Carol v. Shiu Pong Management, 2014 HRTO 892

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Alvaro Jose Carol

Applicant

-and-

Shiu Pong Management and York Region Standard Condominium Corporation 1190

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Maureen Doyle

Date: June 17, 2014

Citation: 2014 HRTO 892

Indexed as: Carol v. Shiu Pong Management

Introduction

1The purpose of this Interim Decision is to address the respondents’ request to remove the individual respondents and Shiu Pong Management as parties to this Application.

BACKGROUND

2The applicant runs a business at premises owned by the respondent York Region Standard Condominium Corporation 1190 (YRSCC). He alleges discrimination on the basis of place of origin and ethnic origin and alleges that the respondent York Region Standard Condominium Corporation treated him differently because of his Peruvian origin. The individual respondents are members of the Board of Directors of YRSCC.

Request to Remove the Individual Respondents

3Rule 1.7(b) of the Tribunal’s Rules provides that the Tribunal may add or remove a party. In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 14 at para. 42, the Tribunal set out the general principles that apply to this issue:

The unnecessary naming of personal respondents is a practice to be discouraged, as this serves to unnecessarily add to the complexity of proceedings and can often operate as a roadblock to resolution. Pursuant to section 45(1) of the Code, a corporation is deemed to be liable for “any act or thing done or omitted to be done in the course of his or her employment by an officer, official, employee or agent”. Where there is no issue as to the ability of a corporate respondent to respond to or remedy an alleged Code infringement and no issue raised as to a corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the actions of an individual who is sought to be added as a personal respondent, then in my view the individual ought not be added as a personal respondent in the absence of some compelling juridical reason. A compelling juridical reason may exist, for example, where it is the individual conduct of a proposed personal respondent that is a central issue as opposed to actions which are more in the nature of following organizational practices or policies or where the nature of the alleged conduct of a proposed personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found.

4The Tribunal further expanded on these principles in Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31 at para. 5:

Applying these principles to the Tribunal’s power to remove a personal respondent from a proceeding, the following non-exhaustive list of factors may be helpful in assessing whether a personal respondent should be removed:

1. Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?

2. Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who sought to be removed?

3. Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?

4. Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?

5. Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?

In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.

5The respondents submit that the individual respondents were at all times acting in the course of their mandate as members of the Board of Directors of YRSCC and that there is no issue with respect to the YRSCC’s responsibility for the actions of its Board of Directors. It submits that there is no compelling reason to continue the proceeding as against the individual respondents.

6The respondents also submit that Shiu Pong Management was acting under the authority and direction of YRSCC and that there is “no issue with respect to YRSCC 1190’s responsibility for….Shiu Pong”. They submit that there is no compelling reason to continue the proceeding as against Shiu Pong Management.

7The applicant has not filed submissions in respect of the issue of removal of respondents.

8With respect to the individual respondents, I agree with the respondents’ submissions. In my view, considering all the circumstances, it is not necessary to involve Rajeev Narang, Ramesh Gupta and Parminder Saini as individual respondents in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the Application.

9The respondents’ request to remove Rajeev Narang, Ramesh Gupta and Parminder Saini as individual respondents to the Application is therefore granted. The style of cause shall be amended accordingly.

10At this point, it appears that allegations have been made against Shui Pong Management which could lead to a finding that it has violated the Code. It appears that the conduct of Shui Pong Management may be central to the allegations made. Accordingly, at this time, the respondents’ request to remove Shui Pong Management as a respondent is denied.

ORDERS

11The Tribunal orders as follows:

1. The respondents’ request to remove Rajeev Narang, Ramesh Gupta and Parminder Saini as individual respondents to the Application is granted and the style of cause is amended accordingly.

2. The respondents’ request to remove Shiu Pong Management as a respondent to the Application is denied.

12I am not seized of this matter.