Pobuda v. Allen Vanguard Corporation, 2014 HRTO 898

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Tanya Pobuda Applicant

-and-

Allen Vanguard Corporation and John Carson Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Sheri D. Price Date: June 18, 2014 Citation: 2014 HRTO 898 Indexed as: Pobuda v. Allen Vanguard Corporation

1This is an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code"), alleging discrimination and/or harassment with respect to employment on the basis of sex and family status. In the Application, the applicant alleges, among other things, that she was sexually harassed by her manager, the personal respondent, while employed by the corporate respondent, and that her employment was terminated on July 25, 2013 in whole or in part because the applicant was not open to the personal respondent's alleged advances.

REQUEST TO DEFER

2In addition to her human rights Application, the applicant filed a wrongful dismissal action against the respondent employer in Small Claims Court. The civil claim does not allege that the respondents harassed and/or discriminated against the applicant because of her sex and/or family status. Rather, it claims that the corporate respondent terminated the applicant's employment without reasonable notice. It also claims damages for alleged misrepresentation as to the nature of the employment the corporate respondent offered to the applicant at the time of hiring; as well as damages for loss of a bonus at the applicant's former employment.

3In its Response to the Application, the respondents request that the Tribunal defer consideration of the Application pending the resolution of the applicant's wrongful dismissal action. The respondents submit that there is a significant overlap between the issues in the civil action and the human rights Application and that allowing the civil action and the human rights Application to proceed concurrently creates a risk of inconsistent decisions on the reasons for the applicant's termination, among other things.

4The applicant opposes deferral of the Application. She submits that the issues in the wrongful dismissal action and the human rights Application are completely different and that the request to defer is merely an attempt by the respondents to delay this process.

5The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1). Deferral of an application seeks to ensure that proceedings dealing with the same facts or issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law.

6In my view, the issues in the civil claim and the human rights Application are quite distinct. The central issue in the Application is whether the applicant experienced sexual discrimination and/or harassment during the course of her employment with the respondents and upon the termination of her employment. These are not issues in the proceeding before the Small Claims Court. The issue before the Small Claims Court appears to be whether the corporate respondent provided the applicant with reasonable notice upon the termination of her employment. This is not an issue in the human rights Application, nor does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to address claims that an employee has been dismissed without reasonable notice of termination.

7The respondents contend that the reason for the termination of the applicant's employment is an issue in both the civil claim and the human rights Application. However, in the civil action, the respondents plead that the applicant's employment was terminated without cause. Accordingly, it is not clear to me that the reason for the applicant's termination is an issue to be determined in the civil action.

8In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that deferral of the Application is warranted. Even if the facts and issues in the Application and the civil action overlap to some extent, I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate to defer the Application to the civil proceeding, since the applicant's human rights allegations will not be addressed in the civil proceeding. In the absence of a real risk of inconsistent findings on the issues in the human rights Application, deferring the Application would be inconsistent with the Tribunal's mandate of ensuring the fair, just and expeditious resolution of Applications. See St. Louis v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2010 HRTO 1637; Pal v. 723736 Ontario, 2010 HRTO 1759; Glen v. York Regional Police, 2010 HRTO 1916.

9For the above reasons, I find that it would not be appropriate to defer consideration of the Application. The Application will continue in the Tribunal's process.

10I am not seized.