Symonik v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2015 HRTO 1163

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Sharon Symonik Applicant

-and-

Children’s Aid Society of Toronto Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Jo-Anne Pickel
Date: September 1, 2015
Citation: 2015 HRTO 1163
Indexed as: Symonik v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Sharon Symonik, Applicant
Self-represented

1The applicant filed this Application alleging discrimination with respect to goods, services, and facilities because of disability, family status, and marital status contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 19, as amended (the “Code”). She named the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto and the Child and Family Services Review Board (“CFSRB”) as respondents to the Application.

2On August 12, 2015, the Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice advising her that the Application against the CFSRB appeared to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction due to the doctrine of judicial/adjudicative immunity. As stated in the Notice, the Tribunal has found that it does not have jurisdiction to hear applications against courts or tribunals based on the execution of adjudicative duties due to the doctrine of judicial/adjudicative immunity. The Tribunal directed that the applicant provide submissions on this issue.

3The applicant provided submissions in response to the Notice that did not address the issue of the CFSRB’s adjudicative immunity.

Analysis

4The Tribunal will only dismiss an Application against a respondent at a preliminary stage where it is plain and obvious that the Application is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

5I find that it is plain and obvious that the Application as against the CFSRB is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction due to the application of the doctrine of adjudicative immunity.

6The doctrine of adjudicative immunity prohibits legal proceedings against judicial and quasi-judicial actors that are based on their actions as adjudicators or decision-makers. The doctrine is rooted in the principle of judicial independence, the purpose of which is to ensure that judicial and quasi-judicial actors are free to execute their decision-making duties with independence and without fear of consequences. See Taucar v. University of Western Ontario, 2013 HRTO 597; Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180; and Cartier v. Nairn, 2009 HRTO 2208.

7The CFSRB is a quasi-judicial decision maker to which the doctrine of adjudicative immunity applies. The applicant’s allegations against the CFSRB are that it did not do enough to help her see her daughter. In June 2015, the applicant applied to the CFSRB requesting a review under s. 68 and/or 68.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 (“Act”). On July 8, 2015, the CFSRB advised the applicant that her complaint was not eligible for review under the Act. The applicant is seeking to challenge this decision. However, this decision is a quasi-judicial decision to which the doctrine of adjudicative immunity applies. Therefore, it is plain and obvious that the Application as against the CFSRB is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and must be dismissed.

Order

8For the reasons set out above, this Application as against the CFSRB is dismissed. The Application against the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto will continue in the Tribunal’s process and proceed to a summary hearing. The Tribunal has sent the parties directions for the summary hearing in a separate Case Assessment Direction.