the applicant must establish, pursuant to subsection 34(2) that the delay was incurred in good faith, otherwise the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the allegations. The Tribunal considered the meaning of good faith in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241 and stated at paras. 24 and 25:

In my view, where an applicant seeks to establish that a delay in filing an application was "incurred" in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith. Otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period. The Code requires a person who wishes to pursue a claim of discrimination to bring the claim forward by filing an Application within one year of the alleged incident, or where there is a series of incidents, within one year of the date of the last incident. This is a mandatory provision, subject only to section 34(2). The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the policy objective, expressed elsewhere in the Code, that human rights claims should be dealt with expeditiously. Thus, the Code requires an individual to act with all due diligence, and file their application within one year, when they may seek to pursue a human rights claim.

In dealing with requests that applications be considered outside the one-year limitation period, the Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances, often related to the human rights claim itself, that justifies exercising the discretion under section 34(2). [...] In Lutz v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 1137, the Tribunal held, referring to a number of Court decisions, that a delay may be found not to have been incurred in good faith where a party says simply that they were not aware of their rights, and made no inquiries about options for pursuing the alleged wrong.

8Under the Tribunal's jurisprudence, an Application will only be dismissed at this preliminary stage if it is "plain and obvious" on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction. See, for example, Masood v. Bruce Power, 2008 HRTO 381; Belcastro v. Metrolinx Go Transit, 2012 HRTO 2121; and Furtney v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada Inc., 2014 HRTO 1343.

9Having reviewed the Application, including the applicant's submissions to the NOID, I find that it is "plain and obvious" on the face of the Application that it does not fall within its jurisdiction, and the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for the delay in filing her Application.

10Assuming the applicant's allegations fall under the Code, they relate to incidents that occurred in 2012 and perhaps in 2013, both of which are more than one year prior to June 17, 2015 when the Application was filed. The applicant has not provided any explanation of what, if any, events occurred after 2013.

11The only explanation the applicant provides for why her Application was filed out of time is that she could not get her thoughts together in the period when she was evicted from her residence. However, she also states in her Application that she found alternate accommodations in 2013 and does not explain why she was not able to file her Application within the one year time period.

12Accordingly, it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction as it was filed outside the one-year limitation period in section 34(1) of the Code and the applicant has not provided a good faith explanation for the delay.

13The Application is dismissed.