HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Larry Wilson
Applicant
-and-
Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Laurie Letheren
Indexed as: Wilson v. Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Larry Wilson, Applicant
Self-represented
1This Application alleges discrimination in employment on the grounds of record of offences, contrary to Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2On July 28, 2015, the Tribunal sent the applicant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”). The NOID advised the applicant that the Tribunal may not have the power to resolve the Application because the description in the “what happened” section of the Application does not demonstrate how the actions of Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council (“OMVIC”) was discrimination on the basis of a criminal conviction for which the applicant has been pardoned and not revoked or a conviction of a provincial offence.
3The applicant to filed submissions in response to the NOID. It is clear from the Application and the applicant’s submissions that he has not been convicted of an offence.
4The term “record of offences” is defined in section 10(1) of the Code as follows:
“record of offences” means a conviction for,
(a) an offence in respect of which a pardon has been granted under the Criminal Records Act (Canada) and has not been revoked; or
(b) an offence in respect of any provincial enactment.
5In de Pelham v. Mytrak Health Systems, 2009 HRTO 172 at paras 6 and 9, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether the ground of “record of offences” applies to someone who has been charged with a criminal offence:
Mr. de Pelham argues that notwithstanding the definition provided in the Code, I should give “record of offences” a broader meaning, to include situations in which an individual has been charged with a criminal offence.
The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and provides that “record of offences” covers only persons convicted of an offence. It is true that the Code is an important public policy statute and must be given a large, liberal and purposive interpretation, but this does not mean that the Tribunal can depart from the express provisions of the legislation.
6In this case, the applicant does not allege that he was convicted of a criminal offence, for which he subsequently received a pardon, which is the only basis on which the Tribunal has jurisdiction with respect to allegations relating to such offences. The applicant’s allegations do not relate to that ground and are, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
7The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 7^th^ day of August, 2015.
“Signed by”
Laurie Letheren
Vice-chair

